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In the past decade, numerous governments had to adjust their fiscal balance, as a 
result of the Great Recession and most recently due to the fall in commodity prices. In 
Chapter 1, I construct a novel dataset to estimate the revenue-raising potential and 
expenditure-cutting space for 129 countries, and decompose their fiscal consolidation 
capacity into specific tax and spending categories. Then, I compare the estimated 
fiscal potential with the consolidation required to stabilize the debt ratio. Finally, I 
show that the estimated fiscal consolidation capacity in 2007 helps to predict (i) the 
size of fiscal stimulus in response to the crisis, and (ii) the GDP costs associated with 
the downturn. 
In Chapter 2, I employ a quantitative general equilibrium model with heterogeneous 
agents, occupational choice, endogenous labor supply, and growth to study the 
implications for the US of the higher debt to GDP ratio that would result from 
delaying the adjustment of its medium term budgetary imbalance. I find that 
compared to a scenario where the debt ratio is stabilized in 2011, postponing the 
  
adjustment for twenty-five years would entail a permanent output loss of 22 percent 
and a fall in welfare of 13 percent in consumption equivalent terms. Moreover, when 
the transitional dynamics are considered, I find that once the debt ratio exceeds 100 
percent of GDP, the welfare losses from further delays in the adjustment exceed the 
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Chapter 1:  
Revenue and Expenditure Gaps - A Cross Country Analysis 
1. Introduction 
At any point in time, governments may require additional resources either to meet 
development goals, improve infrastructure, increase human capital, or adjust their 
fiscal balance. However, some countries might not be able to meet their aspirations 
given their fundamentals. In this paper I calculate the fiscal consolidation potential 
for 129 countries, and decompose the estimated fiscal potential into specific tax and 
spending categories. 
I compute each country’s additional revenue capacity and expenditure-cutting space 
as the difference between observed and expected revenues and expenditures (as a 
share of GDP), considering the country’s economic and demographic characteristics. 
To have reasonable benchmarks, I first estimate the determinants of government’s 
revenues and expenditures, and then compute the expected values from these 
estimates. The capacity for fiscal consolidation is then estimated as the sum of 
potential revenue increases and expenditure cuts that are feasible given the country’s 
characteristics. 
By construction, the expected revenues and expenditures are simply the conditional 
averages of observed in-sample values, and do not correspond to the maximum 
possible revenues (which would require a Laffer-curve-type of analysis) or the 
minimum possible expenditures (which entails political economy or efficiency 
considerations).1 Thus, the fitted values may be understood as the expected revenues 
and expenditures for a given country, if its fiscal effort was the same as in other 
countries with similar fundamentals. 
This implies that the true fiscal potential could be underestimated by this 
methodology, as it is not uncommon that in the wake of a crisis countries manage to 
undertake massive fiscal efforts, as confirmed by the experiences in Ireland, Spain, 
and Portugal after the global financial crisis. However, this indicator of fiscal 
                                                 
1 In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office routinely evaluates the adequacy of different 
sub-categories of revenues and expenditures by comparing them to their long run averages (see for 
example CBO 2017). However, long-run averages might not be reasonable benchmarks if the 
conditions in a country have changed (or are expected to change in the future), for example due to tax 






consolidation capacity might be more realistic, given the political constraints of fiscal 
policy, as the government shutdowns in the United States attest. 
Earlier works have conducted this type of analysis for revenues, using the IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database. However, they have not 
decomposed the estimated revenue potential into specific policy instruments (taxes). 
Moreover, apart from Afonso et. al. (2005), I am not aware of other works that have 
attempted to estimate the expenditure-cutting space −a crucial element of the fiscal 
consolidation plans implemented by various European governments.2 
To overcome some of these limitations, in this paper I construct a novel dataset that 
combines data from GFS and IMF’s country reports (Article IV consultations and 
revisions to ongoing programs). The dataset contains a complete decomposition of 
government’s revenue and expenditure from 2005 until 2016 (as a share of GDP) for 
168 countries. Revenues are decomposed into seven sub-categories: (1) taxes on 
personal income and profits, (2) other taxes (includes property taxes), (3) payroll 
taxes, (4) taxes on consumption, (5) taxes on international trade, (6) grants, and (7) 
other non-tax revenues. Expenditures are decomposed into four sub-categories: (1) 
government consumption (includes the compensation of employees and the purchase 
of goods and services), (2) interest payments, (3) transfers and subsidies (includes 
grants and social security benefits), and (4) gross acquisition of nonfinancial assets 
(gross public investment).3 
I then estimate the determinants of revenues and expenditures both overall and for 
each of the sub-categories. I find that revenues and expenditures can be reasonably 
explained by variables that broadly fall into three classes: (i) measures of the stage of 
development, (ii) demographic characteristics, and (iii) indicators of the structure of 
the economy. In particular, I find that countries with a higher level of development, 
elevated dependency ratios, and a larger share of net oil and gas exports tend to have 
higher revenues and expenditures. Compared to the rest of the world, European 
countries have higher revenues from payroll and from consumption taxes, Sub-
Saharan African countries from taxes to trade and Middle Eastern countries from non-
tax revenues. Sub-Saharan African and Middle Eastern countries have higher 
government consumption outlays explained by elevated wage bills. European and 
Middle Eastern countries have higher transfers and subsidies, although in the former 
                                                 
2 The October 2016 IMF’s Fiscal Monitor estimated that 60 percent of the planned fiscal consolidation 
in advanced economies with debt-to-GDP ratios above 60 percent or cumulative fiscal adjustment 
higher than 3 percent of GDP would come from the expenditure side. 
3 These spending categories correspond to the so-called economic classification, as opposed to the 
functional classification (defense, education, health, social security and housing, economic services, 
other government services, and interests). The economic classification is preferred in this document 






these are mostly explained by pension benefits and in the latter by subsidies (e.g. 
food, energy). 
Since revenues from grants, non-tax sources, and taxes to international trade might 
not be under the control of the policy maker, the additional revenue-raising capacity 
is estimated as the sum of the additional revenue capacity from personal income and 
profit taxes, property taxes, consumption taxes, and payroll taxes. Similarly, the 
expenditure-cutting space is computed as the sum of the cutting space in government 
consumption, social expenditures, and public investment (as the interest bill might not 
be easily modifiable). 
To get a sense of the potential for fiscal consolidation to address fiscal sustainability, 
I compare the estimated fiscal consolidation capacity to an estimate of the fiscal 
adjustment needed to stabilize each country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. I make two 
assumptions to minimize the effects of any short run (cyclical) considerations. First, 
long-run (potential) growth equals the predicted GDP growth for five years in the 
future as published in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO).4 Second, the 
long-run interest rate equals the rate implied by the predicted debt service in WEO 
five years in the future (which in turn is a weighted average of the predicted rates of 
all concessional and non-concessional loans for all maturities). 
Finally, I show that the estimated fiscal consolidation capacity in 2007 can be used to 
predict (i) the size of the fiscal stimulus in response to the Great Recession, and (ii) 
the real cost from the crisis. I find that countries with a large consolidation capacity in 
2007 had less fiscal space at the time of the crisis, and so were less likely to respond 
to the negative external shock, and as a result had a slower recovery −which 
translated into larger output costs from the crisis. This occurs because a high 
consolidation capacity means that a country either overspends or undertaxes (or both) 
relative to its peers, which translates into less space for a fiscal stimulus −as it would 
be difficult to further cut taxes or raise spending. 
 
A large fiscal consolidation capacity means that a county has ample room to raise 
(cut) various revenue (expenditure) categories, but it also means that it has less space 
for expansionary fiscal policy (which was exactly the required policy response in 
2008). Hence, the findings in this paper highlight the importance for countries with 
large consolidation potential and fiscal needs to adjust their public finances to rebuild 
the fiscal space that would allow them to better respond to the next crisis. 
  
                                                 
4 This assumes that five years in the future (the maximum projection period in WEO), economic 







Previous works have estimated the determinants of government’s revenue 
performance (as a share of GDP) applying panel data techniques to the IMF’s GFS 
database. For example, Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) employ a stochastic frontier 
analysis to estimate tax efforts. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) analyze whether 
countries eventually recover the lost revenues from trade liberalization reforms. 
Gupta et. al. (2012) find that foreign grants displace domestic tax revenues as 
opposed to concessional loans. The most recent Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-
Saharan Africa (May 2018) estimates tax efforts for countries in the region and 
attempts to draw lessons from successful fiscal consolidation episodes. 
However, even though widely used, GFS data has two problems. First, although in 
principle it has data for about 150 countries from 1980 until 2016 (for the central 
government, sub-national governments, and general government), in practice the 
coverage varies widely across countries. For example, for 2016 there was data for 
only about 110 countries and for 2017 only four countries have reported data. In fact, 
only about 100 countries have consistently reported data since 2005 either for the 
central or general government.5 Second, the reported values are commonly mistaken 
as they differ markedly from those published in WEO and IMF’s country reports.6 
Moreover, previous papers have only focused on aggregate revenue, and thus have 
not decomposed the estimated revenue potential into specific policy instruments 
(taxes). Furthermore, apart from Afonso et. al. (2005), there have not been recent 
estimates of the expenditure-cutting space, although spending reductions are the 
cornerstone of most European consolidation plans currently being implemented.7 
                                                 
5 Furthermore, prior to the GFS 2001 manual, fiscal statistics were reported on a cash basis following 
the GFS 1986 manual. Starting in 2002 countries gradually started to report their statistics on an 
accrual basis. Nonetheless, about 40 percent of sample countries still report their statistics on a cash 
basis. Also, about 10 percent of the countries only report statistics for the central government. In other 
words, only about half of the sample countries report fiscal statistics for the general government on an 
accrual basis (moreover, the degree of coverage of the general government also varies significantly 
across countries). 
6 Since country reports result from detailed discussions between IMF’s staff and country authorities 
these statistics are presumably more reliable. For further discussion see Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). 
7 Afonso et. al. (2005) estimate potential expenditure savings for 23 industrialized countries based on a 
public performance indicator that averages the outcomes of what they consider to be the objectives of 
the government (income distribution, stability of GDP growth, inflation, GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
unemployment rate, enrollment rates in secondary school, educational attainment as measured by the 
math and science scores in the PISA report, infant mortality, life expectancy, and quality of 
infrastructure). They compute the expected savings in public expenditures as the distance to the 
minimum spending that could produce the same level of output (same level of the performance 







To overcome these limitations, I construct a new database that combines GFS data 
with IMF’s country reports (see further details in the appendix), where I decompose 
for 168 countries the government’s revenues and expenditures from 2005 until 2016 
(as a share of GDP).8 The list of countries in the dataset is presented in Table 1.1. To 
ease the comparisons across countries, these are further classified into one of four 
income categories from the World Bank (based on the gross national income per 
capita in USD according to the Atlas method −which employs five-year averages of 
the exchange rate to avoid excessive fluctuations in the indicator). 
Unfortunately, 84 of the countries in the sample (presented in Table 1.2) only report 
fiscal statistics for the central government, and others only report their statistics on a 
cash basis. Some papers have attempted to solve this inconsistency by excluding all 
countries that do not report statistics for the general government on an accrual basis, 
which implies restricting the analysis to a small sample of advanced countries.9 Other 
works instead only take the information from the central government for all countries. 
However, this offers an incomplete analysis of the fiscal position in most countries 
(especially for those that are highly decentralized). 
In this paper, I incorporate all available information (cash or accrual, general 
government or central government) and attempt to limit the effects of these problems 
in two ways: first, by using a dummy variable for countries that only report statistics 
for the central government as a candidate explanatory variable for the government’s 
revenues and expenditures; and second, by repeating the analysis with a restricted 
sample that only includes the more advanced (richest) countries in the sample (which 
presumably have better statistics). The results suggest that the methodological 
differences in the fiscal statistics (in terms of coverage and accounting basis) are not 
too important for the analysis, since the dummy variable is never significant in any of 
the revenue or expenditure regressions (possibly because it is correlated with the 
country’s level of development), but also because the estimated revenue potential and 
expenditure-cutting space are quite similar when using the complete or restricted 
sample.10 
                                                 
8 Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2012, 2013) construct a similar dataset for about 60 countries by 
combining GFS with OECD data to investigate the effects on per-capita growth of changes in tax 
composition and of a public expenditure reallocation. 
9 Accrual accounting provides a better picture of government balances as it reflects all the revenues 
and expenditures that were actually earned and incurred during the reporting period. For example, 
revenues on an accrual basis often occur before actual cash is received from the taxpayers. Moreover, 
it avoids the temptation for governments to delay payments to artificially lower the (cash) deficit by 
the end of the fiscal year. 
10 As could be expected based on these findings, the results (not shown) are similar if the countries 






For each country in the dataset, revenues are decomposed into seven sub-categories: 
(1) taxes on personal income and profits, (2) other taxes, (3) payroll taxes, (4) taxes 
on consumption, (5) taxes on international trade, (6) grants, and (7) other non-tax 
revenues. The first sub-category pools together personal and corporate income taxes 
because only in more advanced economies is a complete decomposition of these taxes 
available. The second sub-category includes revenues from property taxes, stamp 
taxes, taxes to financial transactions, and any other unexplained tax revenues. The last 
sub-category includes royalties, proceeds from capital income (interest and 
dividends), and the sale of goods and services. To aid the comparison across 
countries, corporate tax revenues directly related to natural resources were 
reclassified in the dataset as other non-tax revenues.11 The observed revenues for each 
sub-category in 2016 (as a share of GDP) are presented in Table 2.1 through Table 
2.4. 
Figure 1: Median revenues by income level in 2016 (percent of GDP) 
 
  
                                                 



























low lowmid highmid high
































Expenditures are decomposed into four sub-categories: (1) government consumption, 
(2) interest payments, (3) transfers and subsidies, and (4) gross acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets. The first sub-category includes all wages and salaries paid to 
public employees including social security contributions made by the employer, and 
the consumption of goods and services. The third sub-category pools together social 
security benefits, grants, subsidies, and other unexplained expenditures, because in 
most countries the information for each of these sub-components is not available. The 
last sub-category comprises gross public investment (including depreciation costs, as 
net investment is only available for advanced countries). The observed expenditures 
for each sub-category in 2016 (as a share of GDP) are presented in Table 3.1 through 
Table 3.4. 
The medians in 2016 by income level for each of the revenue sub-categories are 
presented in Figure 1. It can be readily observed that countries with a higher income 
level also have higher revenues as a share of GDP. These are explained by higher 
income taxes, payroll taxes, other taxes, consumption taxes, and non-tax revenues. 
However, as countries become richer, they receive fewer revenues from taxes to 
international trade (lower tariffs). Poorer countries do not have payroll taxes, since in 
general they do not have social security systems in place. Richer countries do not 
receive grants, except for some eastern European countries that receive cohesion 
funds from the EU. 












































Similarly, the medians in 2016 by income level for each of the expenditure sub-
categories are presented in Figure 2. Countries with a higher income level also have 
higher expenditures as a share of GDP. These are explained by higher government 
consumption, interest payments, and social benefits. Interestingly, gross public 
investment falls as countries become richer, which might reflect the fact that more 
developed countries already have a large stock of public capital (and thus the 
marginal product of public capital is smaller) or that in these countries the private 
sector executes some of these investments (by means of public-private partnerships).12 
3. Estimation of expected revenues and expenditures 
The determinants of government’s revenues and expenditures are estimated, using 
annual data for a balanced panel of 129 countries from 2005 to 2016, with the 
following specification: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 +  𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes overall revenues or expenditures or one of its sub-categories (as a 
share of GDP) for country 𝑖𝑖 in period 𝑡𝑡. 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are explanatory variables used in 
previous studies, such as in Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), Afonso et. al. (2005), and 
Rodrik (1998). Data for the explanatory variables are taken from the IMF, World 
Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, and United Nations (see further details in the 
appendix). To limit endogeneity issues, the explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year (so that the data for the explanatory variables goes from 2004 to 2015). 
The regressions include yearly fixed effects 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 to control for global factors, but do not 
include country-specific fixed effects, as this would defeat the purpose of the exercise 
of trying to estimate the expected revenues or expenditures of a country with 
particular characteristics, which would otherwise be entirely captured by the country 
dummy. However, the regressions include regional dummies  𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 based on IMF area 
departments (presented in Table 1.3) to control for region-specific characteristics or 
fiscal preferences.13 The regressions employ standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated errors. 
3.1. Explanatory variables 
The log of the gross national income per capita is expected to be positively 
associated with revenues and expenditures. Public economic theory suggests that 
since the demand for public goods is income-elastic (Wagner’s law), more developed 
                                                 
12 The October 2014 IMF’s WEO argued that infrastructure is becoming increasingly inadequate in 
many advanced and emerging economies. It advocated for a debt-financed increase in public 
investment given the substantial economic slack that prevailed in most of these countries and the fact 
that interest rates are expected to remain relatively low for the foreseeable future. 






economies have a higher provision of public goods and thus are forced to impose 
higher effective tax rates (either via higher nominal rates or fewer exemptions). Also, 
in more developed countries: (i) the tax base is larger, (ii) the tax administration is 
more effective in implementing the tax code, and (iii) voluntary tax compliance is 
presumably higher as taxpayers are more educated, there are better institutions, and 
governments are usually perceived as less corrupt. 
The old-age dependency ratio measures the proportion of the population of retirement 
age as a share of the working age population. It is expected that the dependency ratio 
is positively correlated with revenues and expenditures, as countries would require 
higher revenues to finance additional age-related expenditures (such as health and 
pensions).14 
Political participation is measured by the turnout in the latest national election. The 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model predicts that under a voting system where the 
degree of fiscal redistribution is determined by the median voter, rising inequality 
should result in higher redistribution (as the median voter becomes relatively poorer 
than the average voter). In practice, more unequal countries tend to have less 
redistribution.15 One possible explanation, as explained by Benabou (1990) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), is that richer people (the elite) are more likely to 
vote and control the democratic process as they have higher incentives not to lose 
their dominant position. Thus, it is expected that in a system with higher political 
participation the elites are less likely to control the political outcome, and this should 
be associated with higher income redistribution (e.g. higher income taxes and social 
expenditures, but lower consumption taxes). 
Higher net oil and gas exports are expected to be associated with elevated 
expenditures (government consumption, social expenditures, and public investment) 
but also with lower tax revenues (as rich countries might not feel the need to tax their 
population to provide public services).16 Thus, it is expected that although resource 
rich countries have high overall revenues this is mostly explained by non-tax 
revenues as their tax intake tends to be low. 
                                                 
14 The youth dependency ratio (proportion of the population younger than 16 years as a share of the 
working age population) was also considered as an alternative control, but it was not found to be a 
significant determinant of revenue or expenditure. However, as expected it is correlated with higher 
government consumption (additional outlays related to education) and lower transfers and subsidies 
(lower spending in pensions). 
15 For example, the US has less redistribution than western Europe which has less redistribution than 
Scandinavian countries. 
16 It should be noted that since royalties and tax revenues directly related no natural resources are 
classified as non-tax revenues, oil and gas exports might be uncorrelated or even negatively correlated 






In countries with a higher ratio of imports to GDP, the tax base for taxes to 
international trade is larger, and thus proceeds from this tax should increase. 
The growth gap in year 𝑡𝑡 is defined as the difference between observed GDP growth 
in year 𝑡𝑡 and predicted growth in WEO for 2021 (used as a proxy for potential 
growth). This variable is intended to control for the effects of the business cycle.17 A 
common assumption for advanced economies is that revenues tend to be acyclical and 
expenditures countercyclical. However, as shown by Frankel et. al. (2016), fiscal 
policy tends to be procyclical in many developing countries. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to be positively correlated with interest payments, 
because for a given interest rate the debt service is costlier, and because the interest 
rate tends to rise with the debt ratio as the probability of default increases as in 
D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2017). 
It is expected that in countries with an outstanding IMF program (listed in Table 4) 
the government’s revenues from grants are higher, as a large share of program 
countries are eligible for concessional financing. 
The log of the annual gross minimum wage in USD (as reported by the Doing 
Business survey of the World Bank) is expected to be positively correlated with 
higher government spending, because in richer countries the average cost of 
providing services is higher, even after adjusting for purchasing power.18 It should 
also be noted that the minimum wage might also capture the quality of public 
services, which is presumably higher in more developed economies. 
Previous works have also included as explanatory variables the share of self-
employment or of agriculture in GDP to control for the difficulty to collect taxes, the 
inflation rate to control for seignorage revenue, the Gini coefficient to control for 
inequality, and various indexes to control for the quality of institutions. None of these 
additional variables was significant in any of the revenue or expenditure regressions 
and were thus not included in the baseline specification. Similarly, the debt ratio and 
minimum wage are not included in the regressions for revenues and the import ratio is 
excluded from the expenditure regressions, as they are never significant (as 
expected). 
                                                 
17 Very similar results are obtained if an output gap measure (estimated with a traditional HP filter) is 
used instead. The growth gap measure is preferred because output gap estimates tend to be sensitive to 
the sample period and the statistical technique used to “filter” the data. 
18 About 20 percent of the countries in the sample are considered “no minimum wage countries” in the 
Doing Business survey, either because they only have a minimum wage for the public sector or 
because they have different minimum wages for different sectors of the economy set by collective 
bargaining agreements. For these countries I employed the public sector minimum wage and when it 







The regressions for total revenue, for each of the sub-categories, and for domestic tax 
revenue (which excludes the proceeds from taxes to international trade, grants, and 
non-tax revenues, as they are not directly under the government’s control) are 
presented in Table 5.19 As expected, I find that more developed countries, as 
measured by income per capita, have higher revenues but receive fewer grants (as a 
share of GDP). The higher revenues are due to higher proceeds from income taxes, 
payroll taxes, and non-tax revenues. Interestingly, the results suggest that in more 
developed countries the revenues from consumption taxes are lower. Since domestic 
tax revenues are higher in more developed countries, these results suggest that these 
countries prefer direct taxes over indirect taxes, possibly because the latter are more 
regressive. An alternative explanation is that governments in poor countries rely more 
on VAT proceeds because, even though they also dislike their regressive nature, they 
are easier to administer. 
Domestic tax revenues (as a share of GDP) are higher in countries where GDP growth 
is above its long-run level, because of additional proceeds from taxes to goods and 
services and income taxes. All other revenue categories seem to be acyclical. 
Countries with elevated dependency ratios have higher domestic tax revenues, 
explained by additional proceeds from income, consumption, and payroll taxes. The 
former could be explained because older persons are richer and thus the tax base for 
wealth or income taxes would presumably be larger. However, the other results might 
seem counterintuitive, because if a country has an older population this would 
decrease its consumption and payroll tax bases (since old persons consume less, as 
shown in Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), and because a smaller share of 
the population would be working). However, it is important to note that the old-age 
ratio is also a proxy for spending pressures from age-related expenditures (pensions 
and health care). Thus, for the government’s budget constraint to hold, it must be true 
that countries with higher spending also have higher revenues.20 
Not surprisingly, countries with higher net exports of oil and gas have higher total 
revenues since their non-tax revenues are larger. However, it interesting that they 
have less domestic tax revenues (due to lower taxes to income, consumption, and 
                                                 
19 Even though governments control tariff rates actual collections are mostly out of their control, as 
these are highly dependent on the exchange rate and on the economy’s openness (which is mostly a 
function of the country’s size and proximity to international markets). For countries whose major 
imports are oil and gas related, these are highly dependent on the international prices. For countries 
that import intermediate goods to be re-exported after some process, these will mostly depend on the 
demand for the processed good from its trading partners. 
20 In other words, it might be the case that an aging population per se would lower the tax base and 
reduce revenues, but to maintain its fiscal balance the government reacts by raising its effective tax 






international trade), which implies that the proceeds from the sale of natural resources 
tend to displace traditional tax revenue sources. In other words, resource-rich 
countries can afford lower taxes, which are undesirable but necessary in poorer 
countries. 
As expected, in countries with a higher ratio of imports to GDP, the base for taxes to 
trade is larger and thus the revenues from this category are higher. In countries with 
higher political participation, the proceeds from income taxes are higher, which 
should increase the redistribution of resources (consumption taxes are also higher, but 
their magnitude is less than proportional, and in any case a sizeable proportion of 
these proceeds are from the consumption by richer persons). In countries with an 
outstanding IMF program the government’s revenue from grants is higher, which 
highlights the fact that a high share of these countries receives concessional 
financing. It is important to note that these grants do not seem to have a significant 
impact on revenues from other categories. 
Compared to the rest of the world, countries in the Middle East and Central Asia 
(MCD) tend to have elevated non-tax revenues; countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(AFR) receive more revenues from taxes to international trade; and countries in 
Europe (EUR) have higher proceeds from payroll and consumption taxes.21 
To further investigate the cyclical behavior of revenues, Table 5.1 compares the 
estimated coefficient for the growth gap explanatory variable in the baseline 
regression (presented in Table 5) with those obtained in a regression that interacts 
this variable with dummy variables for low, middle and high-income countries while 
maintaining all other explanatory variables unchanged. The results suggest that the 
revenues from domestic taxes, taxes to goods and services and income taxes are 
procyclical in low and middle-income countries, but acyclical in high-income 
countries. Table 5.2 presents the correlation of the estimated residuals, which 
validates the OLS estimation (compared to a SUR) as the different revenue categories 
do not appear to be correlated. 
3.3. Expenditures 
The regressions for total expenditures, for each of the sub-categories, and for primary 
expenditures (which excludes interest payments as they are not directly controllable 
by the government) are presented in Table 6. 
I find that countries have additional outlays (as a share of GDP) when they have: (i) a 
higher income per-capita (as predicted by Wagner’s law), as it is associated with 
higher spending in transfers and subsidies, (ii) elevated dependency ratios, which 
result in additional age-related spending (in health and pensions), (iii) more political 
participation, which induces additional expenditure for redistribution (in transfers and 
                                                 






subsidies and in government consumption 22), (iv) higher debt ratios, as their interest 
payments escalate, and (v) larger oil and gas exports, which are also associated with 
higher spending for redistribution and with increases in public investment. 
Government consumption is higher in countries that provide higher quality public 
services (as proxied by the minimum wage), and in countries with higher political 
participation or larger oil and gas proceeds. 
Spending on transfers and subsidies is higher (as a share of GDP) in countries that: (i) 
are more developed, (ii) have elevated dependency ratios, (iii) have more political 
participation, and (iv) have higher oil and gas exports. The former is explained 
because social security systems tend to be more generous and cover a higher 
proportion of the population in advanced countries. In fact, poorer countries typically 
have no social security schemes in place, but only poorly designed subsidies (e.g. for 
food and fuel) that could have a higher impact if better targeted (IMF 2016a). 
Public investment is elevated in countries: (i) with higher growth, (ii) with more 
revenues from oil and gas, and (iii) that receive more grants (as they are commonly 
attached to a specific use or project). This suggests that most countries invest more in 
good times (public investment appears to be highly pro-cyclical). This may be 
explained by the fact that for most countries access to international capital markets is 
quite restricted and even erratic.23 A competing explanation might be that if growth 
shocks are serially correlated the marginal product of capital would be higher in fast-
growing economies. 
I find that, compared to the rest of the world, Middle Eastern (MCD) and European 
(EUR) countries tend to have higher spending on transfers and subsidies, although 
these outlays are mainly explained by pension benefits in the latter and by subsidies 
in the former. Sub-Saharan African (AFR) and Middle Eastern (MCD) countries have 
high government consumption due to elevated public wage bills.24 In fact, in many of 
these countries the government is the biggest formal employer as a large fraction of 
the population is self-employed (see for example, Behar and Mok 2013). 
                                                 
22 Woo et. al. (2016) find in a panel of 17 OECD countries that increases in the public-sector wage bill 
tend to be associated with lower inequality. 
23 This is problematic, as this behavior can exacerbate the real costs of negative shocks as countries are 
forced to cut their investment exactly at a time where it would be ideal to conduct counter-cyclical 
policies, as they cannot get sufficient funding. Furthermore, this behavior can also induce significant 
cost overruns in large projects (which last several years) if work needs to be halted due to the absence 
of funding. It is important to note that although private investment is optimally procyclical, a 
countercyclical fiscal policy is optimal because it allows further consumption smoothing for credit 
constrained individuals who cannot self-insure. 
24 This is consistent with the notion that poor countries (primarily in Africa and the Middle East) tend 







To deepen the analysis of the cyclical behavior of expenditures, Table 6.1 compares 
the estimated coefficient for the growth gap explanatory variable in the baseline 
regression (presented in Table 6) with those from a regression that interacts this 
variable with dummies for income level while maintaining all other explanatory 
variables unchanged. The results suggest that primary spending and outlays on 
transfers and subsidies are procyclical in low-income countries, acyclical in middle-
income countries, and countercyclical in high-income countries. Thus, in poorer 
countries social spending becomes more generous during good times, while in 
advanced economies it is governed by automatic stabilizers (e.g. during good times 
less persons qualify for government assistance). The results for public investment are 
instead puzzling as they seem to suggest that it is countercyclical in poor countries 
but procyclical in rich countries.  
Table 6.2 presents the correlation of the estimated residuals, which validate the OLS 
estimation (compared to a SUR) as the different spending categories do not appear to 
be correlated. 
4. Fiscal gaps and adjustment needs 
 
4.1. Fiscal gaps 
Based on the above regressions, Table 7.1 through Table 7.4 present the estimated 
gaps for domestic tax revenues (taxgap) and primary expenditures (primgap) for 2016 
(as a share of GDP), defined as the difference between observed and fitted values 
from the regressions.25 A negative revenue gap for a particular country indicates that 
the observed revenues (as a share of GDP) from that particular sub-category are 
below what would be expected, taking into account the country’s observable 
characteristics. Thus, in principle, this country could raise additional revenue from 
this sub-category.26 Similarly, a positive expenditure gap means that given its 
characteristics a country is spending more than expected in that particular sub-
category, and thus it might have some cutting space.  
                                                 
25 Other works instead present their results in terms of an “effort index”, computed as the ratio between 
observed and expected values. In this paper I present the results in terms of gaps (as a share of GDP), 
first because they are easier to understand, but more importantly to make the estimated fiscal 
consolidation capacity comparable to the adjustment needs. For example, an effort index of 160 per 
cent of tax revenues might imply a very different fiscal consolidation capacity depending on how large 
current revenues and expenditures are as a share of GDP. 
26 These measures should not be confused with revenue gap estimates that compare observed revenues 
to those that would be possible if all agents fully complied with the letter and spirit of the law (for the 
United Kingdom see HMRC 2017). The problem with these estimates is that they are implicitly 
measuring the size of the shadow economy or the effect of tax heavens, and thus it is not quite clear 
how much of this theoretical compliance gap is recoverable. Moreover, as the law could be changed, 






The fiscal gap is defined as the sum of the revenue-raising potential and expenditure-
cutting space: 
                           𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                    (2) 
For example, I find that Ireland, Switzerland and Iraq could potentially increase their 
tax revenues by about 10 pp of GDP.  Lebanon, Croatia and Mauritius could augment 
their income tax revenues by around 5 pp of GDP. Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and 
Israel could raise their payroll tax revenues by about 5 pp of GDP. Liberia, the US 
and Belgium could augment their revenues from consumption taxes by about 5 pp of 
GDP.27 Argentina, Saudi Arabia and France could presumably reduce their primary 
expenditures by about 10 pp of GDP. Brazil, Liberia and Australia could decrease 
their government consumption by around 9 pp of GDP. France, Argentina, and India 
could reduce their spending in transfers and subsidies by about 8 pp of GDP. Bolivia, 
Tajikistan, and Algeria could lower their public investment by about 8 pp of GDP. 
Although it is interesting to analyze results for given revenue or expenditure sub-
categories, as they reflect countries’ fiscal preferences, it is better to focus on the 
overall gaps and not on individual sub-categories. For example, a given country may 
have low income taxes that are compensated by high revenues from consumption 
taxes (as in Argentina or Mauritius). Overall, tax revenue may be adequate, even if 
the composition is atypical or unfair. It would certainly be mistaken to argue that 
these countries should necessarily increase their income taxes because they are low, 
compared to peers, while ignoring the fact consumption taxes are higher than 
expected.28 Similar arguments could be made for expenditures.29 
Moreover, analyzing specific categories could miss policy changes where one type of 
revenue or spending category is replaced by another. For example, Table 8 presents 
selected countries where the negative correlation between the estimated revenue or 
spending gaps for specific sub-categories is quite large and could indicate policy 
changes. It should be noted however, that even if this realignment across categories is 
caused by chance and not by specific policies, analyzing changes to specific sub-
                                                 
27 Belgium is an interesting case because although its standard VAT rate is 21%, which is higher than 
the OECD average, it has reduced rates (of 0%, 6% and 12%) for an important number of goods and 
services which erode the overall intake. 
28 For example, in Denmark the social security system is financed through income taxes and not with 
payroll taxes. Thus, their revenues from income taxes are abnormally elevated while their payroll taxes 
are unusually low. Something similar occurs in Iceland, where the payroll tax is only paid by 
employers. 
29 For example, in Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the Slovak Republic, spending is lower 
than expected on wages and higher in transfers and subsidies, as public employment in the health 






categories could miss the fact that overall revenues or spending might remain 
adequate due to the re-alignment. 
To address these aggregation issues, the gaps for domestic tax revenues and primary 
expenditures are estimated in two ways: first, from the direct regression for this sub-
category, and secondly as the sum of the estimated gaps from the regression of each 
of its sub-components. Using these estimates, it is possible to obtain an interval (not 
shown) representing a plausible range of estimates for these gaps. For the estimated 
revenue and expenditure gaps, the median absolute difference between the two 
measures is 0.71 and 0.85 pp of GDP, and the correlations between the two measures 
are 95 and 96 percent, respectively. The revenue and expenditure gaps reported in 
Table 7.1 through Table 7.4 are computed as the midpoint of these intervals. The 
estimated revenue and expenditure gaps are then decomposed into their sub-
components, where the relative magnitudes of the gaps estimated from the regression 
for each sub-category are preserved, but their sum is conditioned to equal the overall 
revenue or expenditure gap. 
Even focusing independently on the estimated revenue or expenditure gap is 
problematic, as it misses the obvious fact that due to the existence of the 
government’s budget constraint, the estimated revenue and expenditure gaps are 
positively correlated.30 Therefore, its best to analyze the estimated fiscal gaps that 
encompass all the revenue and expenditure information. A country with average 
revenues and expenditures for a given set of characteristics would appear to have no 
additional fiscal consolidation capacity (a fiscal gap of zero). A negative fiscal gap 
means that if a given country closed its revenue and expenditure gaps (if its revenues 
and expenditures were the same as the conditional average of its peers), its fiscal 
balance would deteriorate. A positive value shows the extent of improvement in the 
fiscal balance that would be possible to achieve given the country’s characteristics (its 
fiscal consolidation capacity). 
For example, the estimated revenue gap for Paraguay is -0.7. Hence, it could 
presumably raise its revenues by 0.7 pp of GDP, as its revenues from income and 
other taxes are around 1.9 and 0.6 pp below its peers, while its revenues from payroll 
and taxes to goods and services are 1.5 and 0.3 pp higher than expected. The 
estimated expenditure gap implies that Paraguay should be able to cut its expenditures 
by 0.5 pp of GDP given its characteristics and the spending of its peers. This is 
explained by the fact that its government consumption expenditures and public 
investment are 1.7 and 0.1 pp above the average of its peers, while its spending in 
transfers and subsidies is 1.2 pp lower than expected. Overall, the estimated fiscal gap 
for Paraguay for 2016 is 1.2 pp of GDP. Hence, about 60 percent of its fiscal gap is 
explained by its revenue-raising capacity. Both the size and composition of the fiscal 
                                                 
30 In other words, countries with higher revenues would also spend more both in absolute terms and 






gap vary significantly across countries and change gradually over time for a given 
country. 
It is important to note that the expected revenues (or expenditures) are generally 
below (above) a country’s maximum (minimum) historical values both for the total 
and for each of the sub-categories. Moreover, it is not clear that historical values are 
the correct benchmark to assess revenue-raising capacity or expenditure-cutting 
space. For example, nowadays most countries need to spend much more than in the 
past in health and pensions due to population aging. Figure 3 uses data from Vegh 
and Vuletin (2015), to show that while the standard VAT rate for the median country 
has marginally increased in the past three decades, the standard corporate rate and 
highest marginal personal income tax rates have sharply decreased.31 Thus, lower 
current revenues compared to history are not necessarily evidence of some unused 
potential. 
Figure 3: Median tax rates (percent) 
 
Similarly, if a country experienced a phase of unsustainable growth due to a real 
estate boom or a financial bubble, which resulted in very high but atypical tax 
revenues, it would be incorrect to deduce that this country has untapped (current) 
revenue potential just because it is collecting lower revenues than it used to, as those 
vigorous tax revenues may never return. Moreover, for some countries the estimated 
revenue potential might be above their own historical values, but the fact that it has 
never had such high revenues does not necessarily imply that the revenue potential is 
non-existent. Maybe such revenues were not possible in the past but are currently 
within reach given changes in the country’s characteristics. 
 
Reassuringly, the estimated fiscal gaps in this paper are broadly in line with previous 
country specific analyses and recommendations by IMF fiscal experts (see IMF 
(2010a) for a summary of policy prescriptions for fiscal consolidation for individual 
                                                 
31 The latter reflects the secular tendency of countries to lower their tax rates (for direct taxes) to 
become more competitive and attract foreign investment, due to the increased mobility of capital and 
rich individuals. For example, in the US the effective corporate tax rate fell from about 40 percent in 
































countries). For example, the IMF has argued that Mexico and Indonesia could 
increase their fiscal revenues, and these countries indeed have negative estimated 
revenue gaps. The IMF has also argued that Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, Finland and 
South Africa could reduce their expenditures, and these countries indeed have 
positive estimated expenditure gaps. For specific revenue sub-categories IMF (2010a) 
argued that (i) Germany and Mexico could increase VAT revenues by eliminating the 
reduced VAT rate for particular items; (ii) Japan has a low statutory VAT rate 
compared to other countries; (iii) Italy has low VAT compliance compared to other 
OECD countries; (iv) Japan and Korea could augment personal income tax revenues 
by broadening their base (since they have relatively high top rates). The results in 
Table 7 confirm that Germany, Mexico, Japan, and Italy are estimated to have 
negative gaps for the taxes on goods and services, and that Korea and Japan have 
negative estimated gaps for the income tax. Naturally, the proposed methodology in 
this document cannot confirm whether the low revenues in these countries are due to 
low rates or low compliance, but the similarities with detailed country analyses are 
nonetheless encouraging.32 
4.2. Fiscal adjustment needs 
Since the size of the government is a political choice of its citizens (or their rulers), in 
this paper I refrain from any discussion of the optimal size of government, or the 
efficiency or fairness of the composition of revenues or expenditures. Instead I focus 
on the amount of fiscal consolidation required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
the medium run, recognizing that for some countries the debt ratios will continue to 
rise in the short run. 
Naturally, such consolidation is only a minimum requirement for debt sustainability. 
For example, this estimate completely abstracts from liquidity considerations, 
domestic financing constraints, the probability that negative shocks could derail debt 
sustainability and the question of the optimal debt level. This is important because in 
many countries the debt ratio is currently at historically elevated levels (in some cases 
even above wartime peaks), initially because of the Great Recession and more 
recently due to the fall of commodity prices. Thus, it might be optimal for some 
countries to reduce their indebtedness, and not just to stabilize the debt ratio. For 
example, the average debt ratio was 60 percent of GDP in advanced economies prior 
                                                 
32 The correlation between statutory tax rates from Vegh and Vuletin (2015) and from KPMG with the 
estimated fiscal gaps is about 25 percent for taxes to goods and services, 25 percent for payroll taxes 
and 40 percent for income taxes. The IMF introduced in 2013 a Tax Administration Diagnostic 
Assessment Tool (TADAT) to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country’s tax 
administration. About 50 countries have been assessed and the correlation with the estimated fiscal 
gaps for income taxes and for taxes to goods and services are about 35 and 30 percent (the assessments 







to the financial crisis and is currently about 110 percent.33 Moreover, this measure 
does not consider the expected increases in age-related expenditures (pensions and 
health) or unfunded contingent liabilities. For example, Table 9 shows that age-
related expenditures are expected to increase by about 1 percent on average in the 
next ten years. 34 
The primary balance 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 (as a share of GDP) that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio at 
level 𝑑𝑑 is: 
     𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 = (𝑖𝑖−𝑔𝑔)
(1+𝑔𝑔)
𝑑𝑑     (3) 
where 𝑖𝑖 is the nominal interest rate, and 𝑓𝑓 is the growth rate of nominal GDP 
(obviously the result does not vary if the real interest rate and real GDP growth are 
used instead). The nominal interest rate is computed for each country as the implied 
rate in their projected debt service, which in turn is a weighted average of the rates for 
all concessional and non-concessional domestic and foreign loans at all maturities. 
Thus, in a country with a high share of concessional financing the effective interest 
rate might be below the current market (marginal) rates. 
Since current growth and interest rates might be atypical in the short run, I instead 
proxy for their long run values to better reflect the country’s medium term fiscal 
adjustment needs (devoid of cyclical considerations). The long run nominal GDP 
growth rate is approximated by the predicted nominal growth for five years ahead in 
WEO. Similarly, the expected debt-to-GDP ratios and interest payments for five years 
in the future are also taken from WEO. Thus, the required fiscal adjustment is defined 
as the difference between the primary balance that would be required to stabilize the 
debt ratio at its projected level in 2021 and the observed primary balance in 2016. 
The estimated required fiscal adjustments (as a share of GDP) are presented in Table 
10.1 through Table 10.4.35 The distribution of the adjustment needs is skewed to the 
left (few countries have large fiscal needs). About 55 per cent of the countries have 
                                                 
33 According to the Spring 2018 Fiscal Monitor, current debt levels were last seen in the aftermath of 
World War II, with debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP in about one quarter of these countries. 
Similarly, in emerging market and middle-income economies, debt is at 50 percent of GDP on average, 
levels last seen during the 1980’s debt crisis, with debt exceeding 70 percent of GDP in one-fifth of 
these countries. In low-income developing countries, debt now exceeds 40 percent of GDP on average, 
almost half of which is non-concessional, with debt exceeding 60 percent in one quarter of these 
countries. 
34 Estimates are from the Spring 2018 Fiscal Monitor, which includes projections for about 100 
countries. Similarly, IMF (2010b, 2011) had estimated that on average public health care and pension 
spending would rise about 3 and 1 pp of GDP in the next two decades, respectively. 
35 A negative requited fiscal adjustment means that the country would need a fiscal loosening to 
stabilize its debt ratio to prevent it from falling (although, as mentioned earlier, these countries might 






negative required adjustments, and thus do not seem to need further adjustments to 
stabilize their debt ratios. 20 per cent of countries require moderate adjustments (less 
than 2 pp of GDP), while the remaining 25 percent require larger efforts. For 
example, Spain and Brazil will need an adjustment of about 1.5 pp of GDP to 
stabilize its debt ratio at 94 and 88 per cent of GDP. The United States would need an 
adjustment of 1.7 pp of GDP to stabilize its debt at 117 per cent of GDP (which 
implies a federal debt in the hands of the public, the measure favored by CBO, of 
about 85 per cent of GDP). 
4.3. Fiscal consolidation gaps 
To get a sense of the relative size of the estimated fiscal consolidation capacity, 
Table 11.1 through Table 11.4 present the fiscal consolidation gap, defined as the 
difference between the estimated fiscal gap and the required fiscal adjustment, for 
countries that require some tightening to stabilize their debt ratio in the medium run. 
A negative fiscal consolidation gap suggests that the estimated fiscal consolidation 
potential is not sufficient to stabilize the debt ratio. Naturally, this does not mean that 
these countries face an imminent crisis or that they do not have enough instruments to 
implement the required fiscal consolidation.36 It only indicates that the country would 
presumably need to exert a fiscal effort that is beyond the average of countries with 
similar characteristics and might also need to implement accompanying structural 
reforms.  
Based on this metric, I find that some of the countries with the biggest fiscal 
difficulties are Lebanon, Zambia, Nigeria, and Iran, with adjustment needs that 
exceed their estimated fiscal consolidation capacity by more than 5 pp of GDP. 
It should be noted, however, that since fiscal gaps are defined as the sum of the 
computed revenue and expenditure gaps, the estimated fiscal gaps might be 
understated if a country with a need to consolidate only alters its overall revenues 
(expenditures) if they are below (above) its peers. This alternative optimistic 
estimation of the fiscal gap is also presented in Table 11.1 through Table 11.4).37 
Naturally, under this assumption the estimated fiscal capacity is larger and most 
countries would have sufficient fiscal consolidation capacity to stabilize their debt 
ratio. 
                                                 
36 For example, Uhlig and Trabandt (2011) compute Laffer curves for the United States and EU-14 
countries and conclude that the maximum possible tax revenues would be about 100 per cent of GDP if 
the labor tax or the capital tax were increased to about 60 percent, and that consumption taxes have no 
peak (there is no Laffer curve), and thus in theory they would always provide additional revenues 
when increased. However, in practice these hypothetical boundaries might not be relevant for policy 
purposes as the political and social costs of such extreme measures would be unbearable (moreover, 
achieving the maximum possible fiscal revenues is not necessarily efficient or desirable). 
37 In other words, the optimistic scenario assumes that taxes would not be lowered (or expenditures 
increased) if they are higher (lower) than expected. Thus, in this scenario the estimated fiscal gap is 






Nonetheless, the optimistic scenario might overstate the true fiscal consolidation 
capacity. If the willingness to pay taxes is a function of the amount of public goods 
and services supplied by the government, it is conceivable that spending pressures 
could increase if the government increases its revenues or that the government might 
be forced to lower its taxes as it lowers its spending. 
4.4. Robustness checks 
As countries in the sample are so different, and since the fiscal statistics of poorer 
countries might not be sufficiently reliable or comparable to those of richer countries, 
I repeat the analysis for a restricted sample of more developed countries (102 
countries classified by the World Bank as high middle income or high income, 
presented in Table 1.1). The regression results for the restricted sample (not shown) 
are qualitatively similar to those for the full sample, although as expected the in-
sample fit of the estimations improves as there is less variance to explain, since the 
remaining countries are more homogeneous. The estimated coefficients remain 
significant, with the same sign, and comparable magnitudes. Thus, the estimated 
fiscal gaps from the full and restricted samples (presented in Table 12) are broadly 
unaffected −the correlation between the two measures is 97 percent. 
 
The regional dummies are probably the most controversial explanatory variables in 
the baseline estimation. Their intended role is to account for systematic differences 
across regions after controlling for other determinants of revenues or spending. For 
example, European countries have much higher revenues and expenditures than other 
countries. Presumably, this reflects their preference for the government to have a 
significant role in the economy. Mechanically, the European dummy implies that the 
conditional average of revenues and expenditures for these countries is higher than 
for other countries. Thus, if two countries have similar structural characteristics, and 
the same revenues and expenditures (as a share of GDP), but one of them is 
European, the baseline estimates would suggest the European country has a larger 
revenue capacity and a smaller space to cut its expenditures (the overall fiscal gap 
could be higher or lower depending on which effect is larger). 
However, it is not clear how limiting these regional differences in fiscal preferences 
really are. For example, Ireland and Switzerland have smaller governments, and thus 
it might be unreasonable to expect them to behave as other European countries. 
Likewise, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the United States also seem to prefer a 
smaller role for the government compared to other advanced economies. It is 
important to note that this does not necessarily mean that in case of need, these 
countries would not be able to reach the tax ratios observed in European economies.38 
                                                 
38 For example, the VAT tax was increased in Japan from 5 to 8 percent in April 2014 and is expected 
to rise again to 10 percent in October 2019 (the latter has been postponed twice due to the weak state 






However, the recent history in the United States suggests that these fiscal constraints 
should not be entirely dismissed. 
For the sake of robustness, I repeated the exercise without including regional 
dummies in the estimations. The regression results (not shown) are also robust to the 
exclusion of the regional dummies (the significance and sign of the estimated 
coefficients on other variables is similar), although as expected the in-sample fit of 
the estimations diminishes. The estimated fiscal consolidation capacities with and 
without the regional dummies are presented in Table 13. The correlation between the 
two measures is 96 percent.  
 
Interestingly, for countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and Central America the 
estimated fiscal gaps fall by about 2.5 pp of GDP when the regional dummies are 
excluded, mostly due to a reduction in their expenditure-cutting space (which means 
the conditional average of expenditures for the peers of these countries is higher 
without the inclusion of the regional dummy). Something similar occurs for countries 
in Central Asia and North Africa. For the other countries the results remain broadly 
similar. 
 
On the contrary, it is also conceivable that the regional dummies from the baseline 
specification, based on IMF area departments (presented in Table 1.3) are not 
detailed enough to capture meaningful differences across regions. Table 14 presents a 
finer set of dummies based on geographical regions, where each of the dummies from 
the baseline specification is roughly split into four regions.39 The regression results 
(not shown) are also robust to the inclusion of detailed regional dummies (as the 
significance and sign of the estimated coefficients is similar), although as expected 
the in-sample fit of the estimations improves (compared to the baseline specification). 
The estimated fiscal consolidation capacities with the more detailed regional 
dummies are presented in Table 13. The correlation with the baseline estimations is 
88 percent but interestingly the correlation improves to 93 percent if countries from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council are not included. For countries in Central Asia and 
North Africa, their estimated fiscal gaps improve by about 3 pp of GDP with the 
detailed regional dummies due to an increase in their estimated revenue-raising 
potential. 
 
The fiscal gaps are estimated only for revenue and expenditure categories considered 
to be under the government’s control, which excludes the proceeds from taxes to 
trade, grants and non-tax revenues and interest spending. However, this assumption 
                                                 
with the rapid aging of its population. The last tax hike had occurred in 1997 when the rate was 
increased from 3 to 5 percent. 
39 The proposed regions attempt to use commonly used classifications, but of course some countries 
are problematic as they belong to more than one region. For instance, the list of countries that belong 






might not be innocuous. For example, it could lead to an overestimation of the fiscal 
consolidation capacity for a country that receives a substantial amount of foreign 
grants or commodity revenues that are used to finance public spending, as the 
baseline specification would capture the additional spending but exclude the revenue 
source. To examine the robustness of the results, Table 15 compares the fiscal 
consolidation capacity from the baseline specification with an alternative estimation 
that includes all revenue and spending categories. The correlation between the two 
measures is about 80 percent but as expected there are significant differences for 
countries with large proceeds from grants or commodity revenues. For the former, the 
fiscal consolidation capacity is unequivocally reduced.  
For resource-rich countries the results are more interesting because the change to the 
consolidation capacity ultimately depends on whether the country has higher or lower 
than expected non-tax revenues considering its net commodity exports. For example, 
the results suggest that Kuwait, Iraq, Oman and Saudi Arabia receive about 10 
percentage points of GDP less than what would be expected, while Norway, 
Botswana, Finland and Ecuador have non-tax revenues that are about 5 percentage 
point higher than expected. The explanation of this result is beyond the scope of this 
paper but might be related to the design of the fiscal regimes for their extractive 
industries or whether private participation in the sector is allowed. 
5. Fiscal gaps, fiscal space, and the cost of the Great Recession 
A country has a large estimated fiscal gap when it has low revenues and/or high 
expenditures relative to other countries with similar characteristics. Normally, a large 
fiscal gap would imply a large fiscal deficit. Thus, having a large consolidation 
potential is not a good thing. It only indicates that a country has some revenue or 
expenditure sub-categories that are very different compared to its peers, and thus 
those areas would probably be good candidates to consider policy changes if the 
country were to initiate a fiscal consolidation.40 Thus, the fiscal gap provides an 
indirect and inverse measure of fiscal space, defined as the size of discretionary fiscal 
measures that a country could implement to stimulate the economy in a recession.41 In 
general, countries with a large consolidation potential are expected to have less fiscal 
space. 
                                                 
40 Similarly, an overweight person with high blood pressure has a large potential to reduce pounds, but 
this would not be considered a good thing. Moreover, reducing weight would probably be a good 
candidate area to begin treatment for the blood pressure before considering any other intervention such 
as medications. 
41 IMF (2016b) defines fiscal space as the “the room to raise spending or lower taxes (…) without 
risking an unfavorable reaction from financial markets and undermining the longer-term health of the 






Figure 4: Cost of the Great Recession 
To analyze the relationship between the fiscal gap and fiscal space, I analyze whether 
the estimated fiscal gaps are correlated with the response of countries to the Great 
Recession and the costs of the downturn. The costs of the recession can be defined in 
terms of GDP levels or growth rates. For 40 countries in the sample (shown in Table 
16.1), the Great Recession reduced real GDP below its 2007 (pre-crisis) level.42 The 
left panel of Figure 4 shows that for the median of these countries, real GDP in 2009 
was about 4 pp below its 2007 level, the downturn lasted about three years (before 
real GDP returned to its 2007 level), and the cumulative output loss was about 7 pp 
(compared to a situation where GDP remained at its 2007 level). It is important to 
note that since the duration of the crisis varies across countries in the sample, the 
cumulative cost of the recession only considers the years in which GDP remained 
below its pre-crisis level (the maximum possible duration of the crisis is nine years, if 
real GDP in 2016 remained below its 2007 level). 
For 75 countries in the sample (presented in Table 16.2), the real GDP growth rate 
fell below its 2007 (pre-crisis) value. The panel on the right of Figure 4 shows that 
for the median of these countries, real GDP growth in 2009 was about 9 pp lower 
than in 2007 (the growth rate measure of the size of the shock), and growth has 
remained lower thereafter. The cumulative lost growth was about 16 pp compared to 
a situation where the economy kept growing at the pre-crisis rate. The cumulative 
cost of the crisis (in growth rates) only considers the years in which growth remained 
below its pre-crisis rate.43 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that since the analysis is conducted with annual data (for the 129 countries with 
fiscal gap estimates), it is possible that a country had a technical recession (with two consecutive 
quarters of negative growth) and is not counted in this sample, if the sub-sequent recovery was strong 
enough to raise real GDP by the end of the year above its 2007 level. 
43 In 2011, several countries were also hit by the fall of commodity prices and thus the analysis 
assumes that for these countries the growth slowdown from the 2007 crisis ends in 20011 as it 







































Table 17.1 shows that, for the 40 countries whose GDP fell below its pre-crisis 
level, the cumulative cost of the crisis was lower for countries that implemented 
some fiscal stimulus, after controlling for the size of the shock.44 The latter is defined 
as the drop in real GDP from 2007 to the trough (for most countries the trough was 
reached in 2009). The size of the stimulus is proxied by the changes in the estimated 
fiscal gap over the crisis period. For example, if the real GDP of country 𝑖𝑖 remained 
below its pre-crisis level until year 𝑡𝑡 (it exceeded the pre-crisis level of real GDP in 
𝑡𝑡 + 1), the size of the stimulus implemented by this country is proxied by: 
    𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = ∫ ∆𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
2007    (4) 
The estimated coefficient on the size of the shock implies that for each additional 
initial pp loss of GDP, the cumulative cost of the recession (in levels) increases by 
4.6 pp of GDP, which suggests that the recession was highly persistent. The results 
show that an increase of one pp in the fiscal gap during the crisis (fiscal stimulus) is 
associated with a reduction of 0.6 pp in the cost of the crisis, while the second 
column of Table 17.1 shows that the change in the fiscal deficit is not a significant 
determinant of the cost of the crisis. The change in the fiscal gap appears to be a 
better measure than the change in the overall deficit, possibly because it excludes 
changes that were not intended (not under the control of the policy maker).45 
To explore whether the computed fiscal gaps are adequate measures of fiscal space, 
in the third column of Table 17.1, I analyze if the estimated pre-crisis fiscal gap (in 
2007) is a significant determinant of the size of the fiscal stimulus implemented as a 
response to the Great Recession. The results suggest that the fiscal gap in 2007 is 
indeed a significant determinant of the size of the stimulus, while the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is not significant.46 The fourth column of Table 17.1 confirms that the cost of 
the recession was lower for countries that were able to implement a larger fiscal 
stimulus as a response to the crisis, instrumenting the stimulus (change in the fiscal 
gap) with the pre-crisis fiscal space. More precisely, the last regression uses as an 
explanatory variable the predicted size of the fiscal stimulus based on the computed 
fiscal gap for 2007. 
Similarly, Table 17.2 repeats the analysis for the 75 countries whose growth fell 
below its pre-crisis rate. The table shows that: (i) the cumulative cost of the crisis (in 
                                                 
44 Some countries not only did not conduct a stimulus bur rather conducted a consolidation as they did 
not have the necessary financing. 
45 For example, it controls for changes in cyclical conditions and excludes changes from commodity 
prices or grants. 
46 Similar results were obtained if the debt ratio is replaced by the average yields in government’s 
bonds in 2007 or if the debt is replaced by its distance to a “tolerable debt level” which varies by 
income level (the IMF uses as risk benchmarks a debt ratio of 50 percent of GDP for low income 






growth rates) was lower for countries that implemented a fiscal stimulus after 
controlling for the size of the initial shock; (ii) the change in the fiscal deficit is not a 
significant explanatory variable of the cost of the crisis; (iii) the pre-crisis fiscal 
space is a significant determinant of the size of the fiscal stimulus (the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is still not significant); and (iv) the cumulative cost of the crisis was lower in 
countries with a larger pre-crisis fiscal space as they able to implement a larger fiscal 
stimulus. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I estimate the size and composition of the fiscal consolidation capacity 
for 129 countries around the world, compare it to the required adjustment that would 
be needed to stabilize each country’s debt ratio, and show that the consolidation 
capacity in 2007 is a significant determinant both of the size of the fiscal stimulus as a 
response to the global financial crisis, and of the real costs of the recession. Overall 
the results suggest the importance for countries to continue to implement fiscal 
consolidation plans to restore the fiscal buffers (space) that would allow them to have 
a countercyclical response in the next crisis, which would diminish its output costs. 
The results in this work are only suggestive, as they depend on the estimated 
equations. Moreover, for some countries, institutional or political constraints might 
make unattainable the estimated size of potential revenue increases or expenditure 
cuts. Thus, these results cannot replace individual country studies and 
recommendations (such as the ones provided in the IMF technical assistance reports) 
that are specifically tailored to incorporate country-specific features and needs (for 
example, they might advise how to enhance the enforcement of the tax code or 
improve the budgeting process by focusing on results). Nonetheless, the exercise in 
this paper is useful as it illustrates in a standardized manner the size and composition 
of the fiscal adjustments that in principle could be achievable by a given country if it 
wished to adjust its fiscal imbalance. Moreover, it provides benchmarks that might be 
used for assessing fiscal policy outcomes, understanding a countries’ particular fiscal 
preferences, or providing a reasonable starting point for a discussion of policy reform 
options. 
A number of interesting issues cannot be addressed with the proposed methodology, 
and thus remain beyond the scope of this paper. The two most salient are: (i) the 
efficient policy mix between revenue and expenditure measures (and more precisely 
between specific taxes and spending categories) given a desired size of fiscal 
consolidation, and (ii) the optimal debt level (and moreover how fast should the fiscal 
consolidation be). More recently, the policy debate has turned to the possibility of 
changing the mix of the consolidation to make it more growth-supportive (smaller 






Chapter 2:  
The Costs of Delaying the Fiscal Consolidation in the US 
1. Introduction 
The sharp worsening of public finances in the US since the Great Recession brought 
the need for fiscal reform to the center of the policy debate. The federal debt held by 
the public surged from 36 percent of GDP in 2007 to 69 percent in 2011, and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2011) projected that without changes in policy, 
the debt ratio would continue to rise without bound due to population aging and the 
rising costs of health care (as seen in Figure 1). Given this grim long-term fiscal 
scenario, how soon should the US adjust its fiscal imbalance? What are the 
implications of delaying the reform and allowing the debt to GDP ratio to rise 
further? 
This paper contributes to the policy debate by using a DSGE model to compute the 
macroeconomic and welfare costs for the US of the higher debt to GDP ratio that 
would result from delaying the adjustment of its medium term budgetary imbalance.47 
In the model there are two sectors of production, a corporate and an entrepreneurial 
sector, that rent capital and hire workers, and have a production technology with a 
labor augmenting deterministic trend. Each period, ex-ante identical agents face 
uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial ability and employment productivity shocks, 
and choose their occupation. Agents can either become entrepreneurs and hire other 
workers, or become workers themselves. 
To make a realistic analysis of the policy options, I assume that the government does 
not have access to lump-sum taxation or state-contingent bonds. Instead it gets 
revenues from distortionary taxes to labor, consumption, and income, and by issuing 
one period risk-free bonds. The revenues are used to service its debt, pay for lump-
sum transfers to all agents, and finance an exogenously determined level of other non-
interest spending. 
I calibrate the model to match the US fiscal situation in 2007. I then take the long run 
projections from CBO for spending in transfers and other non-interest outlays (which 
                                                 
47 CBO estimated in 2011 that to immediately stabilize the debt to GDP ratio the government would 
need to permanently improve its fiscal position by 4.9 percent of GDP per year, but that the required 
adjustment would rise to almost 13 percent of GDP is the adjustment was postponed until 2025. Yet 
these estimates result from debt accounting exercises that assume that interest rates and growth remain 
constant as the debt rises, and thus do not capture the effects that higher government indebtedness has 
on the agents’ incentives to work, save, and invest. Moreover, since these estimates do not come from 






entail a large imbalance between revenues and expenditures, and thus imply a 
continuously rising debt to GDP ratio) to analyze the consequences of stabilizing the 
debt ratio at various levels by adjusting the income tax. I find that delaying the fiscal 
adjustment and allowing the debt ratio to increase would have large macroeconomic 
and welfare effects. In the model, stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio after twenty-five 
years (when it reaches 200% instead of 69% in 2011), would entail a permanent 
output loss of 22% and welfare change equivalent to a permanent reduction of 13% in 
consumption.  
Moreover, I find that if the government delays the adjustment for more than ten years, 
allowing the debt ratio to exceed 100 percent of GDP, the short run welfare gains 
from further delaying the adjustment are smaller than the long run costs. This occurs 
because for low levels of debt, the distortions in the economy are not as large as 
agents with sufficient ability and capital are able to switch occupations and resort to 
self-employment to partially shield from the fall in available jobs and wages that 
results from the crowding out of capital for production. However, as the debt 
continuous to rise the distortions increase as the scale and productivity of the new 
entrepreneurs falls and thus the hedge becomes less efficient. 
Since heterogeneity and entrepreneurship are not compulsory elements for a model of 
debt stabilization, I examine the importance of these features by comparing the 
steady-state results from the benchmark model with those from two alternative 
models without entrepreneurship: a representative agent framework and an Aiyagari 
model with heterogeneity. I find that both heterogeneity and entrepreneurship are 
important to capture relevant mechanisms that result from a higher public 
indebtedness. Ignoring these elements would reduce the estimated long-run costs of 
allowing the debt ratio to increase, because as the debt ratio rises more workers 
switch to the entrepreneurial sector start low-quality firms which intensifies the 
crowding out as they compete for financing with the government and with more 
productive entrepreneurs. 
This paper is related to the representative agent work of Forni, Gerali and Pisani 
(2011), which studies the macroeconomic consequences for Italy of reducing the debt 
to GDP ratio by 10% in ten years, and to IMF (2010c), which analyzes the 
macroeconomic effects of lowering the fiscal deficit by 1%. However, a key 
drawback from the representative agent models is that in this framework, the 
equilibrium interest rate is independent of the debt ratio, which is at odds with the 
empirical literature (i.e. Laubach 2009). Another disadvantage from this class of 
models is that they cannot adequately capture the distributive and insurance effects of 
fiscal policy. 
The paper also builds on the literature that uses general equilibrium models with 
heterogeneous agents to analyze changes in fiscal policy. For example, Domeij and 
Heathcote (2004) compute the welfare consequences of increasing the labor income 
tax to reduce the capital income tax; Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) study the 






capital income tax and the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax; and Conesa 
and Krueger (1999) examine the political support for a social security reform. The 
main difference with these works is that this paper allows for entrepreneurship, which 
augments the estimated costs of a higher debt ratio due to the distortions that arise 
when some agents change their occupation to circumvent the effects of crowding out. 
More recent papers have studied fiscal policy problems in models with 
entrepreneurship, financial frictions, and occupational choice. Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2009) analyze the effects of abolishing the estate tax and replacing it with an 
increase in the consumption or the income tax; Kitao (2008) investigates the effect of 
lowering the capital income tax; Li (2002) computes the optimal subsidy to the loan 
repayments of entrepreneurs financed with income taxes; and Meh (2005) quantifies 
the effects of switching from a progressive to a proportional income tax system. 
Differently from these works, this paper allows for trend growth, endogenizes the 
labor supply, and does not impose a balanced budget in every period as it analyzes the 
implications of the different debt dynamics that result from alternative fiscal 
scenarios. 
2. Model 
The model extends the work of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) to incorporate 
entrepreneurship, as in Kitao (2008). The economy is closed and inhabited by a 
continuum of infinitely lived agents normalized to unity. Time is discrete and a period 
represents one year. Individuals are endowed with a unit of time and decide every 
period whether to become workers or entrepreneurs, in which case they invest in a 
productive project and hire other workers. There are two sectors of production that 
manufacture the same type of good, a corporate and an entrepreneurial sector, that 
rent capital and hire workers. Upon deciding their occupation for the current period, 
workers optimally choose what fraction of their time to work in either of the two 
sectors, and entrepreneurs choose what fraction of their time to work in their own 
firm. The entrepreneurs finance their investment with their own resources and can 
borrow from a financial intermediary, but face a borrowing constraint because debt 
repayments are not perfectly enforced. 
2.1. Shocks 
Agents are ex-ante identical. There is no aggregate uncertainty, but each period 
agents receive idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 and entrepreneurial 
ability 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡, which affect their returns from working and operating a firm. Markets are 
incomplete because the agents can only trade assets with returns that are not state 
contingent. As a result, no insurance is available for the idiosyncratic shocks and 
individuals accumulate assets 𝑓𝑓 to partially self-insure. The shocks follow 
autoregressive Markov processes of order one that evolve according to the transition 
matrices  𝛤𝛤𝜃𝜃 = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃′|𝜃𝜃) and Γ𝑧𝑧 = Pr (𝑧𝑧′|𝑧𝑧), where  Γ = Γ𝜃𝜃⨂Γ𝑧𝑧 is the Kronecker 






respect to their individual asset holdings 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, their labor productivity 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 and their 
entrepreneurial ability 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡. 
2.2. Technology 
The economy has two sectors of production: a non-corporate sector that consists of 
entrepreneurial households that manage their own business, and a corporate sector 
populated by large firms characterized by anonymity that operate in perfectly 
competitive markets and do not face a borrowing constraint. The production function 
for the representative firm of the corporate sector in period t is: 
    𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) = (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)𝛼𝛼(𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)1−𝛼𝛼   (1) 
This Cobb-Douglas technology takes as inputs the aggregate capital 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 and 
efficiency units of labor 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  used in the corporate sector. 𝛼𝛼 is the capital share, and 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 
is the level of aggregate labor productivity.  
Entrepreneurs employ their entrepreneurial endowment 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 to manage their own 
business instead of supplying their working endowment 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 for a wage in the labor 
market. The production function for a given entrepreneur in period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
      𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = (𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)𝑣𝑣[𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼(𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼]1−𝑣𝑣  (2) 
This technology takes as inputs the individual entrepreneurial ability 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡, the stock of 
capital rented by the entrepreneur 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡, the efficiency units of labor employed by the 
firm 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 (which includes the fraction of time that entrepreneurs work in their own firm 
as explained below), and the level of aggregate labor productivity 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡. Since 
managerial ability is a fixed factor, this technology exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale and the entrepreneurs make a positive profit 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 from managing a firm, as in 
Lucas (1978). The share of output that goes to the variable factors is determined by 
the span of control parameter 1 − 𝑣𝑣. 
Technological change is labor augmenting in both sectors such that the economy 
exhibits a balanced growth path. The aggregate productivity of labor 𝜔𝜔 evolves as a 
linear deterministic trend with growth rate 𝛾𝛾: 
     𝜔𝜔′ = 𝛾𝛾𝜔𝜔     (3) 
2.3. Preferences 
The agents have preferences over consumption and leisure represented by the 
function proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988). The utility for an 
agent in period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
   𝑠𝑠�𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� = (𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖






Where 0 < ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 ,  𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 {𝑤𝑤, 𝑒𝑒} is the fraction of time that the individual devotes to 
working, depending on his occupation as a worker or entrepreneur for the current 
period. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1 (𝜙𝜙 − 1⁄ ), the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution is 1 𝜎𝜎⁄ , and 𝜌𝜌 is a scale parameter that determines the relative value of 
leisure. This functional form is convenient not only because it reduces the 
computational cost of solving the problem, as it implies that the aggregate labor 
supply is independent of the distribution of wealth, but also because according to 
Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2011) it provides a good fit with the US data. The level of 
the linear deterministic trend 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 is included in the disutility of labor so that the labor 
supply remains bounded along the balanced growth path. This can be interpreted as 
implying that the productivity of the home production sector grows at the same rate as 
labor productivity in the entrepreneurial and corporate sectors. 
2.4. Occupational choice 
The government does not have access to lump sum taxation. It gets revenues from a 
consumption tax 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐, a payroll tax 𝜏𝜏ℎ, an income tax 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦, and by issuing one period 
risk-free bonds 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡. Each period agents choose their occupation to maximize their 
income given the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks: 
   𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 {(1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)}   (5) 
As in Buera and Shin (2010) the occupational choice is a static problem because there 
is no uncertainty in the entrepreneurial activity, owing to the assumptions on the 
timing of the shocks, and no costs from switching occupations or from a time to build 
constraint.  
Workers receive labor income that is a function of the payroll tax 𝜏𝜏ℎ, the gross 
wage per efficiency unit of time 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, their endowment of working ability 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, and the 
fraction of time that they choose to work ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. Entrepreneurs employ their 
entrepreneurial endowment to manage their own firm and earn a profit 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡, ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒). 
Entrepreneurs do not pay a self-employment tax. Thus, by working more in their own 
firm they could lower their wage bill and increase their profits. As a result, they 
would lower their payroll tax but increase their income tax payments. 
Thus, an agent becomes an entrepreneur when his assets and entrepreneurial ability 
are large enough such that running his own business is more profitable than working 
for another firm. The occupational choice allows for the endogenous entry and exit of 
entrepreneurs from the productive sector and of workers from the labor force. 
2.5. Collateral constraint 
There is a perfectly competitive intermediation sector that collects deposits from all 
agents and lends to the entrepreneurs and the corporate sector. However, there is a 
credit enforceability problem, because when an entrepreneur deposits 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 units of 






borrowed money, where (𝜆𝜆 ≥ 1). The only punishment for diverting funds is that the 
entrepreneur loses his collateral. Hence, the financial intermediaries only lend to the 
entrepreneurs up to the point where they do not renege on their obligations, 
implying (1
𝜆𝜆
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡). Consequently, the entrepreneurs are subject to a collateral 
constraint that limits the amount they are allowed to borrow based on their individual 
asset holdings. The firms in the corporate sector do not have any financing 
constraints. 
2.6. Entrepreneur’s profit 
The profit of an entrepreneur in period 𝑡𝑡 solves: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥{𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘}{𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 ,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡max (0,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 − ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) − 
      (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝜓𝜓 max (0,𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)}  (6) 
   𝑓𝑓. 𝑡𝑡.  𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡     (7) 
Where 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 is the individual’s endowment of entrepreneurial ability, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is the wage per 
efficiency unit of labor, ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 is the fraction of time that the entrepreneur wishes to work 
in his own firm,  𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 represents the stock of asset holdings of the entrepreneur 
deposited at the bank, 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 is his desired stock of capital for production, and 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 is his 
demand for labor efficiency units. The entrepreneur’s own labor supply is part of the 
labor services used for production, and thus the entrepreneur only pays a wage to the 
labor demand that exceeds his own labor supply. The return on deposits is 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 
capital depreciates at the rate 𝛿𝛿. The banks do not own the capital, but without loss of 
generality I assume they are in charge of investing to replace the capital that 
depreciates.  
Since there are zero profits in banking, if the entrepreneur borrows less than he has 
deposited at the bank (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) he pays to the bank the opportunity cost of his 
internal funds  (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). However, if the entrepreneur wishes to borrow more than he 
has deposited at the bank (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 > 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡), the bank undertakes a screening process that 
costs 𝜓𝜓 for every unit of loaned money that exceeds the collateral. Hence, the 
entrepreneur only pays an external finance premium on his external financing. The 
solution to this problem generates the input demand functions 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) 
and 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡). 
2.7. Corporate firm’s problem 
The firms in the corporate sector hire workers in a perfectly competitive labor market 
and rent capital from the financial intermediaries; they do not face any collateral 
constraint, and do not pay the external finance premium. The representative firm in 






   𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐   (8) 
From the FOC the factor prices are determined by the usual marginal productivity 
conditions: 
     𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)   (9) 
     𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) − 𝛿𝛿   (10) 
2.8. Assets 
Agents cannot borrow. Thus, to insure their consumption they deposit their savings at 
a financial intermediary and get a return 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. The intermediaries use the deposits to 
invest in one period risk-free government bonds 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, and lend to the entrepreneurs and 
corporate sector. Since all investments are risk free, in equilibrium financial 
intermediaries are indifferent between lending to the government, entrepreneurs, or 
corporate sector. Because investments are identical from the agent’s perspective, I 
assume that the agents save in the generic asset 𝑓𝑓. 
2.9. Timing 
At the beginning of each period the labor productivity and entrepreneurial ability 
shocks are realized. After observing both shocks the agents make their occupational 
choice and decide what fraction of their time to work. The entrepreneurs and the 
corporate sector go to the financial intermediaries for credit and then hire their 
desired efficiency units of labor. After production takes place, the entrepreneurs and 
the corporate sector compensate their workers and repay their loans. Workers settle 
their payroll taxes. Financial intermediaries reimburse depositors and make zero 
profits. All agents pay income taxes on the yield from their savings and on the income 
from their occupation in the current period. 
The government gives lump-sum transfers to all agents, who then decide how much 
to consume, and deposit their savings at the financial intermediaries. The government 
spends an exogenously determined amount on other non-interest payments and rolls 
over its debt by selling risk-free bonds to the financial intermediaries. If the 
government has a fiscal deficit it sells additional bonds, and if it has a surplus it 
reduces its indebtedness. The funds that the financial intermediaries do not invest in 
the government bonds are the loanable funds for the entrepreneurs and the corporate 
sector in the next period. 
2.10. Equilibrium 
Since the problem has a deterministic trend it is not stationary. In order to transform 
the model into its stationary form let: ?̂?𝑓 = 𝑐𝑐
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this transformation from the definition of the equilibrium, although the problem can 
only be solved in its stationary form. 
2.10.1. Consumer’s problem 
The recursive formulation of the consumer’s problem for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1,�ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖≥0� 𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 {𝑤𝑤,𝑒𝑒}
 𝑠𝑠(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽∑Γ𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡+1, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1)      (11) 
  𝑓𝑓. 𝑡𝑡.    (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦) max{(1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)} + 
trt + 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1   (12) 
     𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡   (13) 
As in Buera and Shin (2010), the 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 operator in the budget constraint represents the 
occupational choice presented in equation (5). Thus, given the sequence of optimal 
static decisions for the occupational choice and intensive margin problems, the 
dynamic program is analogous to a standard capital accumulation problem with 
production. The profit for an entrepreneur of operating his business is given by the 
indirect profit function 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) presented in equations (6) and (7). Both workers 
and entrepreneurs choose the fraction of time that they work ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 or ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, but 
entrepreneurs work in their own business. 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 are transfers from the government that 
are restricted to be non-negative, to avoid the possibility of lump-sum taxation. 
From the FOC the optimality conditions for the intensive margin choices for workers 
and entrepreneurs are: 






  (14) 






   (15) 
The consumption-saving decision is determined by a policy rule 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡), that 
together with the labor supply decision, and the transition probabilities of the labor 
productivity and entrepreneurial ability shocks Γ = Γ𝜃𝜃⨂Γ𝑧𝑧, induce the distribution of 
agents in this economy 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡). This distribution can further be separated into 
the distribution of workers  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) and entrepreneurs  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) based on 
their occupational choices for the current period. 
2.10.2. Aggregates 
Aggregate asset holdings 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 are computed by integrating over the asset holdings of 
each household: 






Likewise, aggregate consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, and transfers are 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 are found by integrating 
over all agents. 
Aggregate labor income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 is found by integrating over the labor incomes of each 
worker: 
      𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 = ∫(1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)  (17) 
Where 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) is the distribution of workers in period 𝑡𝑡. 
Aggregate entrepreneurial income  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 is found by integrating over the profits of each 
entrepreneur: 
         𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = ∫𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)  (18) 
Where 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) is the distribution of entrepreneurs in period 𝑡𝑡. 
The aggregate labor supply 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is found by integrating the labor supply in efficiency 
units of each worker: 
     𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = ∫ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡  𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)   (19) 
The aggregate labor demand from the entrepreneurial sector 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 is computed by 
integrating the individual labor demand in efficiency units from all entrepreneurs that 
exceeds their individual labor supply: 
       𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = ∫𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥(0,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 − ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)  (20) 
 The aggregate labor demand is the sum of the aggregate labor demand from the 
corporate sector 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 and the aggregate labor demand from the entrepreneurial 
sector 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒. 
Similarly, the aggregate demand for capital from the entrepreneurial sector 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 is 
found by integrating over the individual demands for capital from all entrepreneurs. 
The aggregate demand for capital is the sum of the aggregate demand for capital from 
the corporate sector 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 and the aggregate demand for capital from the entrepreneurial 
sector 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒. 
The aggregate supply of capital 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 is computed as the residual from aggregate savings 
after the government’s financing needs are covered: 
    𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡     (21) 
Aggregate production 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the sum of the aggregate production from the 







2.10.3. Market clearing 
Equilibrium in the capital market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
     𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 =  𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 +  𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒   (22) 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
     𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 +  𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒   (23) 
The government’s budget constraint for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝜏𝜏ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +  𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡    (24)  
The revenues from distortionary taxation and debt issuance are used to service the 
government’s debt, pay for the lump-sum transfers 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, and finance an exogenously 
determined level of other non-interest spending 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡. 
The resource constraint for this economy is: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜓𝜓∫𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥(0,𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)  𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)   (25) 
As usual, in every period aggregate production is spent on private consumption, 
public consumption, and net investment. The last term on equation (25) considers the 
resources that are used by the banking sector in the intermediation of resources to the 
entrepreneurial sector when the loans exceed the collateral. 
2.10.4. Definition of equilibirium 
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a balanced growth 
path given by the sequences of occupational choices, intensive margin decisions, 
value functions 𝑉𝑉(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡), policy function𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓′(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡), input demand functions 
𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) and 𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡), factor prices 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝, the stock of aggregate capital 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 
aggregate labor 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, and distributions 𝜇𝜇(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡), given the sequence of fiscal 
policies {𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐, 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦, 𝜏𝜏ℎ, 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡}, the level of the labor augmenting technology 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡, 
and the transition probabilities of the shocks Γ such that: 
i. The sequence of the occupational choices, intensive margin decisions, 
value functions and policy functions solve the consumer’s problem given 
the sequences of factor prices, fiscal policies, the deterministic trend, and 
the transition probabilities of the employment productivity and 
entrepreneurial ability shocks. 
ii. The sequences of input demand functions solve the entrepreneur’s 
problem given the sequences of factor prices, fiscal policies, the 







iii. The sequences of factor prices solve the sequence of maximization 
problems of the representative firm in the corporate sector.  
iv. The sequence of distributions is induced by the sequences of occupational 
choices, intensive margin decisions, policy functions, the deterministic 
trend, and the transition probabilities of the shocks. 
v. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied every period. 
vi. The capital and labor markets clear every period. 
In the balanced growth path all variables grow at the constant rate 𝛾𝛾 except for the 
interest rate, the tax rates, the number of agents in the economy, and the time 
endowment. Along the balanced growth path, the transformed 
variables 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� , 𝑤𝑤� , 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡� , 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� , 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡�, 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡�, 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡� , and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�  are constant. 
3. Calibration 
There are two sets of parameters in the model: ten are fixed a priori, either because 
they have been used by previous studies or because they can be estimated from the 
data without using the model, and twelve are calibrated to match selected targets in 
the initial steady state. The parameterization is presented in Table 1. 
3.1. Parameters fixed a priori 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎𝜎 is 1.5 in line with the findings of Attanasio, 
Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999). The external finance premium 𝜓𝜓 is 2%, which 
corresponds to the average spread between risky (Baa) and risk free (TR10) bonds in 
the US from 1990 to 2007 using monthly data. The annual depreciation rate 𝛿𝛿 is 6% 
following Stokey and Rebelo (1995). The capital income share 𝛼𝛼 equals 0.36 as in 
Kitao (2008). The rate of growth of the deterministic trend 𝛾𝛾 is 1.02, in line with the 
assumption from CBO that the long run growth rate in the US is 2%. The share of 
output going to the fixed factor in the entrepreneurial sector 𝑣𝑣 is 0.15 as in Atkenson 
and Kehoe (2005). The curvature of the labor supply 𝜙𝜙 is 3 such that the Frisch 
elasticity is 0.5, as recommended by Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber (2011) for the 
intensive margin of the labor supply. 
The natural logarithm of the labor productivity and entrepreneurial ability processes 
are approximated with five and three-state Markov processes, using the methodology 
of Tauchen (1986). The persistence of the labor productivity shock 𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃 is 0.91, and the 
standard deviation of the labor productivity shock 𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃 is 0.21, as estimated by Floden 
and Lindé (2001). The persistence of the entrepreneurial ability shock 𝜌𝜌𝑧𝑧 is also fixed 
at 0.91. 
3.2. Calibrated parameters 
Information on the government’s expenditures at the federal level is taken from the 
Office of Management and Budget of the White House. The classification of the 






Other non-interest spending 𝑓𝑓 is calibrated to be 5.9 percent of GDP, which 
corresponds to the combined share of outlays for defense, international affairs, 
administration of justice, general government, energy, transportation, science, and 
technology in 2007. The initial stock of debt 𝐵𝐵 is calibrated to be 36 percent of GDP, 
equal to the debt in hands of the public of the US federal government in 2007. The 
value of government’s lump-sum transfer 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 is calibrated to match the social spending 
of the federal government of 12 percent of GDP in 2007. This includes 
unemployment benefits, Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, supplemental income 
assistance, and all other social spending programs. Although, the targets for 𝑓𝑓,𝐵𝐵 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 were selected without solving the model, the real value of these variables 
needs to be calibrated since 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 is an endogenous variable of the model. 
The tax rates on consumption and labor income are calibrated implicitly such that the 
government’s revenues from each tax in the initial steady state match those of the US 
federal government in 2007, as reported by the Office of Management and Budget. 
The tax rate on consumption 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 is set to 0.7% to match the observed revenues of 0.47 
percent of GDP from federal excise taxes. The payroll tax 𝜏𝜏ℎ is set to 10.4% to match 
the observed revenues of 6.26 percent of GDP from Social Security contributions. 
The income tax 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 is set to 16.7% to satisfy the government’s budget constraint in the 
initial steady state. 
𝜌𝜌 is a scale parameter that determines the relative value of leisure and is chosen such 
that on average workers spend 1/3 of their time working in the initial steady state. 
The subjective discount factor 𝛽𝛽 is set to 0.951, so that the equilibrium risk-free rate 𝑝𝑝 
in the initial steady state is 3%, which was the average real interest rate from 1990-
2007 on one-year US treasury bills, and which coincides with the value used by CBO 
for their long-run projections. The tightness of the collateral constraint λ is 1.4, such 
that the average ratio of liabilities over assets for all entrepreneurs in the initial steady 
state equals 0.37, which was the average leverage ratio from 1990-2007 in the Non-
Corporate Business Sector according to the Flow of Funds of the Federal Reserve. 
The median value of the grid for the labor productivity shock 𝑥𝑥_𝜃𝜃 is normalized such 
that average productivity of workers in the initial steady state is unity. The median 
value of the entrepreneurial ability shock  𝑥𝑥_𝑧𝑧 is normalized such that the percentage 
of entrepreneurs in the initial steady state is 11.5%, which corresponds to the 
percentage of households that are business owners and actively manage their own 
business in the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances according to Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2006). The standard deviation of the entrepreneurial ability shock 𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧 is calibrated to 
be 0.391 such that the corporate sector employs 72% of the total capital employed by 
the corporate and non-corporate sectors, which was the average in the Federal 







3.3. Calibration of the alternative models 
To assess the importance of heterogeneity and entrepreneurship, the steady state 
results from the benchmark model are compared with those from a non-stochastic 
representative agent model that lacks heterogeneity and entrepreneurship, and with 
those from an Aiyagari model with heterogeneity but not entrepreneurship. Hence, 
the Aiyagari model only has labor productivity shocks and the representative agent 
model does not have idiosyncratic shocks. These alternative models are detailed in 
the Appendix and their calibration is presented in Table 1. To make the three models 
comparable, the fixed parameters and calibration targets are identical across models. 
4. Effects of delaying the fiscal consolidation 
First, I analyze the long-run implications of the higher debt to GDP ratio that would 
result from postponing the adjustment of the US fiscal imbalance. Then, I compare 
the results from the benchmark model with those from two alternative models, one 
without heterogeneity and entrepreneurship, and another with heterogeneity but 
without entrepreneurship. Finally, I use the benchmark model to analyze the 
implications of delaying the adjustment but considering the transitional dynamics to 
the new steady state. 
4.1. Long run Macroeconomic consequences 
To compute the long run consequences of delaying the adjustment, I assume that only 
the income tax is adjusted to stabilize the debt ratio, while the outlays on transfers and 
other non-interest spending remain fixed at their CBO projected values for 2030, as I 
vary the debt target from 0 to 200 percent of output.48 
The effect of the changes in the debt to GDP ratio on the equilibrium prices in the 
benchmark model are presented in Figure 2. As the stock of debt to be financed every 
period rises, it crowds out private savings and reduces the loanable funds for the 
corporate and entrepreneurial sectors. As the capital-labor ratio falls, the marginal 
product of capital increases and the marginal product of labor falls. Consequently, 
equilibrium interest rates rise and wages fall. 
The effects of changes in the debt to GDP ratio on real variables in the benchmark 
model are presented in Figure 3. Due to crowding out, the stock of capital and the 
labor efficiency units used for production fall as the debt rises. Due to the fall in the 
inputs of production, aggregate production and consumption also fall with the 
increases in the debt ratio. In particular, in the benchmark model if the target debt to 
                                                 
48 Although many possible fiscal instruments could be used to stabilize the debt ratio, the plan from the 
2010 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson-Bowles Commission) 
specifies that 80% of the additional revenues should come from increases in the effective income tax. 







GDP ratio increases from 0 to 200 percent, the equilibrium interest rate would be 1.9 
percentage points higher, the wage would fall by 8 percent, production would be 28 
percent lower and average consumption would fall by 20 percent. 
In the benchmark model, as the debt to GDP ratio rises the percentage of 
entrepreneurs in the economy increases. This does not mean that increasing the 
government debt is beneficial. Quite the contrary, the increase in entrepreneurship 
occurs as an attempt by some agents to shield themselves from the drastic fall in 
wages by resorting to self-employment. The increase in the government’s debt is akin 
in this model to a financial constraint on the corporate and non-corporate sectors that 
reduces the scale of their business and trims the availability of good employment 
opportunities. Thus, with fewer available jobs, self-employment becomes a second 
best for agents that have some entrepreneurial ability and sufficient capital. 
To better understand the effects of the increase in the debt to GDP ratio in the 
benchmark model it is useful to separate the effects on the two sectors of production. 
The effects of the debt on the corporate sector are presented in Figure 4. Both the 
capital and labor used for production in the corporate sector fall as the debt increases, 
but the fall in capital is larger, and thus the capital-labor ratio falls. As the debt rises, 
the size of the representative firm in the corporate sector gets smaller, its production 
falls, and its share in aggregate GDP falls. In particular, if the debt target is 0 percent 
of GDP the corporate sector production would account for 52 percent of overall GDP, 
but if the debt target is 200 percent of GDP the corporate sector would only represent 
13 percent of aggregate production. 
The effects of the increase in the debt to GDP ratio on the entrepreneurial sector are 
presented in Figure 5. As the debt rises, some agents become entrepreneurs to try to 
circumvent the fall in wages, and thus the entrepreneurial sector begins to grow, 
demanding more labor and capital. However, the scale of production for these new 
entrepreneurs is small and their incomes are low. Since these startups are more labor 
intensive, the capital-labor ratio in the entrepreneurial sector gradually falls, and the 
size of the new firms in the sector continues to decrease as more agents change their 
occupation. 
As the percentage of entrepreneurs grows, this sector increases its production, 
representing a higher share of aggregate GDP. However, the rise in production is not 
linear, which explains the non-linearity in the fall of the aggregate production. In 
particular, as the debt to GDP ratio increases from 0 to 100 percent production falls 
by 8 percent, but if the debt ratio further rises to 200 percent, GDP falls by an 
additional 20 percent. This occurs because as the debt continues to rise, the agents 
who switch their occupation from workers to entrepreneurs have lower 
entrepreneurial ability and assets on the margin. 
To better illustrate this point, Table 3 presents threshold values over assets 𝑓𝑓 of the 
entrepreneurial decision rule for different combinations of the idiosyncratic 






representing the highest ability level) and five states for labor productivity 𝜃𝜃 (with 𝜃𝜃5 
representing the highest ability level). For example, if the debt to GDP ratio is zero, 
all agents with the median value of the entrepreneurial ability and the lowest value of 
the labor productivity ( 𝑧𝑧2,𝜃𝜃1), who own assets above 0.141 become entrepreneurs. 
Thus, as the debt to GDP ratio increases, two things happen: i) for a given 
combination of shocks (𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) the new entrepreneurs will have less assets 𝑓𝑓, and ii) for 
a given level of asset holdings 𝑓𝑓 the new entrepreneurs will have lower 
entrepreneurial ability 𝑧𝑧. 
Since the agents that change their occupation at low levels of the debt ratio have 
relatively high entrepreneurial ability and assets, the increase in production of the 
entrepreneurial sector from these new businesses partly offsets the fall in the 
production in the corporate sector. But as the debt ratio continues to increase, the 
agents that are forced to change their occupation have much lower entrepreneurial 
productivity and assets. Hence, the marginal increase in the production of the 
entrepreneurial sector becomes smaller as the debt rises. 
4.2. Long run welfare consequences 
I define the long run welfare change from the increase in the debt to GDP ratio as the 
permanent percentage increase in the consumption of all agents ∆𝑥𝑥, holding leisure 
unchanged, that would result in the same average utility in the economy with a debt to 
GDP ratio of 𝑥𝑥 percent as in the economy with no debt, when outlays in transfers and 
other non-interest spending as a share of GDP are identical in both economies: 
   ∫𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓, 𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧,∆𝑥𝑥)𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) = ∫𝑣𝑣0(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇0(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) (26) 
Where 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧, 0) and 𝑣𝑣0(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) are the equilibrium value functions, 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) and 𝜇𝜇0(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) are the stationary distributions, associated with the 
steady states of the economies that have debt to GDP ratios of 𝑥𝑥 and 0 percent, but the 
same spending in transfers and other non-interest spending as a share of GDP. 
𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧,∆𝑥𝑥) is the equilibrium value function in the economy with a debt ratio of 𝑥𝑥 
percent, where the equilibrium consumption of each agent has been increased by the 
percentage ∆𝑥𝑥 while leisure remains unchanged. 
The welfare consequences of changes in the debt to GDP ratio computed for the 
benchmark model with this utilitarian welfare criterion are presented in Figure 6. I 
find that increasing the debt to GDP ratio has non-linear effects in welfare. The 
average welfare change that results from increasing the debt ratio from 0 to 100 
percent of GDP would be equivalent to a permanent fall in consumption of 2.6 
percent, but further increasing the debt ratio to 200 percent of GDP would be 
equivalent to an additional fall of 12 percent in consumption. The non-linearity is 
explained by the diminished effectiveness of occupation switching as a response to 
declining wages. When the debt is low, the occupation switching works reasonably 
well because the agents that change their occupation are sufficiently productive and 






welfare loss is not too big. But as the debt continues to rise, new entrepreneurs 
operate small and unproductive firms, and the welfare costs of the debt become very 
large. 
4.3. Heterogeneity and entrepreneurship 
Since heterogeneity and entrepreneurship are not sine qua non elements for 
computing the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of a higher debt to GDP 
ratio, I assess the importance of these features by repeating the above experiment with 
a non-stochastic representative agent model (without heterogeneity and 
entrepreneurship), and with an Aiyagari model (with heterogeneity but without 
entrepreneurship). 
Qualitatively, the effects of a rising debt to GDP ratio on equilibrium prices, real 
variables and welfare, presented in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 6, are similar 
across the three models. The capital to labor ratio decreases as the debt ratio rises, and 
thus the equilibrium interest rate increases and wages fall. Due to the fall in the 
factors of production, output and consumption fall, and ultimately welfare is reduced. 
But quantitatively, there are large variations between models. 
To better understand the differences, Figure 7 presents the determination of the 
equilibrium interest rate across models. In the representative agent model, the 
equilibrium interest rate net of taxes 𝑅𝑅0 equals the inverse of the subjective discount 
factor. Thus, in this model, the net interest rate is neutral with respect to an increase 
in the government’s debt as presented in Figure 2. In the models with heterogeneity, 
the equilibrium interest rate net of taxes 𝑅𝑅1 is determined by the interaction between 
the supply and demand for assets. 
The heterogeneity that results from the idiosyncratic shocks and the incomplete 
markets assumption implies that all agents have some possibility of reaching a state 
with low income. Thus, they choose to hold more assets than would be optimal if 
markets were complete, and so in the models with heterogeneity the equilibrium 
interest rate is always below the interest rate that would prevail if markets were 
complete or if there were no idiosyncratic shocks 𝑅𝑅1 < 𝑅𝑅0. Most importantly, in these 
models as the debt rises and the interest rate approaches the inverse of the subjective 
discount factor from below, the aggregate asset holdings 𝐴𝐴 tend to infinity. 
The main difference for the determination of the interest rate between the Aiyagari 
model and the model with entrepreneurship is that in the latter there is an additional 
sector that demands capital. As a result, for every debt level there is less capital 
available for the corporate sector and the equilibrium interest rate is higher (𝑅𝑅1 > 𝑅𝑅2). 
As explained above, as the debt ratio increases, due to the fall in wages some agents 
find it optimal to change their activity and become entrepreneurs. For the individuals 
that can change their activity this decision provides a partial hedge against the fall in 
wages. However, as the entrepreneurial sector grows its financing needs become 






larger in the model with entrepreneurship. In particular, if the debt to GDP ratio rises 
from 0 to 200 percent of GDP, the rise in the interest rate in the model with 
entrepreneurship would be almost three times larger than in the Aiyagari model. 
The welfare implications of the rise in the debt to GDP ratio are presented in Figure 
6. In the representative agent model, the government debt is purely distortionary 
because it crowds out private savings and forces the government to increase its 
distortionary taxation. As a result, the welfare costs rise monotonically as the debt to 
GDP ratio increases, and the representative person would prefer to be born in an 
economy without debt. Moreover, the welfare costs for the representative agent rises 
linearly with the debt ratio, and the optimal fiscal policy would be for the government 
not only to repay all its debt but to accumulate sufficient assets to finance its spending 
from the proceeds of its investments without recurring to distortionary taxation.  
In the models with heterogeneity, as explained in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), the 
debt is still distortionary but it also has a positive welfare effect as it enhances the 
liquidity in the economy by providing an additional instrument for smoothing 
consumption. As the debt ratio increases, the rise in the interest rate reduces the 
opportunity cost of saving. As a result, the agents choose to hold more assets in 
equilibrium. At the same time, as the return on their assets is higher, the agents 
become better insured against the stochastic variations in income. This liquidity effect 
explains why in the Aiyagari model the welfare costs of the rise in the debt ratio are 
smaller than in the representative agent model. 
In the model with entrepreneurs, as the debt ratio begins to rise some agents with a 
relatively high entrepreneurial ability change their occupation and are able to partially 
circumvent the fall in wages. This explains why when the debt ratio is low the welfare 
costs of the increase in the debt are lower than in the models without 
entrepreneurship. However, as the debt ratio continues to rise, the workers that switch 
their occupation on the margin have less entrepreneurial ability and savings. As a 
result, the aggregate consequences of higher debt grow more severe. 
In Figure 8 I decompose the welfare effects of higher debt by wealth percentiles. For 
the Aiyagari model, I find that the rise in the debt ratio has a bigger adverse effect on 
rich people. In particular, if the debt to GDP target was raised from 0 to 200 percent, 
the welfare cost for the average person from the lowest wealth percentile would be 
equivalent to a permanent fall of 6 percent in consumption, compared to 9 percent in 
average for those in the highest wealth percentile.  
On the contrary, in the model with entrepreneurs the rise in the debt ratio is very 
costly for the poor, while if the debt ratio is not too high, a higher debt might even be 
beneficial for the rich. For example, raising the debt ratio from 0 to 80 percent would 
entail an average welfare loss for those in the poorest percentile equivalent to a 
permanent fall of consumption of 5 percent, compared to a permanent increase of 3 
percent on average for the richest 10 percent. However, if the debt ratio continues to 






the poorest agents. For example, raising the debt ratio from 0 to 200 percent would be 
equivalent on average to a permanent fall of 20 percent in the consumption of the 
agents of the poorest percentile and of 7 percent for those in the richest percentile. 
The relative effects of the debt on rich and poor people differ across models, because 
the characteristics of the rich agents in the two models are not equivalent. In the 
Aiyagari model the rich persons are workers with a high working ability, whereas in 
the benchmark model they are entrepreneurs with high entrepreneurial ability. In both 
models the rise in the debt ratio lowers wages and raises the interest rate, but the fall 
in wages is larger. Thus, the change in prices due to the rise in the debt especially 
hurts the rich agents in the Aiyagari model because the rise in their capital income is 
not enough to outweigh the fall in their labor income.  
In the model with entrepreneurship the rise in the interest rate reduces the profitability 
of entrepreneurship, but for low levels of debt this effect is more than compensated 
by the rise in profitability that arises from the fall in wages. However, as the debt 
continues to rise the distortions from the higher taxes far outweigh any positive 
effects. In both models the poor agents do not have much working ability or assets, 
and thus their welfare is highly dependent on the level of the public transfers. Since 
the fall in GDP is larger in the model with entrepreneurs, the fall in the level of 
transfers (which are assumed to be fixed as a share of GDP) and in the welfare of the 
poor are much larger in the model with entrepreneurs. 
Overall, based on my experiments, eliminating heterogeneity and entrepreneurship 
from the model would result in a lower estimate of the costs of a higher debt ratio, 
once the debt exceeds 120 percent of GDP. Restricting the occupational choice by 
eliminating the entrepreneurial sector would reduce the estimated costs of the rise in 
the debt, because it would eliminate the additional distortions that arise from the 
agents that switch their occupation to start low quality entrepreneurial activities, 
which compete for financing with the government and more productive firms. 
4.4. Consequences with transitional dynamics 
Although the steady state comparisons are informative on the long run costs of 
delaying the adjustment of the fiscal imbalance, in order to have a complete picture of 
the consequences of different policy alternatives, the transitions to the steady states 
must be computed. In particular, because the benefits from the adjustment might be 
over-stated by only looking at the long run result, as this kind of analysis ignores the 
short run pain from the adjustment. 
Given the projected rise in the imbalance between revenues and expenditures 
(presented in Figure 1), it is evident that the US requires a change in fiscal policy to 
stabilize its debt ratio. However, although the adjustment is unavoidable, it can be 
delayed if the government temporarily finances its additional spending needs by 
issuing more bonds and thereby increasing its indebtedness. Thus, in the dynamic 






debt to GDP ratio reaches the level where at which the government wishes to stabilize 
its debt. Consequently, to stabilize the debt ratio at a lower level the government 
needs to adjust earlier. 
The simulations begin in 2011, after the Great Recession, where three things change 
compared with the initial steady state in 2007 (used to calibrate the model): 1) the 
debt to GDP rose from 36 to 69 percent, 2) other non-interest spending jumped from 
5.9 to 9.5 percent of GDP, and 3) the cost of transfers increased from 12 to 13.2 
percent of GDP. Since CBO projects an ever-increasing primary spending as a share 
of GDP due to population aging and the rising costs of health care, for the simulations 
I assume that after twenty years (in 2030) the primary spending stabilizes as a fraction 
of GDP (as presented in Figure 1). 
At the beginning of the period, the government credibly announces its new fiscal 
policy, which includes its selected debt to GDP target, the paths for the non-interest 
spending, tax rates, and lump sum transfers for all future periods. Thus, all the tax 
rates remain fixed at their initial steady state levels until the debt ratio reaches the 
desired target, and at that point the government adjusts its income tax as required to 
stabilize the debt. As soon as the agents learn the new policies they re-optimize their 
behavior, considering the announced paths of the government’s policies and prices. 
Given this behavior, the economy eventually reaches the steady states presented 
above, depending on the debt to GDP target selected by the government, in which the 
distribution of agents over states is invariant. 
Since GDP is an endogenous variable, to match the sequence of CBO projected 
values for transfers and other non-interest spending as a share of GDP from 2011 to 
2030, I follow an iterative process: (1) I fix the target debt to GDP ratio, (2) I guess 
the sequence for the real values of transfers and other non-interest spending, (3) I 
iterate over the sequence of equilibrium wages, interest rates, until the labor and 
capital markets clear every period, (4) when the debt to GDP ratio reaches the 
selected target, I iterate over the personal income tax in order to satisfy the 
government’s budget and stabilize the debt ratio at the specified level, (5) I compare 
the resulting spending sequence as a share of GDP with the desired targets and adjust 
the guess as required, (6) I repeat the process as required until obtaining a match. 
I compute the transitional dynamics for four different fiscal scenarios (presented in 
Figure 9). In a benchmark scenario, I assume that the government immediately 
stabilizes its debt ratio at 69 percent of GDP (its level in 2011). In a second scenario 
the government delays the adjustment for ten years until the debt ratio reaches 100 
percent of GDP (in 2020). In the third scenario the delays lasts twenty years until the 
debt reaches 150 percent of GDP (in 2030). In the last scenario the adjustment is 
postponed for twenty-five years until the debt ratio reaches 200 percent of GDP (in 
2035). As in the CBO projections (Figure 1), the model simulations (Figure 9) 
confirm that without a fiscal adjustment the debt ratio follows an explosive path as 






The pats for the income tax associated with the alternative scenarios are also 
presented in Figure 9. In the simulations, since the debt ratio only reaches 150 and 
200 percent of GDP after 2030 (where I assume the primary spending as a fraction of 
GDP becomes stationary), the income tax is only adjusted once in these scenarios. On 
the contrary, for the scenarios where the debt is stabilized at 69 and 100 percent of 
GDP, the income tax is adjusted every year to preserve the debt ratio at the desired 
target until the primary expenditures stabilize in 2030 (as a percentage of GDP). 
A steady state comparison of the main fiscal variables in the initial steady state and in 
the alternative scenarios is presented in Table 4. As expected, the fiscal adjustment 
required to stabilize the debt ratio rapidly grows as the delay increases. For example, 
compared to the scenario where the government immediately stabilizes its debt ratio, 
delaying the adjustment for ten years would only require an additional effort of 1.2 
percent of GDP, after twenty years the correction would need to be 3.1 percent of 
GDP, and after twenty-five years it would augment to 7.3 percent of GDP. 
The transition paths of the main macroeconomic variables under the four alternative 
scenarios are presented in Figure 10. As explained in the long-run analyses, as the 
debt ratio increases, the interest rate and the percentage of entrepreneurs rises; while 
wages, GDP and aggregate consumption fall, due to the crowding out. In Figure 11 
and Figure 12 are presented the transition paths for the main variables of the 
corporate and non-corporate sectors. As expected, as the debt ratio increases, the size 
of the corporate sector falls and the entrepreneurial sectors grows as some agents 
choose to switch their occupation to shield from the negative effects of the crowding 
out. However, since the marginal entrepreneurs are less productive and have lower 
assets, their production is not enough to compensate the fall of production in the 
corporate sector and thus GDP falls. 
Comparing the transitions from different scenarios, it is clear that adjusting the 
imbalance earlier entails an era of restraint that eventually pays off in the medium 
term as the economy converges to a steady state with a lower debt ratio, and higher 
output and consumption per-capita. Alternatively, delaying the consolidation involves 
a period of macroeconomic excess that is unsustainable (where the economy lives 
beyond its means by accumulating public debt), that eventually leads to a steady state 
with a higher debt ratio, and a lower level of output and consumption per-capita. 
Thus, given the short run costs of the consolidation, is it optimal to delay as much as 
possible the adjustment of the fiscal imbalance? 
I define the welfare effect from the fiscal policy that stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio 
at 𝑥𝑥%, as the permanent percentage change in the consumption of all agents ∆𝑥𝑥, 
holding leisure unchanged, starting from the first period of the transition to the new 
steady state, that would result in the same average discounted utility as that associated 
with the transitional dynamics to the new steady state in the benchmark scenario 
(where the debt ratio is immediately stabilized at 69 percent of GDP): 






Where 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧, 0) and 𝑣𝑣69(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) are the value functions, and 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓, 𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) and 
𝜇𝜇69(𝑓𝑓, 𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧) are the distributions associated with the first period of the transition to the 
new steady states of the economies that have a debt to GDP target ratio of 𝑥𝑥 and 69 
percent. 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝑓𝑓,𝜃𝜃, 𝑧𝑧,∆𝑥𝑥) is the equilibrium value function in the first period of the 
transition for the economy with a debt target ratio of 𝑥𝑥 percent, where the equilibrium 
consumption of each agent has been increases by ∆𝑥𝑥 percent while leisure remains 
unchanged in all period of the transition to the new steady state. 
To separate the long run consequences from the effects of the transition to the new 
steady state, I also compute the long run welfare change from these four scenarios 
using the same welfare criteria from equation (26), but this time taking as benchmark 
the economy where debt is stabilized at 69 percent instead of an economy without 
debt. The welfare consequences from the different policies computed for the 
benchmark model are presented in Figure 13. 
I find that in the long run: 1) delaying the adjustment for ten years and allowing the 
debt ratio to increase from 69 to 100 percent of GDP would be equivalent in the long 
run to a permanent fall in consumption of 0.8 percent; 2) postponing the correcting 
for twenty years and allowing the debt ratio to rise to 150 percent of GDP is 
equivalent to a permanent fall in consumption of 7.3 percent; and 3) deferring the 
change for twenty-five years and allowing the debt to reach 200 percent of GDP is 
equivalent to a fall in consumption of 13 percent. As explained earlier, in the long run 
increasing the debt ratio always has negative welfare effects and the cost rise non-
linearly with debt. 
When the transition to the new steady state is considered I find that: 1) delaying the 
adjustment for ten years would be equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption 
of 0.1 percent; 2) postponing for twenty years is equivalent to a fall in consumption of 
2.5 percent; and deferring the change for twenty-five years would be equivalent to a 
change in consumption of 3.6 percent. Thus, if the adjustment is postponed less than 
ten years, and consequently the debt ratio is stabilized at a level that is lower than 100 
percent of GDP, the short run costs from the adjustment outweigh the long run 
benefits. However, when the debt ratio exceeds 100 percent of GDP, the distortions 
from further increases in the debt ratio outweigh the short run gains from deferring 
the adjustment. 
Based on my results it is possible to conclude that the current policy of the US 
government of deferring the adjustment is optimal as the debt ratio is still not high 
enough and thus not too distortionary. Although it should be stressed that the deferral 
is only beneficial for the current generation which benefits from the period of 
macroeconomic excess, while future generations would prefer to be born in a country 








In this paper I compute the macroeconomic and welfare costs for the US of the higher 
debt to GDP ratio that would result from delaying the policy changes required to 
correct its medium-term budgetary imbalance. I find that the stakes are high, given 
the continuous increase in the federal debt that the current policies entail. Based on 
my simulations, if the US government fails to adjust its medium term fiscal imbalance 
for twenty-five years the debt to GDP ratio would rise from 69 percent in 2011 to 200 
percent by 2035, the average growth during the transition to the steady state would 
only be 0.9 percent compared to 1.8 percent in a scenario where the debt ratio is 
immediately stabilized at 69 percent of GDP, and would eventually result in a 
permanent output loss of 22 percent. Furthermore, a delay of twenty-five years would 
be equivalent to a permanent fall of 3.6 percent in consumption even after considering 
the short run welfare gains from delaying the fiscal adjustment. Thus, I conclude that 
even if it might not be optimal for the US government to immediately correct its 
medium-term imbalance, in a few years it will unavoidably need to implement a large 
fiscal adjustment to avoid the harsh consequences from further delays. 
In the model I assumed that the economy is closed and that the government never 
defaults, and these simplifications could potentially alter the results. If default was 
explicitly modeled, the reaction of the equilibrium interest rate to changes in the stock 
of debt would increase. On the contrary, if I had modeled the US as a small open 
economy the world interest rate would not be affected by its borrowing needs. 
Although the US has a high component of foreign financing, I believe my 
assumptions are sufficiently realistic to provide an idea of the importance of the 
policy choices that the US government will need to make in the near future. After all, 
if the US indebtedness were to reach the high levels implicit in this paper the world 




Annexes Chapter 1:  






The dataset contains a full decomposition of public revenues and expenditures (as a share of 
GDP) from 2005 to 2016 for 168 countries (96% of world’s GDP). The list of countries is 
presented in Table 1.1. Whenever possible, the information corresponds to the general 
government. However, 75 countries in the sample only report statistics for the central 
government (presented on Table 1.2). 
The dataset combines information from various sources to maximize the number of countries 
covered. The main source is the submission by country desks to WEO in April 2017. The 
information was then corrected and completed with the latest available information for the 
country from IMF country reports (Article IV and program reviews). When information was still 
missing, it was completed with revenue statistics from the OECD. 
The government’s revenues are decomposed into seven categories: 
1) taxes on income profits and capital gains (excluding taxes to oil and gas companies),  
2) other taxes (mainly property taxes), 
3) payroll taxes (all social security contributions for pensions, health, and unemployment 
insurance), 
4) taxes on goods and services (excises and VAT), 
5) taxes on international trade and transactions (tariffs and duties), 
6) grants, and 
7) non-tax revenues (royalties, capital income, and commodity related income). 
Social security contributions are assumed to be part of the government’s revenues. Whenever 
possible, tax revenues directly related to natural resources (e.g. oil, gas, minerals) are included as 
non-tax revenues to make tax revenues comparable among countries. Proceeds from 
privatizations are not included as revenues. 
The government’s expenditures are decomposed into four categories: 
1) government consumption (wages, and purchase of goods and services),  
2) interest payments, 
3) transfers and subsidies (social security benefits, grants, subsidies, and other expenses), and 
4) gross acquisition of nonfinancial assets (public investment including depreciation costs). 
The explanatory variables are: 
1) Gross National Income per capita in nominal USD, as reported by the World Bank using the 
Atlas Method. 
2) Expected years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if 
prevailing patterns of age-specific enrollment rates persist throughout the child’s life, as reported 
by the UNESCO. 
3) The growth gap estimated as the difference between observed GDP growth and its projection 
for 2021 as reported in WEO (used as a proxy for potential growth). 
4) Old-age dependency ratio, the ratio of population older than 65 to the population aged 15-64, 
as reported by the United Nations Population Division. 
5) Net oil and gas exports (as a percentage of GDP), as reported in WEO. 




7) Political participation index, as reported in the Democracy Index of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
8) Gross public debt (as a percentage of GDP), as reported in WEO. 
9) Gross minimum annual wage (nominal USD), as reported in the Doing Business report of the 
World Bank. 
 
The countries in the dummy variables EUR, AFR, APD, WHD and AFR correspond to area 




Table 1.1: List of countries by income level (GNI per capita) 
Low income countries Low middle income countries
Afghanistan Gambia, The Nepal Armenia Guatemala Nigeria
Benin Guinea Niger Bangladesh Honduras Pakistan
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Bhutan India Philippines
Burundi Haiti Senegal Bolivia Indonesia São Tom and Prín
Cent Afr Republic Liberia Sierra Leone Cabo Verde Kenya Sri Lanka
Chad Madagascar Tanzania Cambodia Kosovo Sudan
Comoros Malawi Togo Cameroon Kyrgyz Republic Swaziland
Congo, Dem Mali Uganda Congo, Rep Lao PDR Tajikistan
Ethiopia Mozambique Zimbabwe Cote d'Ivoire Lesotho Tonga
Djibouti Mauritania Tunisia
Egypt Moldova Ukraine
El Salvador Morocco Vanuatu
Ghana Nicaragua Zambia
High middle income countries High income countries
Albania Fiji Montenegro Antigua and Barb Greece Portugal
Algeria Gabon Namibia Australia Hungary Qatar
Angola Georgia Palau Austria Ireland San Marino
Argentina Grenada Panama Bahamas, The Israel Saudi Arabia
Azerbaijan Guyana Paraguay Bahrain Italy Seychelles
Belarus Iran Peru Barbados Japan Singapore
Belize Iraq Romania Belgium Korea Slovak Republic
Bosnia and Herz Jamaica Russia Brunei Dar Kuwait Slovenia
Botswana Jordan Serbia Canada Latvia Spain
Brazil Kazakhstan South Africa Chile Lithuania St. Kitts and Nevis
Bulgaria Lebanon St. Lucia Croatia Luxembourg Sweden
Colombia Macedonia, FYR St. Vin and Gren Cyprus Macao Switzerland
Costa Rica Malaysia Thailand Czech Republic Malta Trin and Tobago
Dominica Maldives Turkey Denmark Netherlands United Arab Em
Dom Republic Marshall Isl Tuvalu Estonia New Zealand United Kingdom
Ecuador Mauritius Finland Norway United States





Table 1.2: List of countries that only report central government statistics 
 
  
Low income countries Low middle income countries
Afghanistan Guinea Niger Armenia Guatemala Sri Lanka
Benin Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Bangladesh Kenya Sudan
Burkina Faso Haiti Senegal Cabo Verde Lesotho Swaziland
Burundi Liberia Sierra Leone Cameroon Mauritania Tonga
Cent Afr Republic Madagascar Tanzania Congo, Rep Morocco Tunisia
Chad Malawi Togo Djibouti Nicaragua Vanuatu
Congo, Dem Mali Uganda Ghana São Tom and Prín Zambia
Gambia, The Nepal Zimbabwe
High middle income countries High income countries
Albania Gabon Maldives Antigua and Barb New Zealand Singapore
Algeria Grenada Marshall Isl Bahamas, The Oman St. Kitts and Nevis
Angola Iran Mauritius Brunei Dar Qatar Trin and Tobago
Belize Iraq Namibia Korea Saudi Arabia Uruguay
Botswana Jamaica Palau
Dominica Jordan Russia
Dom Republic Lebanon St. Lucia





Table 1.3: List of countries by area department in the IMF 
 
Albania Hungary Portugal Angola Gabon Nigeria
Austria Ireland Romania Benin Gambia, The Rwanda
Belarus Israel Russia Botswana Ghana São Tom and Prín
Belgium Italy San Marino Burkina Faso Guinea Senegal
Bosnia and Herz Kosovo Serbia Burundi Guinea-Bissau Seychelles
Bulgaria Latvia Slovak Republic Cabo Verde Kenya Sierra Leone
Croatia Lithuania Slovenia Cameroon Lesotho South Africa
Cyprus Luxembourg Spain Cent Afr Republic Liberia Swaziland
Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Sweden Chad Madagascar Tanzania
Denmark Malta Switzerland Comoros Malawi Togo
Estonia Moldova Turkey Congo, Dem Mali Uganda
Finland Montenegro Ukraine Congo, Rep Mauritius Zambia
France Netherlands United Kingdom Cote d'Ivoire Mozambique Zimbabwe
Germany Norway Equ Guinea Namibia
Greece Poland Ethiopia Niger
European (EUR) African (AFR)
Afghanistan Kyrgyz Republic Antigua and Barb Guatemala Australia Maldives
Algeria Lebanon Argentina Guyana Bangladesh Marshall Isl
Armenia Mauritania Bahamas, The Haiti Bhutan Nepal
Azerbaijan Morocco Barbados Honduras Brunei Dar New Zealand
Bahrain Oman Belize Jamaica Cambodia Palau
Djibouti Pakistan Bolivia Mexico Fiji Philippines
Egypt Qatar Brazil Nicaragua India Singapore
Georgia Saudi Arabia Canada Panama Indonesia Sri Lanka
Iran Sudan Chile Paraguay Japan Thailand
Iraq Tajikistan Colombia Peru Korea Tonga
Jordan Tunisia Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis Lao PDR Tuvalu
Kazakhstan United Arab Em Dominica St. Lucia Macao Vanuatu
Kuwait Dom Republic St. Vin and Gren Malaysia
Ecuador Trin and Tobago
El Salvador United States
Grenada Uruguay























Afghanistan 26.9 2.8 0.5 0.4 2.2 2.4 15.9 2.7
Benin 15.2 2.1 1.2 0.0 3.6 5.7 0.5 2.1
Burkina Faso 22.0 3.7 0.5 0.1 8.9 2.5 3.8 2.5
Burundi 15.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 7.1 1.3 2.9 0.9
Cent Afr Republic 14.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.9 6.0 0.6
Chad 13.0 3.3 0.9 0.0 1.3 1.9 3.8 1.8
Comoros 22.7 3.0 0.1 0.0 7.4 1.6 8.4 2.2
Congo, Dem 10.1 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.3 1.9 2.1
Ethiopia 16.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 3.7 4.1 0.9 2.6
Gambia, The 19.7 4.3 0.1 0.0 7.0 5.0 1.7 1.6
Guinea 21.1 3.3 0.0 0.0 9.3 3.4 1.6 3.5
Guinea-Bissau 16.4 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 2.8 3.8 3.0
Haiti 18.5 3.1 1.8 0.0 4.4 4.2 4.3 0.7
Liberia 30.1 7.5 0.3 0.0 1.3 8.6 9.5 2.9
Madagascar 14.7 2.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.3 3.4 0.5
Malawi 25.2 9.1 0.1 0.0 7.4 1.6 5.0 2.0
Mali 21.6 3.6 0.0 0.0 7.8 1.9 1.6 6.7
Mozambique 24.7 9.1 0.8 0.0 7.6 1.8 1.4 4.0
Nepal 23.3 5.1 1.8 0.0 7.1 4.9 1.9 2.5
Niger 20.0 3.5 1.3 0.0 5.7 4.0 4.7 0.8
Rwanda 23.6 6.6 0.0 0.0 7.9 1.3 5.1 2.7
Senegal 26.8 5.9 0.4 0.3 11.0 2.7 2.8 3.7
Sierra Leone 15.2 5.3 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.6 3.0 1.6
Tanzania 15.9 4.8 1.9 0.0 5.2 0.9 0.9 2.2
Togo 21.7 5.1 0.0 0.0 3.9 7.9 2.9 1.9
Uganda 14.4 4.6 0.1 0.0 6.8 1.3 1.0 0.6
Zimbabwe 24.7 7.6 2.0 0.0 11.3 1.9 0.0 1.9






















Armenia 21.4 9.0 2.0 0.3 7.9 1.1 0.6 0.5
Bangladesh 10.4 2.5 1.1 0.0 2.9 2.2 0.1 1.5
Bhutan 29.5 8.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.3 12.3 3.9
Bolivia 32.4 5.6 4.4 1.4 11.7 1.6 0.2 7.5
Cabo Verde 27.8 6.3 0.4 0.0 9.2 3.3 3.9 4.7
Cambodia 19.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 9.0 2.4 1.9 2.4
Cameroon 16.6 4.8 0.2 0.3 6.6 2.0 0.4 2.3
Congo, Rep 27.4 7.5 0.4 0.0 6.9 2.7 0.9 9.0
Cote d'Ivoire 19.9 3.9 0.0 2.1 3.8 5.4 1.4 3.3
Djibouti 32.5 7.9 1.4 0.0 7.7 1.8 4.5 9.2
Egypt 20.9 4.0 0.4 0.0 5.1 1.1 0.2 10.1
El Salvador 20.7 5.4 0.1 2.4 9.0 0.8 0.2 2.9
Ghana 17.1 5.4 0.0 0.2 7.3 2.6 0.7 0.9
Guatemala 10.9 3.9 1.3 0.0 4.6 0.4 0.0 0.7
Honduras 26.8 6.6 0.4 3.1 11.1 0.8 0.8 4.0
India 21.3 6.4 0.0 0.0 9.8 1.4 0.0 3.7
Indonesia 14.3 5.4 1.4 0.0 4.5 0.3 0.0 2.7
Kenya 20.2 8.8 0.0 0.0 6.8 1.2 0.5 2.9
Kosovo 26.4 3.9 -0.6 0.0 20.3 0.0 0.0 2.8
Kyrgyz Republic 38.0 5.8 0.5 5.7 12.5 2.9 4.4 6.2
Lao PDR 18.4 2.3 1.8 0.0 6.8 1.5 2.3 3.7
Lesotho 42.1 11.8 0.5 0.0 8.2 14.9 2.5 4.2
Mauritania 28.1 4.7 0.2 0.0 8.9 2.8 2.1 9.4
Moldova 34.2 4.9 1.6 9.9 14.2 1.1 1.0 1.5
Morocco 26.2 8.3 2.0 0.0 10.3 0.9 1.0 3.7
Nicaragua 25.6 6.9 0.8 5.7 9.0 0.7 1.1 1.4
Nigeria 4.8 1.4 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5
Pakistan 15.5 4.1 1.9 0.0 5.2 1.4 0.2 2.7
Philippines 19.5 6.5 1.2 2.4 6.5 0.5 0.0 2.4
São Tom and Prín 28.0 5.7 0.6 0.0 1.2 4.8 13.5 2.2
Sri Lanka 13.2 2.4 1.1 0.1 6.2 1.3 0.1 1.9
Sudan 9.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.4 0.3 3.5
Swaziland 25.6 7.8 0.0 0.0 6.3 9.3 1.4 0.8
Tajikistan 27.9 4.2 0.4 2.5 12.0 1.2 2.5 5.1
Tonga 33.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 16.4 2.2 5.8 4.1
Tunisia 22.9 8.4 3.3 0.3 8.1 0.7 0.1 2.0
Ukraine 38.4 8.4 3.9 5.5 14.5 0.9 0.0 5.2
Vanuatu 24.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 12.6 3.7 5.8 2.0
Zambia 17.9 6.6 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.9 0.3 4.8






















Albania 26.6 4.0 3.8 5.3 11.3 0.4 0.8 1.4
Algeria 29.0 6.3 0.5 0.0 5.0 2.4 0.0 14.8
Angola 19.6 4.6 1.0 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.0 10.5
Argentina 33.7 5.4 2.8 6.6 14.5 1.6 0.0 2.8
Azerbaijan 34.5 6.3 1.1 1.2 8.2 1.1 0.1 16.6
Belarus 38.1 7.0 2.5 12.1 10.7 3.5 0.0 2.3
Belize 30.4 7.5 3.5 0.0 9.8 5.7 1.3 2.6
Bosnia and Herz 42.9 3.7 0.0 15.0 18.0 0.8 0.7 4.7
Botswana 32.0 6.2 0.2 0.0 3.4 6.8 0.1 15.4
Brazil 32.7 5.5 2.3 5.5 12.0 0.7 0.0 6.7
Bulgaria 35.4 5.4 1.0 6.6 14.6 0.2 3.1 4.5
Colombia 24.9 6.6 1.8 3.5 9.0 0.7 0.1 3.3
Costa Rica 26.8 4.5 0.9 9.3 8.4 1.3 0.0 2.4
Dominica 37.5 4.9 0.5 0.0 14.8 5.4 1.0 10.9
Dom Republic 14.4 4.1 0.6 0.0 7.8 1.0 0.0 0.9
Ecuador 30.7 4.2 1.9 4.8 6.9 1.8 0.0 11.1
Equ Guinea 15.8 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.0 11.6
Fiji 28.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 10.7 9.3 0.2 2.3
Gabon 17.1 3.6 1.4 0.0 2.6 3.3 0.0 6.2
Georgia 28.6 10.5 1.2 0.0 14.1 0.2 0.8 1.8
Grenada 27.1 4.6 0.9 0.0 8.8 7.4 3.6 1.8
Guyana 28.6 8.5 0.8 2.6 9.7 2.4 1.1 3.5
Iran 15.1 3.2 0.2 0.0 2.2 1.2 0.0 8.3
Iraq 26.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 24.1
Jamaica 27.9 7.3 0.3 0.0 8.2 9.8 0.3 2.0
Jordan 25.5 3.4 1.6 0.0 10.5 1.1 3.0 5.9
Kazakhstan 18.0 5.6 0.7 1.2 3.3 2.1 0.0 5.1
Lebanon 18.7 3.9 2.2 4.1 4.7 2.7 0.0 1.1
Macedonia, FYR 27.8 4.0 0.4 8.6 11.5 0.8 0.8 1.7
Malaysia 20.4 7.6 0.6 0.0 4.3 0.2 0.0 7.6
Maldives 34.6 6.1 2.4 0.0 11.9 4.6 0.9 8.7
Marshall Isl 66.2 6.4 0.1 0.0 6.2 4.0 37.2 12.3
Mauritius 23.4 5.7 1.8 0.3 11.8 0.3 1.2 2.3
Mexico 23.2 7.3 0.2 3.6 6.2 0.3 0.0 5.7
Montenegro 43.9 5.3 2.9 11.2 18.3 0.6 0.4 5.2
Namibia 31.5 10.7 0.2 0.0 8.1 9.3 0.1 3.1
Palau 39.6 3.2 3.1 0.5 7.8 5.0 14.8 5.2
Panama 20.5 4.6 0.5 6.0 4.2 0.6 0.0 4.6
Paraguay 23.3 2.8 0.3 4.9 8.4 1.1 0.2 5.6
Peru 18.7 5.6 1.7 2.2 6.4 0.2 0.1 2.5
Romania 29.1 5.9 1.6 8.1 10.4 0.1 0.5 2.5
Russia 32.8 6.7 1.4 7.0 6.9 0.6 0.0 10.2
Serbia 42.4 5.6 1.6 11.0 17.1 0.9 0.2 6.0
South Africa 29.4 14.9 1.1 1.0 9.0 1.1 0.0 2.3
St. Lucia 27.7 6.5 0.3 0.0 6.7 11.8 1.3 1.1
St. Vin and Gren 29.2 6.5 0.2 0.0 7.7 10.3 2.6 1.9
Thailand 21.9 6.4 0.4 1.0 9.7 0.7 0.0 3.7
Turkey 31.2 6.5 2.7 6.8 11.6 1.7 0.0 1.9
Tuvalu 124.5 9.3 0.0 3.3 4.6 3.2 32.9 71.2






















Antigua and Barb 25.6 1.9 0.5 0.0 8.0 6.8 0.0 8.4
Australia 34.6 19.1 1.3 1.4 5.8 0.5 0.1 6.4
Austria 49.6 12.5 3.8 18.2 10.0 1.7 0.1 3.3
Bahamas, The 21.7 0.0 11.3 2.9 1.8 5.7 0.0 0.0
Bahrain 17.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 2.0 14.9
Barbados 37.9 7.3 2.3 5.9 15.6 2.6 0.1 4.1
Belgium 51.0 16.3 5.1 16.1 6.8 1.8 0.0 4.9
Brunei Dar 17.9 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 15.7
Canada 38.8 15.3 4.3 4.8 7.5 0.3 0.0 6.6
Chile 23.3 6.1 0.1 1.4 10.0 1.2 0.5 4.0
Croatia 45.5 5.9 0.4 11.8 20.2 0.1 2.1 5.0
Cyprus 38.7 9.0 1.9 8.5 13.6 0.0 0.7 5.0
Czech Republic 40.5 7.8 1.0 14.9 10.9 0.6 0.7 4.6
Denmark 52.7 26.4 4.8 0.3 13.3 1.4 0.0 6.5
Estonia 40.7 7.8 0.9 11.9 13.5 0.7 1.7 4.2
Finland 54.2 15.5 1.2 13.1 13.0 1.5 0.2 9.6
France 53.2 10.7 7.0 18.9 9.4 1.5 0.1 5.6
Germany 45.1 11.9 1.4 16.7 9.1 0.9 0.2 4.9
Greece 50.3 8.9 1.5 14.2 12.2 5.2 2.7 5.6
Hungary 45.8 6.9 0.0 14.2 13.9 4.3 1.7 4.8
Ireland 27.2 10.9 0.1 4.6 7.6 1.4 0.2 2.4
Israel 37.5 10.3 3.3 7.1 12.6 0.3 1.1 2.8
Italy 47.2 14.3 3.3 13.2 9.5 2.9 0.2 3.8
Japan 32.6 10.1 2.6 12.5 7.2 0.2 0.0 0.1
Korea 22.1 7.2 1.7 4.0 5.4 0.6 0.0 3.2
Kuwait 51.9 0.4 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.2
Latvia 36.3 7.5 0.8 8.7 11.3 1.0 3.0 3.9
Lithuania 34.3 5.7 0.3 12.5 10.9 0.0 0.8 4.1
Luxembourg 43.1 13.4 0.6 12.0 9.8 2.5 0.2 4.6
Macao 27.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 24.4
Malta 38.1 13.3 0.3 6.8 14.1 0.0 0.4 3.2
Netherlands 44.1 10.2 2.5 14.8 9.3 1.8 0.0 5.5
New Zealand 35.1 18.0 0.0 1.0 10.0 1.1 0.0 5.1
Norway 53.1 19.0 1.1 8.9 9.5 0.8 0.0 13.8
Oman 29.9 1.6 1.0 3.4 0.0 1.1 0.9 21.9
Poland 38.8 7.2 2.3 14.0 10.7 0.3 0.0 4.3
Portugal 43.5 10.3 1.8 11.7 11.2 1.8 0.0 6.7
Qatar 30.3 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 24.3
San Marino 40.2 6.6 1.0 12.2 8.6 0.2 0.0 11.7
Saudi Arabia 21.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 19.1
Seychelles 37.9 10.9 3.3 0.0 16.7 1.9 1.3 3.8
Singapore 22.1 7.2 3.7 0.0 2.4 0.8 0.0 8.0
Slovak Republic 39.7 7.5 0.4 14.2 9.3 1.3 2.3 4.7
Slovenia 39.4 6.7 0.8 14.4 12.0 1.9 1.2 2.4
Spain 37.9 9.7 1.5 12.2 9.7 1.2 0.5 3.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 33.9 5.2 0.7 0.0 8.6 6.1 2.8 10.5
Sweden 48.9 18.1 0.4 12.8 11.2 1.0 0.1 5.3
Switzerland 32.7 12.2 1.6 6.6 5.0 1.4 0.0 5.9
Trin and Tobago 23.5 5.4 2.6 0.0 6.6 1.7 0.2 7.0
United Arab Em 26.3 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 24.5
United Kingdom 36.3 11.6 3.5 7.8 10.4 1.4 0.0 1.5
United States 31.4 12.5 2.6 6.8 4.3 0.2 0.0 5.0
Uruguay 28.6 6.6 0.2 7.3 10.7 1.0 0.0 2.8


















Afghanistan 26.7 17.1 0.1 6.2 3.4
Benin 21.3 9.0 1.2 5.2 5.9
Burkina Faso 24.5 9.3 0.7 5.1 9.4
Burundi 21.2 9.8 1.1 5.0 5.3
Cent Afr Republic 12.4 7.3 0.6 1.6 2.9
Chad 14.3 7.9 2.1 1.5 2.8
Comoros 29.9 13.4 0.2 5.6 10.7
Congo, Dem 10.9 7.0 0.2 1.3 2.4
Ethiopia 18.4 3.7 0.5 4.8 9.4
Gambia, The 29.9 11.6 7.7 4.2 6.4
Guinea 21.4 9.7 1.9 3.9 5.9
Guinea-Bissau 20.1 7.5 0.9 5.8 5.9
Haiti 18.5 10.5 0.3 1.7 6.0
Liberia 36.0 22.7 0.5 4.4 8.4
Madagascar 16.0 9.4 0.9 0.5 5.2
Malawi 33.0 13.5 4.9 8.7 5.9
Mali 25.6 8.0 0.7 8.0 8.9
Mozambique 30.7 14.6 2.9 3.4 9.8
Nepal 22.0 5.6 0.4 10.5 5.5
Niger 26.5 8.9 0.9 4.6 12.1
Rwanda 26.0 6.9 1.0 7.5 10.6
Senegal 31.0 10.3 2.2 6.0 12.5
Sierra Leone 23.1 12.4 0.8 1.4 8.5
Tanzania 19.6 11.3 1.6 0.0 6.7
Togo 31.4 10.8 2.4 4.2 14.0
Uganda 18.0 8.7 2.3 0.0 7.0
Zimbabwe 35.0 18.7 1.5 8.7 6.1

















Armenia 27.0 8.4 1.9 13.5 3.1
Bangladesh 13.8 3.4 1.9 3.4 5.1
Bhutan 31.6 13.5 1.5 7.3 9.3
Bolivia 38.9 14.4 1.0 9.0 14.5
Cabo Verde 31.0 16.7 2.6 7.4 4.3
Cambodia 22.3 11.1 0.4 3.0 7.8
Cameroon 21.3 10.4 1.1 3.0 6.8
Congo, Rep 44.6 21.9 0.7 0.2 21.8
Cote d'Ivoire 23.8 11.1 1.7 4.3 6.7
Djibouti 48.3 21.6 1.4 1.2 24.1
Egypt 32.9 9.1 8.3 12.4 3.1
El Salvador 21.5 13.5 2.7 2.8 2.5
Ghana 25.4 10.5 6.4 3.7 4.8
Guatemala 11.9 5.5 1.5 2.7 2.2
Honduras 28.1 14.2 2.4 5.0 6.5
India 27.9 2.6 4.9 15.8 4.6
Indonesia 16.8 7.6 1.5 4.1 3.6
Kenya 27.5 10.0 3.2 6.6 7.7
Kosovo 27.9 12.3 0.3 8.1 7.2
Kyrgyz Republic 42.5 18.6 1.2 12.7 10.0
Lao PDR 24.3 12.0 1.3 3.0 8.0
Lesotho 49.8 29.2 0.9 9.7 10.0
Mauritania 28.1 10.9 1.1 4.7 11.4
Moldova 36.3 15.3 1.3 16.0 3.7
Morocco 30.2 14.5 2.7 7.3 5.7
Nicaragua 27.3 10.0 0.9 10.8 5.6
Nigeria 9.3 3.5 1.0 3.0 1.8
Pakistan 19.9 3.5 4.3 8.6 3.5
Philippines 19.9 8.1 2.1 5.3 4.4
São Tom and Prín 30.9 12.0 0.4 4.8 13.7
Sri Lanka 18.8 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.8
Sudan 11.1 5.1 0.6 4.1 1.3
Swaziland 37.8 19.8 1.5 6.9 9.6
Tajikistan 38.5 11.8 0.6 11.1 15.0
Tonga 32.6 25.2 0.9 4.6 1.9
Tunisia 28.6 16.5 2.2 4.6 5.3
Ukraine 40.6 16.0 4.1 17.4 3.1
Vanuatu 32.6 16.8 0.9 6.1 8.8
Zambia 24.0 11.1 3.4 5.9 3.6

















Albania 28.3 7.4 2.4 14.8 3.7
Algeria 40.6 11.7 0.3 14.1 14.5
Angola 23.7 12.8 3.0 3.4 4.5
Argentina 39.5 15.4 0.8 19.6 3.6
Azerbaijan 35.9 16.5 0.9 5.1 13.4
Belarus 42.7 14.5 2.0 21.5 4.7
Belize 34.0 18.2 2.9 6.9 6.0
Bosnia and Herz 42.8 20.6 0.9 17.4 3.9
Botswana 33.9 17.8 0.4 6.9 8.8
Brazil 41.6 23.0 8.7 8.4 1.5
Bulgaria 33.8 10.2 0.8 18.7 4.1
Colombia 28.3 8.4 3.6 10.5 5.8
Costa Rica 31.3 16.9 2.8 9.8 1.8
Dominica 38.8 18.2 2.1 6.0 12.5
Dom Republic 17.6 6.0 2.9 5.5 3.2
Ecuador 37.3 14.8 1.6 10.3 10.6
Equ Guinea 32.2 8.7 0.4 4.9 18.2
Fiji 34.5 17.3 2.9 12.1 2.2
Gabon 21.7 11.6 2.3 2.8 5.0
Georgia 30.2 9.3 1.2 15.7 4.0
Grenada 24.7 12.9 3.0 4.5 4.3
Guyana 33.0 13.6 0.9 11.9 6.6
Iran 17.9 6.7 0.7 8.3 2.2
Iraq 40.1 18.9 0.7 9.9 10.6
Jamaica 28.8 16.7 7.9 1.8 2.4
Jordan 28.9 6.6 3.0 15.6 3.7
Kazakhstan 22.4 9.3 1.5 8.7 2.9
Lebanon 26.8 9.8 9.0 6.9 1.1
Macedonia, FYR 30.5 8.4 1.1 18.2 2.8
Malaysia 23.4 8.7 2.3 8.2 4.2
Maldives 43.0 21.5 3.1 6.5 11.9
Marshall Isl 63.9 36.3 0.7 17.9 9.0
Mauritius 26.7 9.0 2.6 13.0 2.1
Mexico 26.0 8.4 3.1 10.3 4.2
Montenegro 49.2 15.8 2.3 25.2 5.9
Namibia 39.4 21.6 2.4 11.3 4.1
Palau 41.6 22.2 0.3 7.8 11.3
Panama 22.8 7.8 1.7 6.3 7.0
Paraguay 24.3 13.2 1.2 5.8 4.1
Peru 21.0 12.1 1.0 3.2 4.7
Romania 31.5 12.9 1.3 14.8 2.5
Russia 36.4 8.0 1.0 23.1 4.3
Serbia 43.6 16.5 3.1 20.7 3.3
South Africa 33.0 16.3 3.5 9.5 3.7
St. Lucia 31.9 15.1 4.8 6.9 5.1
St. Vin and Gren 30.5 16.6 2.2 6.9 4.8
Thailand 21.5 13.0 0.9 5.3 2.3
Turkey 33.5 11.5 2.1 16.2 3.7
Tuvalu 127.3 69.0 0.1 58.0 0.2

















Antigua and Barb 24.6 12.8 2.6 6.2 3.0
Australia 37.3 20.1 1.5 12.2 3.5
Austria 51.0 17.2 2.2 28.8 2.8
Bahamas, The 25.2 11.2 3.1 7.6 3.3
Bahrain 35.4 15.9 3.0 11.1 5.4
Barbados 44.8 13.2 6.7 22.2 2.7
Belgium 53.7 16.5 2.7 30.9 3.6
Brunei Dar 39.8 24.4 0.0 7.8 7.6
Canada 40.8 20.7 2.9 13.3 3.9
Chile 26.2 9.5 0.8 11.8 4.1
Croatia 47.0 19.2 3.4 20.9 3.5
Cyprus 39.0 16.1 2.6 18.2 2.1
Czech Republic 39.9 15.1 1.0 20.4 3.4
Denmark 53.6 25.0 1.4 24.3 2.9
Estonia 40.4 18.8 0.1 16.8 4.7
Finland 56.1 24.5 1.1 27.1 3.4
France 56.5 17.9 1.9 33.1 3.6
Germany 44.3 12.3 1.4 28.5 2.1
Greece 50.3 17.3 3.3 24.9 4.8
Hungary 47.6 18.9 3.2 22.7 2.8
Ireland 28.1 11.1 2.4 12.9 1.7
Israel 40.1 18.8 3.1 16.6 1.6
Italy 49.6 15.3 4.0 28.0 2.3
Japan 36.8 9.3 1.6 22.1 3.8
Korea 21.8 4.1 0.7 15.3 1.7
Kuwait 55.5 27.7 0.3 19.3 8.2
Latvia 36.7 13.2 1.2 19.6 2.7
Lithuania 34.3 14.6 1.7 15.1 2.9
Luxembourg 41.4 12.1 0.4 25.1 3.8
Macao 22.7 8.3 0.0 11.1 3.3
Malta 38.7 18.7 2.1 14.1 3.8
Netherlands 44.6 14.9 1.1 25.3 3.3
New Zealand 33.8 12.3 1.4 17.0 3.1
Norway 50.2 22.7 1.1 21.6 4.8
Oman 51.7 17.3 0.5 22.0 11.9
Poland 41.3 16.1 1.7 20.2 3.3
Portugal 45.8 17.1 4.2 22.6 1.9
Qatar 34.4 9.6 0.7 9.8 14.3
San Marino 44.1 20.8 0.2 20.9 2.3
Saudi Arabia 38.6 27.5 0.2 2.3 8.6
Seychelles 39.0 23.6 3.6 7.0 4.8
Singapore 20.0 9.1 0.0 5.5 5.4
Slovak Republic 41.6 14.5 1.5 22.3 3.3
Slovenia 41.2 15.5 2.8 21.3 1.6
Spain 42.4 15.9 2.8 21.8 1.9
St. Kitts and Nevis 30.1 17.9 1.7 6.0 4.5
Sweden 49.1 20.2 0.4 26.3 2.2
Switzerland 32.8 11.2 0.6 17.9 3.1
Trin and Tobago 37.5 11.9 2.1 20.4 3.1
United Arab Em 30.2 8.9 0.2 18.4 2.7
United Kingdom 39.4 18.1 2.5 17.1 1.7
United States 35.7 14.7 2.5 18.0 0.5
Uruguay 32.6 11.1 3.2 15.9 2.4




Table 4: List of countries with IMF programs during 2005 - 2016 
 
Note: Colombia, Mexico, and Poland are not included even though they have a Flexible Credit Line (FCL), because the FCLs do not 
entail automatic disbursements.
Albania Latvia Algeria Gabon Niger
Belarus Macedonia, FYR Benin Gambia, The Rwanda
Bosnia and Herz Moldova Burkina Faso Ghana São Tom and Prín
Cyprus Portugal Burundi Guinea Senegal
Greece Romania Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Seychelles
Hungary Serbia Cent Afr Republic Kenya Sierra Leone
Ireland Turkey Chad Lesotho Tanzania
Kosovo Ukraine Comoros Liberia Togo
Congo, Dem Madagascar Uganda




Afghanistan Jordan Bangladesh Antigua and Barb Guyana
Armenia Kyrgyz Republic Maldives Argentina Haiti
Azerbaijan Mauritania Nepal Bolivia Honduras
Djibouti Pakistan Sri Lanka Costa Rica Jamaica
Egypt Tajikistan Dominica Nicaragua







log (GNI per capita thousands of usd) 1.0*** 0.7*** 0.07*** -0.03 -0.5*** -0.06** -0.2*** 0.4*** 0.5***
(0.17) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.12)
0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Old-age dependency ratio (+65/15-64) 0.4*** 0.2*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.1*** -0.01 -0.001 -0.1*** 0.6***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
0.08 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09
Political particip. (Democracy index) 0.8*** 0.7*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.2*** -0.04** -0.06*** 0.2** 1.1***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08)
0.10 0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08
Net oil and gas exports (% of GDP) 0.2*** -0.04*** 0.003** -0.005*** -0.08*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.3*** -0.1***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
0.07 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.04
Imports (% of GDP) 0.04*** 0.007*** -0.002*** -0.006*** 0.004 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.02*** 0.005
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Growth gap 0.04 0.05*** -0.002 0.006 0.05*** -0.01* -0.003 -0.01 0.1***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
0.021 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.002 -0.001
Constant 3.8*** -6.3*** -0.8*** 0.8** 6.3*** 1.7*** 1.6*** 1.5*** -3.1***
(1.5) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (1.0)
Dummy for IMF Program 0.20 -0.3 -0.002 -0.03 0.2 0.2** 0.4*** -0.6*** -0.2
(0.44) (0.17) (0.04) (0.05) (0.2) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.31)
Dummy for EUR 11.9*** -1.3*** 11.1*** 0.3*** 4.6*** 0.3*** 0.6*** 0.7*** 9.9***
(0.7) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5)
Dummy for AFR 3.4*** 2.0*** 0.1 -0.4*** 0.4 0.9*** 0.6*** -1.7*** 2.5***
(0.7) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5)
Dummy for MCD 6.2*** 0.5* 0.1 0.1 1.5*** 0.4*** 0.3*** 1.2*** 2.9***
(0.7) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5)
Dummy for WHD 3.9*** -0.6** 2.8*** 0.1 2.6*** 0.2* 0.1 0.1 3.7***
(0.6) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.4)
Number of Observations 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691 1,691
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.68 0.98 0.28 0.62 0.85 0.36 0.92 0.87
***, **, *: statistically significant at 1, 5, or 10 percent.















































Table 5.2: Correlation of estimated residuals 
 
  
Growth gap 0.04 0.05*** -0.002 0.006 0.05*** -0.01* -0.003 -0.01 0.10***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Growth gap x low income 0.12 0.07** -0.001 0.006 0.11*** 0.01 -0.007*** 0.02 0.20***
(0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
Growth gap x middle-income 0.05 0.06*** 0.006 0.006 0.05** -0.01* -0.001 -0.01 0.10***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Growth gap x high-income -0.10 0.03 -0.02** 0.006 -0.02 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.08** -0.06
(0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)















































































log(GNI per capita thousands of usd) 1.2*** 0.2* 0.1*** 0.3*** 0.06 1.0***
(0.20) (0.13) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.20)
0.09 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09
Old-age dependency ratio (+65/15-64) 0.2*** 0.02 -0.01 0.4*** -0.03** 0.3***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.04
Political particip. (Democracy index) 0.9*** 0.4*** 0.02 0.6*** -0.2*** 0.7***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.12)
0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6
Net oil and gas exports (% of GDP) 0.1*** 0.03*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.2***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.03
Growth gap 0.03 0.01 -0.002 0.02 0.06*** 0.07*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.02
Gross debt  (% of GDP) 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.01*** -0.005*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6
log(gross min. wage thousand usd) 1.1*** 0.6*** -0.01 0.3** -0.06 1.3***
(0.21) (0.14) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) (0.21)
0.07 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07
Constant -5.3*** -1.0 -0.3 -5.1*** 5.4*** -5.8***
(1.6) (1.02) (0.2) (1.0) (0.5) (1.6)
Grants (% of GDP) 1.0*** 0.2*** -0.1*** 0.1** 0.5*** 1.2***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Dummy for EUR 12.9*** 5.7*** -0.01 6.2*** 0.3 11.8***
(0.7) (0.5) (0.10) (0.4) (0.2) (0.7)
Dummy for AFR 2.4*** 3.1*** 0.0 -0.5 0.5** 2.3***
(0.7) (0.4) (0.09) (0.4) (0.2) (0.7)
Dummy for MCD 7.0*** 3.3*** -0.3** 2.7*** -0.4 6.7***
(0.7) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.7)
Dummy for WHD 3.5*** 2.8*** 0.2*** -0.1** -0.04 2.7***
(0.6) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.6)
Number of Observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.47 0.71 0.81 0.64 0.74
***, **, *: statistically significant at 1, 5, or 10 percent.
Primary 
Expenditures
Numbers below the standard errors correspond to the marginal R2 of each variable when added to a regression that only 


























     Omitted: 










Table 6.2: Correlation of estimated residuals 
 
Growth gap 0.03 0.01 -0.002 0.02 0.06*** 0.07*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Growth gap x low income 0.2*** 0.05 0.006 0.16*** -0.07*** 0.07***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Growth gap x middle-income 0.02 0.03 -0.004 -0.01 0.09*** 0.07***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Growth gap x high-income -0.2*** -0.09 -0.009 -0.17*** 0.06*** 0.07**
(0.09) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)






























































Benin 5.8 -4.7 -3.0 -0.1 0.7 -2.3 1.2 -1.3 1.2 1.3
Burkina Faso 0.5 2.2 -0.6 0.1 0.0 2.7 2.8 -1.3 1.4 2.7
Burundi 5.7 -0.5 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 0.6 5.2 2.3 3.5 -0.6
Cent Afr Republic -6.8 -2.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -2.1 -9.5 -2.3 -1.1 -6.1
Chad -8.7 -0.4 1.7 0.0 0.7 -2.9 -9.2 -2.1 -1.0 -6.1
Comoros 5.5 -1.1 -1.9 0.0 -0.3 1.1 4.4 1.6 1.2 1.5
Guinea -5.4 3.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 4.3 -1.7 -1.0 -0.2 -0.5
Guinea-Bissau 3.2 -3.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -2.4 -0.1 -1.8 2.9 -1.1
Haiti -0.1 -4.5 0.0 -2.9 1.2 -2.8 -4.7 0.3 -4.0 -0.9
Liberia 11.9 -3.5 2.1 0.0 0.3 -5.8 8.5 9.3 -0.5 -0.3
Madagascar 0.7 -6.7 -2.4 0.0 -0.5 -3.7 -5.9 -1.3 -3.7 -0.9
Malawi 0.8 5.3 5.0 0.0 -0.4 0.7 6.1 3.1 4.3 -1.2
Mali 2.9 1.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 2.3 4.1 -2.5 4.1 2.5
Mozambique 1.8 5.5 4.1 0.0 0.5 1.0 7.4 3.6 -1.5 5.3
Nepal 1.0 2.8 1.3 -0.1 0.9 0.7 3.8 -1.6 4.8 0.5
Niger 3.4 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.1 -0.3 4.5 -1.1 1.3 4.3
Senegal 2.0 5.3 0.4 0.3 -0.1 4.7 7.3 -0.7 1.6 6.4
Sierra Leone 1.3 3.0 4.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 4.3 2.5 -1.1 2.9
Tanzania 0.4 -1.9 -1.5 -0.1 1.3 -1.5 -1.5 0.8 -4.4 2.1
Togo 10.0 -0.9 1.5 0.0 -0.3 -2.0 9.2 0.7 1.0 7.4
Uganda 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 -2.0 2.0

























Armenia -4.0 2.0 1.7 -0.4 0.6 0.1 -2.0 -3.0 1.8 -0.8
Bangladesh 0.2 -4.3 -1.5 -0.1 0.1 -2.8 -4.1 -3.2 -1.8 0.8
Bhutan -1.1 3.6 4.7 0.0 -0.7 -0.5 2.5 3.2 1.0 -1.8
Bolivia 4.9 7.7 1.5 -2.3 3.5 4.9 12.5 2.6 1.2 8.7
Cabo Verde 0.3 4.1 0.6 -0.1 0.1 3.5 4.4 4.8 1.8 -2.2
Cameroon 1.3 -3.1 -3.0 0.0 -0.5 0.4 -1.8 -1.2 -2.9 2.4
Congo, Rep 14.3 5.5 2.5 -0.1 0.4 2.7 19.8 10.1 -5.1 14.7
Cote d'Ivoire 2.3 -0.6 -0.5 2.2 -0.4 -1.9 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.5
El Salvador -2.6 -1.6 0.2 -1.3 -0.9 0.4 -4.2 2.5 -5.2 -1.4
Ghana -5.6 1.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 2.2 -4.2 -1.1 -2.2 -0.8
Guatemala -5.3 -5.6 0.1 -3.1 0.3 -2.9 -10.9 -5.5 -3.3 -2.2
Honduras -2.5 5.2 1.8 -0.3 -0.3 4.0 2.7 2.4 -1.5 1.7
India -0.1 1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -1.1 4.0 1.5 -6.9 7.3 1.1
Indonesia -3.1 -1.8 -0.6 -0.3 0.3 -1.2 -4.9 -1.5 -3.3 -0.1
Kenya 0.7 1.4 1.5 -0.2 -0.6 0.7 2.0 -2.2 0.9 3.3
Kyrgyz Republic 3.1 11.6 1.3 5.6 -0.3 5.0 14.6 7.0 3.9 3.7
Lao PDR 2.2 3.5 0.2 0.0 1.3 1.9 5.7 4.8 -0.9 1.8
Lesotho 20.7 5.0 3.8 -0.1 0.2 1.1 25.7 17.2 3.6 5.0
Mauritania -3.8 3.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 2.9 -0.6 -1.2 -4.6 5.1
Moldova -0.5 2.9 -0.2 -1.0 0.7 3.5 2.4 1.4 1.2 -0.2
Morocco -4.5 5.8 2.5 -0.3 0.9 2.7 1.4 2.5 -2.6 1.5
Nicaragua -1.5 7.1 3.8 2.6 -0.1 0.7 5.6 -0.4 5.2 0.8
Nigeria -4.3 -6.8 -3.2 -0.1 0.1 -3.6 -11.1 -6.6 -0.5 -4.1
Pakistan -6.8 0.1 1.3 -0.1 0.9 -1.9 -6.7 -7.2 1.1 -0.6
Philippines -5.8 3.0 0.1 2.0 0.2 0.7 -2.8 -1.3 -2.3 0.9
Sri Lanka -2.0 -4.8 -4.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -6.8 -1.1 -4.7 -1.0
Sudan -5.1 -7.6 -3.2 -0.1 -1.1 -3.2 -12.7 -5.8 -3.7 -3.2
Swaziland 13.4 3.6 3.0 0.0 -0.3 0.9 17.0 9.9 3.6 3.5
Tajikistan 7.1 9.7 2.2 2.6 -0.4 5.4 16.8 2.6 5.5 8.7
Tunisia -3.7 1.6 0.3 -0.2 1.5 0.1 -2.1 3.3 -7.9 2.5
Ukraine 0.7 1.0 1.8 -6.2 2.7 2.8 1.7 1.9 -1.0 0.8

























Albania -5.3 -4.9 -1.8 -5.8 2.8 0.0 -10.2 -7.3 -2.4 -0.4
Algeria 12.4 0.3 1.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 12.8 0.2 4.4 8.1
Angola -4.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.7 0.6 -1.3 -5.7 0.1 -3.2 -2.5
Argentina 2.8 7.1 -2.5 2.3 1.4 5.8 9.8 2.1 7.6 0.2
Azerbaijan 0.7 7.3 2.5 0.8 0.3 3.6 8.0 4.8 -3.8 6.9
Belarus 3.1 3.6 1.6 0.5 1.6 0.0 6.7 0.9 5.0 0.9
Bosnia and Herz 0.0 5.5 -2.8 3.3 -1.3 6.3 5.5 6.3 -0.7 -0.1
Botswana 9.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 8.8 5.3 1.0 2.6
Brazil 0.6 7.3 -0.3 1.7 1.2 4.6 7.9 10.2 -0.3 -2.1
Bulgaria 0.4 -10.6 -5.5 -6.2 -0.6 1.7 -10.3 -5.6 -4.1 -0.6
Colombia -3.7 4.5 2.1 -0.2 0.8 1.8 0.8 -3.3 2.8 1.2
Costa Rica -0.4 2.7 -2.6 5.3 -0.2 0.2 2.3 4.1 0.3 -2.0
Dom Republic -2.9 -5.6 -1.3 -3.5 -0.5 -0.4 -8.5 -5.6 -2.1 -0.9
Ecuador 10.9 0.9 -0.7 1.2 0.9 -0.5 11.8 3.1 2.6 6.1
Equ Guinea 4.8 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.5 5.0 -3.9 0.3 8.7
Gabon -4.8 -2.7 -2.8 -0.5 0.9 -0.3 -7.5 -0.9 -4.9 -1.8
Georgia -2.9 4.1 1.2 -1.1 0.1 3.9 1.1 -1.5 1.9 0.7
Guyana 6.7 3.1 3.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.9 9.8 2.2 5.0 2.7
Iran -4.3 -5.9 -2.4 -0.4 -0.8 -2.4 -10.2 -6.4 -1.1 -2.7
Iraq 19.0 -9.3 -2.9 -0.2 -0.9 -5.2 9.7 5.1 0.1 4.6
Jamaica 1.0 -3.1 2.9 -3.6 -0.8 -1.6 -2.2 5.4 -6.8 -0.7
Jordan -3.9 2.5 -1.6 0.0 0.8 3.3 -1.4 -6.0 6.0 -1.5
Kazakhstan -3.7 -1.2 1.5 0.7 -0.4 -3.0 -4.9 -2.1 -0.7 -2.2
Lebanon -8.0 -5.0 -5.8 3.2 1.0 -3.5 -13.1 -4.7 -7.3 -1.1
Malaysia 0.0 -0.8 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0 0.1 0.1
Mauritius -2.6 1.0 -4.5 -0.3 1.1 4.6 -1.6 -3.3 4.1 -2.3
Mexico 0.4 -2.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -1.7 -2.0 -4.2 1.5 0.6
Panama 0.2 -4.6 -2.3 2.2 -0.6 -3.9 -4.4 -4.8 -2.8 3.2
Paraguay 1.2 -0.7 -1.9 1.5 -0.6 0.3 0.5 1.7 -1.2 0.1
Peru -1.4 -2.8 -0.4 -1.5 0.6 -1.5 -4.1 0.3 -5.2 0.7
Romania -1.1 -7.3 -2.2 -4.2 0.1 -1.1 -8.4 -1.9 -5.0 -1.6
Russia 4.1 -5.9 0.9 -4.5 0.0 -2.3 -1.8 -7.0 5.6 -0.4
Serbia 1.3 0.6 -3.3 -1.2 0.2 4.9 1.9 1.6 -0.1 0.4
South Africa -4.0 8.5 4.9 0.5 0.4 2.7 4.6 3.0 1.5 0.0
Thailand -1.9 1.6 -0.8 0.4 -0.6 2.6 -0.4 4.6 -3.8 -1.3
























Australia 0.5 4.6 4.9 0.1 0.0 -0.4 5.1 7.8 -3.3 0.5
Austria -2.1 5.9 0.4 5.3 2.1 -1.8 3.8 -0.8 4.5 0.1
Belgium -1.2 9.1 6.2 3.7 3.7 -4.6 7.8 -0.4 8.0 0.2
Canada -1.3 5.5 3.9 0.1 2.5 -1.1 4.2 5.7 -2.3 0.7
Chile -1.1 -0.9 0.1 -2.9 -1.0 2.8 -2.1 -2.7 1.7 -1.1
Croatia -2.5 2.2 -4.6 -0.7 -1.1 8.6 -0.3 2.6 -1.9 -1.0
Cyprus -5.2 1.1 0.4 -3.0 0.7 3.1 -4.1 -1.0 -1.4 -1.7
Czech Republic -0.8 -1.8 -2.7 2.4 -0.4 -1.1 -2.6 -0.9 -1.3 -0.4
Estonia 0.7 -2.2 -2.6 -0.5 -0.5 1.4 -1.5 3.1 -5.0 0.3
Finland 6.2 2.8 2.3 0.3 -0.6 0.8 9.0 6.7 1.7 0.6
France 2.2 6.8 -1.3 5.8 5.0 -2.6 9.0 0.0 8.1 0.9
Germany -1.9 -1.1 -0.7 3.3 -0.3 -3.4 -3.0 -5.4 3.2 -0.8
Greece 1.5 -1.8 -2.5 1.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 0.6
Hungary 3.0 1.7 -1.0 2.1 -1.3 1.9 4.7 3.9 2.5 -1.7
Ireland -4.4 -13.8 -0.7 -7.2 -1.2 -4.7 -18.2 -6.9 -8.5 -2.8
Israel -3.5 0.0 1.9 -4.5 1.8 0.8 -3.4 1.5 -3.1 -1.8
Italy -1.3 -0.6 1.4 0.2 1.2 -3.4 -1.8 -2.8 1.3 -0.3
Japan -2.4 0.8 -4.2 7.3 0.6 -2.9 -1.6 -2.8 -1.2 2.4
Korea -2.4 -0.4 -0.5 2.5 0.4 -2.8 -2.8 -5.6 4.0 -1.2
Kuwait 27.0 -2.3 -3.3 2.1 0.5 -1.6 24.7 13.5 10.1 1.1
Latvia 0.4 -7.7 -2.3 -4.0 -0.7 -0.7 -7.4 -2.6 -2.5 -2.3
Lithuania -1.3 -6.8 -4.6 0.2 -1.1 -1.2 -8.1 -1.0 -6.4 -0.7
Luxembourg -2.1 1.9 2.6 0.4 0.2 -1.2 -0.2 -5.2 4.9 0.1
Malta -2.5 -3.1 2.0 -5.8 -0.8 1.5 -5.6 2.5 -8.3 0.2
Netherlands 0.9 -1.7 -2.2 2.1 1.0 -2.6 -0.8 -2.6 1.5 0.4
New Zealand -3.3 4.7 4.2 -0.4 -1.6 2.6 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.3
Norway -0.1 1.4 6.3 -3.8 -0.5 -0.6 1.3 3.0 -2.8 1.2
Oman 21.9 -0.7 -1.5 3.3 0.4 -3.0 21.2 4.2 12.7 4.3
Poland -0.1 0.5 -1.7 2.0 0.9 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.2
Portugal 1.1 -3.6 -1.1 -1.3 0.1 -1.4 -2.5 0.2 -1.8 -0.8
Saudi Arabia 16.6 -6.2 -2.1 -0.1 -0.7 -3.3 10.5 14.0 -5.6 2.0
Slovak Republic 0.4 0.0 -0.5 2.7 -0.6 -1.5 0.4 -1.3 3.5 -1.8
Slovenia -2.5 -2.3 -3.9 2.0 -0.6 0.2 -4.8 -1.4 -1.1 -2.2
Spain 0.1 -4.5 -1.5 -0.3 -0.2 -2.5 -4.4 -1.4 -1.7 -1.3
Switzerland -0.1 -12.2 0.3 -6.2 0.1 -6.5 -12.2 -6.7 -5.6 0.0
Trin and Tobago 10.0 -3.3 -1.0 -4.1 1.6 0.2 6.7 -0.9 9.5 -1.9
United Kingdom -3.4 -3.7 0.6 -5.0 1.8 -1.0 -7.1 0.7 -6.4 -1.4
United States 0.2 -0.6 1.5 1.9 1.0 -4.9 -0.4 0.1 2.3 -2.8



























































Table 9: Projected increase in age-related spending in the next decade (percent of GDP) 
 
 
Benin 0.2 Mozambique 0.2 Bangladesh 0.2 Honduras 0.7 Nicaragua 1.3
Burkina Faso 0.3 Nepal 0.2 Bolivia -0.4 India 0.1 Nigeria 0.1
Chad 0.1 Niger 0.2 Cambodia 0.2 Indonesia 0.3 Pakistan 0.1
Congo, Dem 0.2 Rwanda 0.6 Cameroon 0.1 Kenya 0.3 Philippines 0.3
Ethiopia 0.2 Senegal 0.2 Congo, Rep 0.2 Kyrgyz Republic 3.7 Sri Lanka 1.1
Guinea 0.2 Tanzania 0.3 Cote d'Ivoire 0.0 Lao PDR 0.2 Sudan 0.2
Haiti 0.1 Uganda 0.2 Egypt 1.9 Moldova 3.2 Tajikistan 0.6
Madagascar 0.5 Zimbabwe 0.0 Ghana 0.3 Morocco 1.6 Ukraine 1.7
Mali 0.0 Zambia 1.5
Algeria 2.7 Kazakhstan 1.4 Australia 1.6 Hungary -0.6 Oman 0.9
Angola 0.4 Malaysia 1.7 Austria 1.2 Ireland 1.5 Poland 0.3
Argentina 1.1 Mexico 0.9 Belgium 1.5 Israel 0.7 Portugal 2.1
Azerbaijan 3.3 Peru 0.8 Canada 1.6 Italy 0.7 Qatar 0.9
Belarus 3.1 Romania 0.5 Chile 0.2 Japan 0.5 Saudi Arabia 2.0
Brazil 5.8 Russia 3.0 Croatia 0.2 Korea 2.8 Slovak Republic 0.2
Colombia 0.1 South Africa 0.7 Cyprus 0.1 Kuwait 5.2 Slovenia 0.8
Dom Republic 0.8 Thailand 3.0 Czech Republic 0.5 Latvia -0.6 Spain 0.7
Ecuador 1.5 Turkey 0.5 Denmark -0.2 Lithuania 1.3 Sweden -0.2
Iran 2.0 Estonia -0.2 Luxembourg 2.4 Switzerland 2.3
Finland 2.3 Malta 0.1 United Arab Em 0.8
France 0.6 Netherlands 2.3 United Kingdom 1.5
Germany 1.5 New Zealand 2.2 United States 3.6
Greece 0.0 Norway 1.8 Uruguay 0.5
Low income countries Low middle income countries























Benin 2.9 -4.9 -2.0 8.3 2.9 42.8
Burkina Faso -0.2 -1.8 -2.0 8.3 2.0 35.8
Burundi -3.0 -5.1 -8.1 14.9 5.2 104.8
Cent Afr Republic -3.3 2.3 -1.0 9.2 1.9 15.6
Chad -2.6 0.8 -1.8 7.3 2.0 36.8
Comoros 5.5 -7.0 -1.5 6.4 1.1 30.1
Guinea -4.0 1.6 -2.4 9.3 2.1 37.0
Guinea-Bissau 0.5 -2.8 -2.3 7.9 1.3 37.8
Haiti -2.2 0.3 -1.9 8.2 1.4 31.4
Liberia 2.3 -5.4 -3.1 9.0 1.8 47.7
Madagascar -2.7 -0.4 -3.1 10.3 2.5 46.1
Malawi -1.2 -2.9 -4.1 13.9 3.7 47.8
Mali 1.9 -3.3 -1.4 6.1 2.0 38.5
Mozambique -8.7 -3.1 -11.8 21.3 2.7 79.0
Nepal -3.4 1.7 -1.7 10.6 1.8 21.6
Niger 2.7 -5.6 -2.9 8.9 1.9 46.7
Senegal 0.4 -2.0 -1.6 8.4 4.6 50.9
Sierra Leone 2.8 -7.1 -4.3 14.8 3.5 45.6
Tanzania -0.5 -2.1 -2.6 11.8 4.6 43.1
Togo 4.7 -7.3 -2.6 7.7 2.4 54.9
Uganda -0.4 -1.3 -1.7 13.7 8.0 42.9























Armenia 1.3 -3.7 -2.4 8.2 2.8 51.0
Bangladesh -0.2 -1.5 -1.7 13.0 6.4 33.0
Bhutan -1.6 -0.6 -2.2 10.7 6.5 70.1
Bolivia 3.3 -5.5 -2.2 8.7 3.4 48.3
Cabo Verde -3.7 -0.6 -4.3 6.3 2.0 111.6
Cambodia -0.4 -2.5 -2.9 9.7 0.6 35.2
Cameroon 2.2 -3.6 -1.4 7.4 2.6 33.8
Congo, Rep 16.2 -16.5 -0.3 1.8 1.2 52.6
Cote d'Ivoire 0.5 -2.2 -1.7 8.6 4.1 45.4
Djibouti 13.5 -14.4 -0.9 9.2 4.7 25.6
Egypt -0.4 -3.7 -4.1 13.0 6.3 79.8
El Salvador -0.6 1.9 1.2 4.6 6.2 69.0
Ghana -0.1 -1.9 -2.0 11.8 6.9 55.5
Guatemala -1.0 0.5 -0.5 8.6 6.0 27.5
Honduras -2.5 1.1 -1.4 8.5 4.7 45.4
India -0.8 -1.7 -2.5 12.6 6.9 59.3
Indonesia 0.1 -1.0 -0.9 9.7 5.9 29.3
Kenya 1.8 -4.1 -2.3 11.8 5.7 47.4
Kyrgyz Republic -0.3 -3.3 -3.6 8.5 1.4 56.6
Lao PDR -0.7 -4.6 -5.3 10.1 2.4 78.2
Lesotho 3.9 -6.8 -2.9 10.6 2.1 38.9
Mauritania -5.9 1.1 -4.8 7.5 1.3 84.1
Moldova -1.5 -0.8 -2.3 9.1 3.2 45.6
Morocco -0.1 -1.3 -1.4 6.3 3.4 57.1
Nicaragua -1.9 -0.8 -2.7 12.0 2.8 34.6
Nigeria 2.1 -3.5 -1.4 16.5 8.5 24.9
Pakistan -1.2 -0.1 -1.3 11.3 7.8 57.1
Philippines -3.2 1.7 -1.5 10.2 4.3 29.3
São Tom and Pr -2.4 -2.5 -4.9 8.2 0.8 71.6
Sri Lanka -1.2 -0.6 -1.8 10.6 6.8 66.3
Sudan -3.1 -1.2 -4.3 15.4 2.3 39.2
Swaziland 12.5 -10.7 1.8 5.6 7.6 79.2
Tajikistan 6.1 -10.0 -3.9 12.4 3.0 48.2
Tunisia 1.1 -3.5 -2.4 7.9 3.7 64.7
Ukraine -4.0 1.9 -2.1 10.2 5.7 60.2
Vanuatu 5.4 -7.5 -2.1 6.0 2.1 59.1























Albania -2.6 0.7 -1.9 7.9 3.5 50.1
Algeria 10.9 -11.3 -0.4 5.9 2.3 13.5
Angola -1.0 -1.1 -2.1 9.3 5.2 61.8
Argentina 1.2 -5.0 -3.8 12.7 2.8 44.8
Azerbaijan -0.7 -0.5 -1.2 9.1 4.1 28.9
Belarus 2.3 -2.6 -0.3 8.1 6.9 60.4
Belize 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 4.3 3.2 79.0
Bosnia and Herz -2.1 1.0 -1.1 5.9 2.4 35.3
Botswana 1.5 -1.5 0.0 6.1 6.1 5.7
Brazil 1.6 -0.2 1.4 7.1 8.3 87.8
Bulgaria -2.5 2.4 -0.1 4.7 3.9 20.4
Colombia 0.1 0.2 0.3 6.7 7.1 38.8
Costa Rica 2.4 -1.7 0.7 7.7 8.4 57.8
Dominica -1.3 0.8 -0.5 3.3 2.6 81.3
Dom Republic 0.7 -0.3 0.4 9.2 9.3 43.9
Ecuador 7.0 -5.0 2.0 2.9 9.1 31.1
Equ Guinea 16.0 -16.0 0.0 3.3 3.1 25.6
Fiji 2.3 -2.8 -0.5 6.8 5.4 51.4
Gabon 1.6 -2.3 -0.7 6.2 4.5 50.1
Georgia -2.0 -0.4 -2.4 8.7 2.8 44.8
Grenada -6.3 5.4 -0.9 4.8 2.9 51.4
Guyana 2.3 -3.5 -1.2 5.1 2.4 50.9
Iran 2.0 -2.1 -0.1 13.3 10.8 16.2
Iraq 11.1 -12.9 -1.8 6.3 2.2 48.7
Jamaica -7.9 7.0 -0.9 8.4 6.6 75.1
Jordan -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 5.6 4.3 77.0
Kazakhstan 2.3 -2.9 -0.6 7.3 4.3 24.4
Lebanon 4.8 0.9 5.7 5.0 8.2 165.4
Macedonia, FYR 0.6 -1.6 -1.0 6.1 3.5 43.9
Malaysia -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 7.9 5.0 46.8
Maldives 4.2 -5.3 -1.1 6.9 5.1 84.9
Mauritius -0.6 -0.7 -1.3 7.2 4.1 51.2
Mexico 0.2 0.3 0.5 6.3 6.8 54.1
Montenegro 2.6 -3.0 -0.4 5.0 4.2 73.4
Namibia 4.7 -5.5 -0.8 9.7 7.4 56.4
Panama -0.5 -0.6 -1.1 8.4 4.3 31.0
Paraguay 0.2 0.2 0.4 7.7 8.4 28.5
Peru 0.8 -1.3 -0.5 6.6 4.6 28.5
Romania 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 5.9 3.3 44.9
Russia 2.7 -2.6 0.1 5.4 5.8 18.5
Serbia -3.4 1.9 -1.5 7.1 4.0 57.8
South Africa 0.1 -0.1 0.0 7.9 7.4 53.7
St. Lucia 3.3 0.6 3.9 3.1 7.0 97.7
St. Vin and Gren -1.3 0.9 -0.4 4.3 3.5 67.4
Thailand -1.8 1.3 -0.5 5.6 4.1 41.8
Turkey 0.8 -0.2 0.6 10.3 11.4 29.0





















Australia 0.8 -1.2 -0.4 5.2 3.9 36.6
Austria -1.4 0.8 -0.6 3.2 2.2 69.8
Belgium -1.0 0.0 -1.0 3.6 2.5 99.4
Canada -1.0 0.9 -0.1 3.9 3.7 82.7
Chile 1.5 -2.1 -0.6 6.4 4.1 31.2
Croatia -1.8 1.9 0.1 4.2 4.2 75.8
Cyprus -3.2 2.3 -0.9 3.9 2.7 86.7
Czech Republic -2.1 1.6 -0.5 4.0 2.2 29.6
Estonia -0.8 0.4 -0.4 6.2 0.8 8.2
Finland 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 3.6 2.2 59.9
France 0.2 -1.4 -1.2 3.5 2.1 90.4
Germany -3.0 2.2 -0.8 3.1 1.4 50.9
Greece -3.7 3.3 -0.4 2.7 2.4 162.8
Hungary -2.0 1.4 -0.6 4.9 3.7 69.7
Ireland -2.5 1.5 -1.0 4.6 2.8 61.2
Israel -0.1 0.5 0.4 5.0 5.4 63.6
Italy -0.5 1.6 1.1 2.3 3.1 121.3
Japan -0.2 -2.6 -2.8 1.7 0.5 232.4
Korea -1.4 1.0 -0.4 5.2 3.8 36.0
Kuwait 2.7 -3.3 -0.6 6.7 4.4 31.2
Latvia -1.5 0.8 -0.7 6.4 3.2 26.6
Lithuania -1.7 1.7 0.0 5.6 5.3 32.0
Luxembourg -2.9 2.1 -0.8 5.0 1.5 22.9
Malta -2.0 1.5 -0.5 5.1 3.8 49.1
Netherlands -1.1 0.6 -0.5 3.0 1.9 50.1
New Zealand -2.3 2.7 0.4 4.9 7.7 12.4
Norway -4.3 4.0 -0.3 4.4 3.2 33.2
Oman 21.5 -21.3 0.2 4.6 4.9 49.3
Poland -0.2 -0.8 -1.0 5.2 3.0 51.7
Portugal -0.6 1.9 1.3 2.7 3.7 122.9
Saudi Arabia 17.7 -17.0 0.7 2.5 5.0 26.4
Slovak Republic -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 5.4 3.2 44.9
Slovenia -1.2 1.0 -0.2 3.9 3.4 77.9
Spain 1.5 -1.7 -0.2 3.4 3.1 93.9
Switzerland -1.0 0.5 -0.5 2.7 1.2 38.7
Trin and Tobago 10.0 -11.9 -1.9 5.8 3.8 112.7
United Kingdom -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 3.9 2.7 83.2
United States 1.7 -1.8 -0.1 3.8 3.6 117.4




Table 11.1: Fiscal adjustment gaps selected low income countries (percent of GDP) 
 
 
Table 11.2: Fiscal adjustment gaps selected low-middle income countries (percent of GDP) 
 
  
Benin 5.8 2.9 3.0 5.8 2.9 3.0
Comoros 5.5 5.5 0.0 5.5 5.5 0.0
Guinea-Bissau 3.2 0.5 2.7 3.3 0.5 2.8
Liberia 11.9 2.3 9.6 11.9 2.3 9.6
Mali 2.9 1.9 1.0 4.1 1.9 2.3
Niger 3.4 2.7 0.7 4.5 2.7 1.8
Senegal 2.0 0.4 1.6 7.3 0.4 6.9
Sierra Leone 1.3 2.8 -1.5 4.3 2.8 1.4
Togo 10.0 4.7 5.3 10.0 4.7 5.3















Armenia -4.0 1.3 -5.3 0.0 1.3 -1.3
Bolivia 4.9 3.3 1.6 12.5 3.3 9.3
Cameroon 1.3 2.2 -0.8 3.1 2.2 1.0
Congo, Rep 14.3 16.2 -1.9 19.8 16.2 3.6
Cote d'Ivoire 2.3 0.5 1.8 2.3 0.5 1.8
Kenya 0.7 1.8 -1.1 2.0 1.8 0.3
Lesotho 20.7 3.9 16.8 25.7 3.9 21.8
Nigeria -4.3 2.1 -6.4 6.8 2.1 4.7
Swaziland 13.4 12.5 0.9 17.0 12.5 4.5
Tajikistan 7.1 6.1 1.0 16.8 6.1 10.7
Tunisia -3.7 1.1 -4.8 0.0 1.1 -1.1


















Table 11.3: Fiscal adjustment gaps selected high-middle income countries (percent of GDP) 
 
 
Table 11.4: Fiscal adjustment gaps selected high income countries (percent of GDP) 
  
Algeria 12.4 10.9 1.6 12.8 10.9 1.9
Argentina 2.8 1.2 1.6 9.8 1.2 8.6
Belarus 3.1 2.3 0.9 6.7 2.3 4.5
Botswana 9.3 1.5 7.8 9.3 1.5 7.8
Brazil 0.6 1.6 -1.0 7.9 1.6 6.3
Costa Rica -0.4 2.4 -2.8 2.3 2.4 -0.1
Dom Republic -2.9 0.7 -3.6 5.6 0.7 5.0
Ecuador 10.9 7.0 4.0 11.8 7.0 4.8
Equ Guinea 4.8 16.0 -11.2 5.0 16.0 -11.0
Gabon -4.8 1.6 -6.4 2.7 1.6 1.1
Guyana 6.7 2.3 4.5 9.8 2.3 7.6
Iran -4.3 2.0 -6.2 5.9 2.0 4.0
Iraq 19.0 11.1 7.9 19.0 11.1 7.9
Kazakhstan -3.7 2.3 -6.0 1.2 2.3 -1.1
Lebanon -8.0 4.8 -12.9 5.0 4.8 0.2
Peru -1.4 0.8 -2.2 2.8 0.8 1.9
Russia 4.1 2.7 1.4 5.9 2.7 3.2















Australia 0.5 0.8 -0.3 5.1 0.8 4.3
Chile -1.1 1.5 -2.7 0.9 1.5 -0.6
Kuwait 27.0 2.7 24.3 27.0 2.7 24.3
Oman 21.9 21.5 0.4 21.9 21.5 0.4
Saudi Arabia 16.6 17.7 -1.1 16.6 17.7 -1.1
Spain 0.1 1.5 -1.4 4.5 1.5 3.0
Trin and Tobago 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0


















Table 12: Fiscal gaps in 2016 full and restricted samples 
Restricted sample: only high- middle and high-income countries 
 
full restrict full restrict
Albania -5.3 -7.3 Australia 0.5 1.2
Algeria 12.4 10.6 Austria -2.1 -1.2
Angola -4.8 -5.7 Belgium -1.2 -2.5
Argentina 2.8 3.8 Canada -1.3 -0.3
Azerbaijan 0.7 -2.2 Chile -1.1 -1.8
Belarus 3.1 1.1 Croatia -2.5 -2.2
Bosnia and Herz 0.0 -1.1 Cyprus -5.2 -6.5
Botswana 9.3 8.5 Czech Republic -0.8 -0.5
Brazil 0.6 0.1 Estonia 0.7 0.7
Bulgaria 0.4 1.2 Finland 6.2 7.7
Colombia -3.7 -4.4 France 2.2 3.5
Costa Rica -0.4 0.3 Germany -1.9 -0.2
Dom Republic -2.9 -2.3 Greece 1.5 1.2
Ecuador 10.9 10.5 Hungary 3.0 1.4
Equ Guinea 4.8 -5.4 Ireland -4.4 -2.4
Gabon -4.8 -5.7 Israel -3.5 -3.7
Georgia -2.9 -1.9 Italy -1.3 0.0
Guyana 6.7 6.6 Japan -2.4 -2.6
Iran -4.3 -5.4 Korea -2.4 -4.0
Iraq 19.0 16.3 Kuwait 27.0 22.5
Jamaica 1.0 -0.9 Latvia 0.4 0.3
Jordan -3.9 -5.7 Lithuania -1.3 -1.4
Kazakhstan -3.7 -5.9 Luxembourg -2.1 -5.7
Lebanon -8.0 -8.4 Malta -2.5 -3.4
Malaysia 0.0 -2.6 Netherlands 0.9 1.6
Mauritius -2.6 0.4 New Zealand -3.3 -2.3
Mexico 0.4 0.9 Norway -0.1 0.5
Panama 0.2 0.8 Oman 21.9 17.4
Paraguay 1.2 0.7 Poland -0.1 0.3
Peru -1.4 -0.8 Portugal 1.1 1.9
Romania -1.1 -0.8 Saudi Arabia 16.6 13.6
Russia 4.1 2.7 Slovak Republic 0.4 -1.5
Serbia 1.3 1.0 Slovenia -2.5 -2.9
South Africa -4.0 -0.5 Spain 0.1 1.3
Thailand -1.9 -3.5 Switzerland -0.1 0.9
Turkey -3.6 -3.9 Trin and Tobago 10.0 8.0
United Kingdom -3.4 -2.3
United States 0.2 2.2
Uruguay -0.5 0.5





























Benin 5.8 4.8 3.9 Armenia -4.0 -0.6 0.1 Albania -5.3 -5.1 -9.7 Australia 0.5 0.0 1.4
Burkina Faso 0.5 -0.1 -0.7 Bangladesh 0.2 -1.7 0.6 Algeria 12.4 14.8 15.8 Austria -2.1 -1.6 -3.1
Burundi 5.7 4.0 3.2 Bhutan -1.1 -1.7 0.7 Angola -4.8 -5.6 -0.9 Belgium -1.2 0.4 -2.0
Cent Afr Republic -6.8 -7.4 -4.4 Bolivia 4.9 2.0 6.0 Argentina 2.8 0.1 3.3 Canada -1.3 -2.9 -1.2
Chad -8.7 -9.1 -5.2 Cabo Verde 0.3 0.9 -2.1 Azerbaijan 0.7 2.9 6.7 Chile -1.1 -4.1 0.5
Comoros 5.5 4.6 5.9 Cameroon 1.3 0.0 3.3 Belarus 3.1 3.0 2.1 Croatia -2.5 -2.4 -3.7
Guinea -5.4 -5.8 -6.5 Congo, Rep 14.3 14.4 18.0 Bosnia and Herz 0.0 0.3 -4.1 Cyprus -5.2 -4.5 -6.3
Guinea-Bissau 3.2 2.5 1.2 Cote d'Ivoire 2.3 1.9 0.9 Botswana 9.3 8.5 11.1 Czech Republic -0.8 -0.2 -1.3
Haiti -0.1 -2.4 -1.7 El Salvador -2.6 -4.9 -3.3 Brazil 0.6 -2.3 0.5 Estonia 0.7 1.0 0.9
Liberia 11.9 13.5 12.2 Ghana -5.6 -5.5 -6.9 Bulgaria 0.4 0.3 -0.1 Finland 6.2 6.4 9.0
Madagascar 0.7 0.1 0.0 Guatemala -5.3 -8.2 -5.0 Colombia -3.7 -6.7 -5.0 France 2.2 2.4 0.8
Malawi 0.8 0.3 -0.4 Honduras -2.5 -4.4 -1.9 Costa Rica -0.4 -2.9 -0.1 Germany -1.9 -1.6 -2.8
Mali 2.9 2.3 1.9 India -0.1 -1.2 0.6 Dom Republic -2.9 -5.8 -5.3 Greece 1.5 2.2 -1.7
Mozambique 1.8 2.9 0.6 Indonesia -3.1 -4.6 -1.5 Ecuador 10.9 7.8 11.9 Hungary 3.0 4.0 1.8
Nepal 1.0 0.0 2.2 Kenya 0.7 -0.1 0.2 Equ Guinea 4.8 -2.6 11.7 Ireland -4.4 -3.0 -5.2
Niger 3.4 2.8 2.2 Kyrgyz Republi 3.1 6.6 7.1 Gabon -4.8 -5.5 -0.3 Israel -3.5 -4.0 -4.4
Senegal 2.0 1.7 0.2 Lao PDR 2.2 1.9 3.4 Georgia -2.9 0.8 0.3 Italy -1.3 -0.7 -3.4
Sierra Leone 1.3 0.9 0.8 Lesotho 20.7 21.6 20.3 Guyana 6.7 4.7 3.8 Japan -2.4 -0.7 -6.5
Tanzania 0.4 -0.8 -0.8 Mauritania -3.8 -0.6 -2.3 Iran -4.3 -2.1 -2.5 Korea -2.4 -2.5 -2.2
Togo 10.0 10.0 7.9 Moldova -0.5 -0.2 -1.3 Iraq 19.0 22.0 20.9 Kuwait 27.0 29.2 14.4
Uganda 0.5 -1.5 -1.7 Morocco -4.5 -1.3 -3.3 Jamaica 1.0 -0.1 -3.5 Latvia 0.4 0.4 0.0
Zimbabwe 6.3 6.3 5.0 Nicaragua -1.5 -3.8 -1.3 Jordan -3.9 0.3 -3.5 Lithuania -1.3 -0.7 -2.0
Nigeria -4.3 -6.0 -5.1 Kazakhstan -3.7 -1.6 1.3 Luxembourg -2.1 1.9 0.3
Pakistan -6.8 -4.0 -2.5 Lebanon -8.0 -3.5 -9.0 Malta -2.5 0.1 -2.8
Philippines -5.8 -6.8 -4.2 Malaysia 0.0 -0.1 1.8 Netherlands 0.9 1.7 0.4
Sri Lanka -2.0 -2.4 -1.7 Mauritius -2.6 -2.2 -3.4 New Zealand -3.3 -3.7 -2.4
Sudan -5.1 -3.1 -4.8 Mexico 0.4 -2.3 0.4 Norway -0.1 -0.6 4.7
Swaziland 13.4 12.9 13.4 Panama 0.2 -2.4 0.5 Oman 21.9 24.8 9.1
Tajikistan 7.1 9.4 11.0 Paraguay 1.2 -1.4 1.9 Poland -0.1 -0.3 -1.0
Tunisia -3.7 0.2 -2.2 Peru -1.4 -4.5 -0.8 Portugal 1.1 1.7 -1.4
Ukraine 0.7 1.0 -1.2 Romania -1.1 -1.6 -1.9 Saudi Arabia 16.6 19.1 3.3
Zambia -7.5 -8.1 -6.6 Russia 4.1 2.6 4.7 Slovak Republic 0.4 1.2 0.4
Serbia 1.3 1.5 -3.8 Slovenia -2.5 -1.6 -3.4
South Africa -4.0 -4.6 -4.6 Spain 0.1 0.1 -1.6
Thailand -1.9 -2.0 -0.7 Switzerland -0.1 0.2 0.1
Turkey -3.6 -4.8 -3.7 Trin and Tobago 10.0 7.7 9.0
United Kingdom -3.4 -3.4 -4.6
United States 0.2 -1.8 -0.3
Uruguay -0.5 -2.8 -0.6





Table 14: List of countries by geographical region 
 
North America Central America
Canada Argentina Ecuador Costa Rica Antigua and Barb Guyana
United States Bolivia Mexico El Salvador Bahamas, The Haiti
Brazil Paraguay Guatemala Barbados Jamaica
Chile Peru Honduras Belize St. Kitts and Nevis
Colombia Uruguay Nicaragua Dominica St. Lucia
Panama Dom Republic St. Vin and Gren
Grenada Trin and Tobago
Central Asia North Africa West Asia GCC
Armenia Algeria Iran Bahrain
Azerbaijan Djibouti Iraq Kuwait
Georgia Egypt Jordan Oman
Kazakhstan Mauritania Lebanon Qatar
Kyrgyz Republic Morocco Saudi Arabia
Tajikistan Sudan United Arab Em
Tunisia
Oceania East Asia South Asia ASEAN Pacific Islands
Australia Japan Afghanistan Brunei Dar Fiji
New Zealand Korea Bangladesh Cambodia Maldives
Macao Bhutan Indonesia Marshall Isl
Singapore India Lao PDR Palau
Nepal Malaysia Tonga
Pakistan Philippines Tuvalu
Sri Lanka Thailand Vanuatu
Eastern Europe Nordic Balkans
Austria Hungary Poland Belarus Denmark Albania
Belgium Ireland Portugal Bulgaria Finland Bosnia and Herz
Croatia Israel San Marino Moldova Norway Kosovo
Cyprus Italy Slovak Republic Romania Sweden Macedonia, FYR
Czech Republic Latvia Slovenia Russia Montenegro
Estonia Lithuania Spain Turkey Serbia
France Luxembourg Switzerland Ukraine
Germany Malta United Kingdom
Greece Netherlands
Central Africa East Africa
Benin Liberia Angola Burundi Botswana Namibia
Burkina Faso Mali Cameroon Ethiopia Comoros Seychelles
Cabo Verde Niger Cent Afr Republic Kenya Lesotho South Africa
Cote d'Ivoire Nigeria Chad Rwanda Madagascar Swaziland
Gambia, The Senegal Congo, Dem Tanzania Malawi Zambia
Ghana Sierra Leone Congo, Rep Uganda Mauritius Zimbabwe
Guinea Togo Equ Guinea Mozambique
Guinea-Bissau Gabon
São Tom and Prín
























Benin 5.8 3.2 Armenia -4.0 1.6 Albania -5.3 -1.2 Australia 0.5 -2.6
Burkina Faso 0.5 -2.9 Bangladesh 0.2 2.2 Algeria 12.4 9.9 Austria -2.1 -3.0
Burundi 5.7 4.6 Bhutan -1.1 -12.3 Angola -4.8 1.6 Belgium -1.2 -2.4
Cent Afr Republic -6.8 -9.5 Bolivia 4.9 5.9 Argentina 2.8 1.4 Canada -1.3 -3.2
Chad -8.7 -4.0 Cabo Verde 0.3 -6.5 Azerbaijan 0.7 -1.0 Chile -1.1 1.9
Comoros 5.5 -1.8 Cameroon 1.3 3.3 Belarus 3.1 3.7 Croatia -2.5 -3.9
Guinea -5.4 -2.3 Congo, Rep 14.3 14.7 Bosnia and Herz 0.0 -2.1 Cyprus -5.2 -5.7
Guinea-Bissau 3.2 -1.4 Cote d'Ivoire 2.3 -0.2 Botswana 9.3 7.0 Czech Republic -0.8 -1.6
Haiti -0.1 -4.7 El Salvador -2.6 -1.7 Brazil 0.6 4.6 Estonia 0.7 -0.7
Liberia 11.9 0.4 Ghana -5.6 6.3 Bulgaria 0.4 -3.2 Finland 6.2 -2.0
Madagascar 0.7 -3.0 Guatemala -5.3 -0.9 Colombia -3.7 0.6 France 2.2 -2.2
Malawi 0.8 1.6 Honduras -2.5 -1.8 Costa Rica -0.4 1.9 Germany -1.9 -4.9
Mali 2.9 1.6 India -0.1 2.1 Dom Republic -2.9 1.3 Greece 1.5 -10.6
Mozambique 1.8 1.1 Indonesia -3.1 -0.6 Ecuador 10.9 5.1 Hungary 3.0 -1.4
Nepal 1.0 -4.4 Kenya 0.7 2.7 Equ Guinea 4.8 15.5 Ireland -4.4 -2.1
Niger 3.4 1.0 Kyrgyz Republic 3.1 -0.6 Gabon -4.8 2.7 Israel -3.5 -2.0
Senegal 2.0 -1.9 Lao PDR 2.2 0.7 Georgia -2.9 0.4 Italy -1.3 -4.9
Sierra Leone 1.3 3.2 Lesotho 20.7 17.9 Guyana 6.7 2.2 Japan -2.4 -6.3
Tanzania 0.4 0.7 Mauritania -3.8 -6.5 Iran -4.3 -2.6 Korea -2.4 -3.7
Togo 10.0 3.7 Moldova -0.5 1.7 Iraq 19.0 26.7 Kuwait 27.0 38.7
Uganda 0.5 4.1 Morocco -4.5 -2.6 Jamaica 1.0 -8.1 Latvia 0.4 -2.5
Zimbabwe 6.3 5.9 Nicaragua -1.5 0.1 Jordan -3.9 -6.0 Lithuania -1.3 -1.0
Nigeria -4.3 2.7 Kazakhstan -3.7 2.3 Luxembourg -2.1 0.3
Pakistan -6.8 -1.5 Lebanon -8.0 -0.5 Malta -2.5 0.3
Philippines -5.8 -3.0 Malaysia 0.0 -0.2 Netherlands 0.9 -1.6
Sri Lanka -2.0 1.7 Mauritius -2.6 -1.8 New Zealand -3.3 -5.7
Sudan -5.1 -4.0 Mexico 0.4 1.0 Norway -0.1 -5.3
Swaziland 13.4 16.1 Panama 0.2 -0.3 Oman 21.9 29.2
Tajikistan 7.1 5.6 Paraguay 1.2 -0.4 Poland -0.1 0.4
Tunisia -3.7 1.2 Peru -1.4 0.9 Portugal 1.1 -3.4
Ukraine 0.7 1.1 Romania -1.1 0.9 Saudi Arabia 16.6 24.9
Zambia -7.5 3.6 Russia 4.1 3.1 Slovak Republic 0.4 -1.0
Serbia 1.3 -0.7 Slovenia -2.5 -2.4
South Africa -4.0 -0.3 Spain 0.1 -1.2
Thailand -1.9 -3.2 Switzerland -0.1 -2.9
Turkey -3.6 -0.4 Trin and Tobago 10.0 12.7
United Kingdom -3.4 -1.9
United States 0.2 -2.3
Uruguay -0.5 0.3




Table 16.1: Countries with recessions 
 
Table 16.2: Countries with growth slowdowns 
 
  
Argentina El Salvador Haiti Lithuania Slovenia
Armenia Estonia Hungary Luxembourg Spain
Austria Finland Ireland Mexico Trin and Tobago
Belgium France Italy Netherlands Turkey
Botswana Gabon Jamaica New Zealand Ukraine
Canada Georgia Japan Norway United Kingdom
Croatia Germany Kuwait Portugal United States
Czech Republic Greece Latvia Russia Zimbabwe
Countries where real GDP fell below its 2007 level
Argentina Cent Afr Republic Guatemala Lithuania Romania
Armenia Chile Guyana Luxembourg Russia
Australia Colombia Honduras Madagascar Serbia
Austria Costa Rica Hungary Mauritius Slovak Republic
Belgium Croatia Indonesia Mexico Slovenia
Benin Czech Republic Ireland Moldova South Africa
Bolivia Dom Republic Israel Netherlands Spain
Bosnia and Herz El Salvador Italy New Zealand Sri Lanka
Botswana Estonia Jamaica Nicaragua Sudan
Brazil Finland Japan Norway Switzerland
Bulgaria France Kazakhstan Panama Tajikistan
Cambodia Gabon Kenya Peru Turkey
Cameroon Georgia Korea Philippines Ukraine
Canada Germany Kuwait Poland United Kingdom
Cabo Verde Greece Latvia Portugal United States




Table 17.1: Determinants of cumulative cost of the Great Recession (levels) 
 
 
Table 17.2: Determinants of cumulative cost of the Great Recession (growth) 
 






Fiscal Gap in 2007 -0.3**
(0.12)
Debt Ratio in 2007 -0.01
(0.02)
Size Stimulus (hat) -0.1*
(0.04)
Constant -6.0*** -5.2* -0.1 -3.7
(3.39) (4.87) (0.61) (4.51)
Number of  countries 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.24 0.94















Fiscal Gap in 2007 -0.4***
(0.07)
Debt Ratio in 2007 0.02
(0.06)
Size Stimulus (hat) -0.1*
(0.06)
Constant 0.3 1.0 -1.0 8.2
(2.16) (2.28) (0.57) (4.51)
Number of  countries 75 75 75 75
R-squared 0.81 0.80 0.37 0.36












Annexes Chapter 2:  
 





Table 1: Calibration initial steady state 
 
1. Fixed a priori 
  Repres. Aiyagari Entrep.  
Relative risk aversion 𝜎𝜎 1.5 1.5 1.5 Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999) 
External finance premium 𝜓𝜓 . . 2% Spread (Baa - TR10) 1990-2007 
Annual depreciation rate 𝛿𝛿 6% 6% 6% Stokey and Rebelo (1995) 
Capital income share 𝛼𝛼 0.36 0.36 0.36 Kitao (2008) 
Growth deterministic trend 𝛾𝛾 1.02 1.02 1.02 Long run growth in CBO projections 
Share of output entrepreneurs 𝑣𝑣 . . 0.15 Atkensons and Kehoe (2005) 
Curvature of the labor supply 𝜙𝜙 3 3 3 Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber (2011) 
Persistence labor prod. shock 𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒 . 0.91 0.91 Floden and Lindé (2001) 
Persistence entrep. ability shock 𝜌𝜌𝑧𝑧 . . 0.91 Floden and Lindé (2001) 
St. dev. labor prod. shock 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 . 0.206 0.206 Floden and Lindé (2001) 
 
2. Calibrated to match selected targets 
  Repres. Aiyagari Entrep.  
Other non-interest spending 𝑓𝑓/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% Spending defense, justice, science in 2007 
Transfers 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 12% 12% 12% Social spending in 2007 
Debt to GDP ratio 𝐵𝐵/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 36% 36% 36% Debt in hands of the public in 2007 
Consumption tax 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% Revenues excise taxes 0.47% in 2007 
Payroll tax 𝜏𝜏ℎ 9.8% 9.8% 10.4% Revenues payroll tax 6.26% in 2007 
Income tax 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 17.3% 17.8% 16.7% Satisfy government’s budget constraint initial ss 
Relative value of leisure 𝜌𝜌 0.142 0.411 0.451 Such that ℎ𝑤𝑤���� = 1/3 for workers initial ss 
Subjective discount factor 𝛽𝛽 0.976 0.958 0.951 Such that 𝑝𝑝 = 3% initial ss 
Tightness collateral constraint 𝜆𝜆 . . 1.4 Leverage= 0.38 Non-Corp. sector 1990-2007 
Mean labor prod. shock 𝑥𝑥_𝜃𝜃 . 0.937 0.91 Such that ?̅?𝜃 =1 for workers initial ss 
Mean entrep. ability shock 𝑥𝑥_𝑧𝑧 . . 0.004 Such that % of entrep. = 11.5% initial ss 
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Figure 1: Long term projections from CBO 
  
  
Note: The projections are taken from the Alternative Scenario in the 2011 Long Term 
Budget Outlook of CBO. The revenues and primary expenditures correspond to the 
federal government and are presented as a percentage of GDP. The classification of the 
primary expenditures between transfers and non-interest spending is presented in Table 
2. Since the explosive path projected by CBO cannot be used for the simulations, I 



















































































Figure 2: Effect of debt in equilibrium prices 
  
   
Note: The government’s debt is expressed as a fraction of GDP in the horizontal axis. r 
is the gross risk-free rate, w is the gross wage rate per unit of labor efficiency, 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 is the 













































Figure 3: Effect of debt in real variables 
  
   
  
Note: The government’s debt is expressed as a fraction of GDP in the horizontal axis. 𝐾𝐾 
is the aggregate stock of capital used for production, 𝐿𝐿 is the aggregate labor efficiency 
units used for production, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 is the aggregate production, and 𝐶𝐶 is aggregate 
consumption. ℎ� is the average fraction of time spent working and %𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 is the 
























































Figure 4: Effect of debt in the corporate sector 
  
 
Note: The government’s debt is expressed as a fraction of GDP in the horizontal 
axis. 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶  is the labor efficiency units used for production in the corporate sector, 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶 is 
the stock of capital used for production in the corporate sector, and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶  is the 
production from the corporate sector. Aggregate production 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the sum of the 
aggregate production from the entrepreneurial sector 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 and the corporate 









































Figure 5: Effect of debt in the entrepreneurial sector 
  
 
Note: The government’s debt is expressed as a fraction of GDP in the horizontal 
axis. 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒 is the aggregate labor efficiency units used for production in the 
entrepreneurial sector, 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 is the aggregate stock of capital used for production in the 






























Table 3: Thresholds for the entrepreneurial decision 
 B=0% B=100% B=200% 
𝑧𝑧2_𝜃𝜃1 0.141 0.121 0.081 
𝑧𝑧3_𝜃𝜃1 0.06 0.05 0.04 
𝑧𝑧2_𝜃𝜃2 0.383 0.322 0.201 
𝑧𝑧3_𝜃𝜃2 0.101 0.091 0.067 
𝑧𝑧3_𝜃𝜃3 0.181 0.161 0.121 
𝑧𝑧3_𝜃𝜃4 0.403 0.362 0.242 
𝑧𝑧3_𝜃𝜃5 1.349 1.148 0.631 
 
Note: This table shows the minimum asset holdings, for different combinations of the 




Figure 6: Effect of debt in welfare 
 
Note: The government’s debt is expressed as a fraction of GDP in the horizontal 
axis. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is defined as the permanent percentage increase in the consumption of all 
agents, holding leisure unchanged, that would result in the same average utility as in 















Figure 7: Interest rate determination 
 
Note: The equilibrium net interest rate in the representative agent model  𝑅𝑅0 equals 
the inverse of the subjective discount factor and is not a function of the the stock of 
debt. The equilibrium  net interest rate in the model with heterogeneity and 
entrepreneurship 𝑅𝑅1 is determined by the marginal product of capital in the corporate 
sector. The stock of capital used in the corporate sector 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶 is the residual of the 
aggregate asset holdings 𝐴𝐴 after the financing needs from the government 𝐵𝐵 and the 
entrepreneurial sector 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 are covered. The equilibrium net interest rate in the model 
without entrepreneurship 𝑅𝑅2 is determined by the marginal product of capital in the 
corporate sector (there is no entrepreneurial sector). The stock of capital used in the 
corporate sector 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶 is the residual of the aggregate asset holdings 𝐴𝐴 after the 
financing needs from the government 𝐵𝐵 are covered. As the debt rises, the 
equilibrium interest rate in the incomplete markets economy increases. But the rise in 
the interest rate is bounded because as it approaches the interest rate of the complete 
markets economy from below, aggregate asset holdings tend to infinity. 
 
𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 + 𝐵𝐵 
 
























Figure 8: Decomposition of the effect of debt on welfare by wealth percentiles 
  
Note: The wealth percentiles are presented in the horizontal axis. Each series 
represents the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 by wealth percentiles for different levels of the debt to GDP ratio. 
The 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 by wealth percentiles is defined the permanent percentage increase in the 
consumption of all agents in a certain wealth percentile, holding leisure unchanged, 
that would result in the same average utility of the agents in the same wealth 
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Figure 9: Model simulations – fiscal variables 
   
  
Note: 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 corresponds to the primary spending projections from CBO, the 
model simulations assume that primary expenditures stabilize in 2030. 𝐵𝐵 is the debt in 
the hands of the public as a percentage of GDP, 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 is the income tax, 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 are 
the government’s revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP and 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 is the 
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B=69% B=100% B=150% B=200% 
 
Debt to GDP 36% 69% 100% 150% 200% 
Real interest rate 3.0% 3.7% 3.8% 4.1% 5.3% 
Government revenues percent of 
GDP 18.9% 26.4% 27.6% 29.5% 33.6% 
Transfers percent of GDP 12% 17.4% 17.4% 17.4% 17.4% 
Other non-interest spending 
percent of GDP 5.9% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 
Primary expenditures percent of 
GDP 17.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 
Primary surplus percent of GDP 1.0% 2.5% 3.7% 5.6% 9.7% 
Personal income tax rate 16.7% 26.0% 26.6% 28.3% 30.5% 
 
Note: This table shows a steady state comparison between the initial calibration and 





Figure 10: Model simulations – macroeconomic variables 
  
   
   
Note:  r is the gross risk-free rate, w is the gross wage rate per unit of labor efficiency, 
𝑌𝑌 is the aggregate production, and 𝐶𝐶 is aggregate consumption. ℎ� is the average fraction 
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Figure 11: Model simulations – corporate sector 
  
 
Note: 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶  is the labor efficiency units used for production in the corporate sector, 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶 is 
the stock of capital used for production in the corporate sector, and 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶  is the production 
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Figure 12: Model Simulations – entrepreneurial sector 
  
 
Note: 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒 is the aggregate labor efficiency units used for production in the 
entrepreneurial sector, 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒 is the aggregate stock of capital used for production in the 
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Figure 13: Model simulations – welfare effects 
 
Note: This figure shows the changes in welfare that result from stabilizing the debt to 
GDP ratio at different levels. 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 is the permanent increase in consumption required 
such that the average welfare in the steady state from each scenario equals the average 
welfare when the debt to GDP is stabilized at 69% (its level in 2011). 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓 is the 
required permanent increase in consumption, starting from the first period of the 
transition to the new steady state, such that the average welfare associated from the 
dynamics of each scenario equals the average welfare from the dynamics of the  

















i. Representative agent model 
The production function of the representative firm in period t is: 
     𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) = (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼(𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼   
  (1) 
The aggregate productivity of labor 𝜔𝜔 evolves as a linear deterministic trend with 
growth rate 𝛾𝛾: 
      𝜔𝜔′ = 𝛾𝛾𝜔𝜔    
  (2) 
The utility for an agent in period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
    𝑠𝑠(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = (𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝜙𝜙)1−𝜎𝜎 (1 − 𝜎𝜎� )  
  (3) 
The firm chooses its demand for inputs in order to maximize its profits: 
    𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡  𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 − (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡   
  (4) 
From the FOC, the factor prices satisfy the traditional marginal productivity 
conditions: 
     𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡)    
  (5) 
     𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿    
  (6) 
Since the problem has a deterministic trend, it is not stationary and requires the same 
transformation used for the benchmark model. However, to avoid complicating the 
notation I omit this transformation, although the problem can only be solved in its 
stationary form. 
The recursive formulation of the consumer’s problem for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
   𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡≥0 𝑠𝑠(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1)  
  (7) 
   𝑓𝑓. 𝑡𝑡.    (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)(1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡  + 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 −
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1   (8) 
     𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡    
  (9) 
From the FOC of this problem: 
     𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡 + 1)   
  (10) 







  (11) 
The aggregate supply of capital is defined as the residual from aggregate savings after 
the government’s financing needs are covered. Then, equilibrium in the capital 
market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
      𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡    




Equilibrium in the labor market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
      ℎ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡    
  (13) 
The government’s budget constraint for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
 𝜏𝜏ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +
 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  (14)  
The parameterization of this model is presented in Table 1. As in the benchmark 
model the coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎𝜎 is 1.5, the annual depreciation rate 𝛿𝛿 
is 6%, the capital income share 𝛼𝛼 equals 0.36, the rate of growth of the deterministic 
trend 𝛾𝛾 is 1.02, and the curvature of the labor supply 𝜙𝜙 is 3 such that the Frisch 
elasticity is 0.5.  
Other non-interest spending 𝑓𝑓 is calibrated to be 5.9percent of GDP, the initial stock 
of debt 𝐵𝐵 is calibrated to be 36percent of GDP, the value of government’s lump-sum 
transfer 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 is calibrated to be of 12percent of GDP, the tax rate on consumption 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 is 
and labor 𝜏𝜏ℎ  are calibrated to match the revenues of the federal government in 2007 
from the excise taxes and the Social Security contributions. The income tax 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 is 
selected to satisfy the government’s budget constraint in the initial steady state. 𝜌𝜌 is 
chosen such that on average workers spend 1/3 of their time working in the initial 
steady state. The subjective discount factor 𝛽𝛽 is selected, so that the equilibrium risk 





ii. Aiyagari model 
Agents are ex-ante identical. There is no aggregate uncertainty, but each period they 
receive idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. Markets are incomplete because 
the agents can only trade assets with returns that are not state contingent. As a result, 
no insurance is available for the idiosyncratic shocks and individuals accumulate 
assets 𝑓𝑓 to partially self-insure. The shocks follow an autoregressive Markov 
processes of order one that evolves according to the transition matrix Γ = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃′|𝜃𝜃). 
Ex-post, agents are heterogeneous with respect to their individual asset holdings 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 
their labor productivity 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. 
The production function of the representative firm in period t is: 
     𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) = (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼(𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼   
  (1) 
The aggregate productivity of labor 𝜔𝜔 evolves as a linear deterministic trend with 
growth rate 𝛾𝛾: 
      𝜔𝜔′ = 𝛾𝛾𝜔𝜔    
  (2) 
The utility for an agent in period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
    𝑠𝑠(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = (𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝜙𝜙)1−𝜎𝜎 (1 − 𝜎𝜎� )  
  (3) 
The firm chooses its demand for inputs in order to maximize its profits: 
    𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡  𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 − (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡   
  (4) 
From the FOC, the factor prices satisfy the traditional marginal productivity 
conditions: 
     𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡)    
  (5) 
     𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿    
  (6) 
Since the problem has a deterministic trend, it is not stationary and requires the same 
transformation used for the benchmark model. However, to avoid complicating the 
notation I omit this transformation, although the problem can only be solved in its 
stationary form. 
The recursive formulation of the consumer’s problem for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
   𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡≥0 𝑠𝑠(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽∑Γ𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡+1)
  (7) 
   𝑓𝑓. 𝑡𝑡.    (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)(1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + trt + 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 −
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1  (8) 
     𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡    
  (9) 
From the FOC of this problem: 











The consumption-saving decision is determined by a policy rule 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡), that 
together with the labor supply decision, and the transition probabilities of the labor 
productivity shock Γ, induce the distribution of agents in this economy 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡). 
Aggregate asset holdings 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 are computed by integrating over the asset holdings of 
each household: 
     𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = ∫𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)    
  (11) 
Likewise, aggregate consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, and transfers are 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 are found by integrating 
over all agents. 
The aggregate labor supply 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is found by integrating over the individual labor 
supplies in efficiency units: 
     𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = ∫ℎ𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡  𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)   
  (12) 
The aggregate supply of capital is computed as the residual from aggregate savings 
after the government’s financing needs are covered. Thus, equilibrium in the capital 
market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
      𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡    
  (13) 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that for every 𝑡𝑡: 
      𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡    
  (14) 
The government’s budget constraint for period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
 𝜏𝜏ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏ℎ)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +
 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  (15) 
The parameterization of this model is presented in Table 1. As in the benchmark 
model the coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎𝜎 is 1.5, the annual depreciation rate 𝛿𝛿 
is 6%, the capital income share 𝛼𝛼 equals 0.36, the rate of growth of the deterministic 
trend 𝛾𝛾 is 1.02, and the curvature of the labor supply 𝜙𝜙 is 3 such that the Frisch 
elasticity is 0.5. The natural logarithm of the labor productivity process is 
approximated with a five state Markov process, with a persistence of 0.91, and a 
standard deviation of 0.21. 
Other non-interest spending 𝑓𝑓 is calibrated to be 5.9percent of GDP, the initial stock 
of debt 𝐵𝐵 is calibrated to be 36percent of GDP, the value of government’s lump-sum 
transfer 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 is calibrated to be of 12percent of GDP, the tax rate on consumption 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 is 
and labor 𝜏𝜏ℎ  are calibrated to match the revenues of the federal government in 2007 
from the excise taxes and the Social Security contributions. The income tax 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 is 
selected to satisfy the government’s budget constraint in the initial steady state. 𝜌𝜌 is 
chosen such that on average workers spend 1/3 of their time working in the initial 
steady state. The subjective discount factor 𝛽𝛽 is selected, so that the equilibrium risk 
free rate 𝑝𝑝 in the initial steady state is 3%. The median value of the grid for the labor 
productivity shock 𝑥𝑥_𝜃𝜃 is calibrated such that average productivity of workers in the 
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